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Zusammenfassung III 
Zusammenfassung  
Wird ein Objekt als eigener Besitz wahrgenommen, so erhöht dies die Erinnerungswahr-
scheinlichkeit für dieses Objekt in einem anschließenden Gedächtnistest im Vergleich zu 
einem Objekt, das zu einer anderen Person gehört (mere ownership-Effekt oder „Effekt 
des bloßen Besitzens“; Cunningham et al., 2008). Dies gilt auch, wenn die Zuweisung 
völlig willkürlich geschieht. Beim mere ownership-Effekt erfordert die Besitzzuwei-
sungsaufgabe kein bewusstes Nachdenken über die Stimuli oder deren Bezug zum Selbst, 
im Gegensatz zum etablierten Selbstreferenzeffekt (Rogers, Kuiper & Kirker, 1977). Die-
ser bekannte Gedächtnisvorteil durch selbstreferenzielle Verarbeitung wird gemeinhin im 
Rahmen der Verarbeitungstiefetheorie interpretiert (Craik & Lockhart, 1972), nämlich 
als Folge “tieferer” und stärker elaborierter semantischer Verarbeitung zum Enkodie-
rungszeitpunkt. Von theoretischem Interesse ist die Frage ob der mere ownership-Effekt 
auf eine ähnliche Weise erklärt werden kann. In einer Reihe von acht Experimenten 
wurde der mere ownership-Effekt genauer untersucht. Dabei wurden Rahmenbedingun-
gen für das Auftreten des Effekts, sowie Unterschiede und Ähnlichkeiten zum Selbstref-
erenzeffekt geprüft. Das Hauptaugenmerk lag hierbei auf der Rolle semantischer Verar-
beitung für die Entstehung des mere ownership-Effekts, insbesondere auf semantischer 
Elaboration und Organisation als Komponenten semantischer Verarbeitung (Einstein & 
Hunt, 1981). Nach zwei erfolgreichen Replikationen (Experiment 1+ 2, gescheiterte Rep-
likation in Pilotstudie) untersuchten wir, ob der mere ownership-Effekt von semantischer 
Verarbeitung oder Verarbeitbarkeit im weitesten Sinne abhängt (Experiment 3): Es zeigte 
sich kein mere ownership-Effekt für bedeutungslose Pseudoobjekte. Mithilfe einer Enko-
dieraufgabe ohne verbale Beschriftungen, untersuchten wir, ob sich Spuren semantischer 
Elaboration in einer späteren Testphase nachweisen ließen. Wir fanden Hinweise für 
spontane semantische Verarbeitung unabhängig von der Selbst- oder Fremdzuweisung 
(Experiment 4). Mittels einer Verarbeitungstiefemanipulation testeten wir den Einfluss 
semantischer Organisation: Hier verschwand der mere ownership-Effekt, wenn der 
Selbst-/Fremdzuweisungsaufgabe zusätzlich eine semantische Klassifikationsaufgabe 
hinzugefügt wurde, blieb aber bestehen, wenn eine perzeptuelle Aufgabe hinzukam (Ex-
periment 5). In einem weiteren Test für die Rolle semantischer Organisation zeigte sich 
erhöhtes Clustering für dem Selbst zugewiesene Stimuli im Vergleich zu einer anderen 
Person zugewiesen Stimuli in der freien Wiedergabe (Experiment 6). In einem letzten 
Experiment überprüften wir die zusätzliche Frage ob eine implizite, eher indirekte Ver-
bindung zum Selbst ausreicht, um einen mere ownership-Effekt zu erzeugen. Dazu wurde 
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das Lernmaterial im Kontext einer perzeptuellen Matching-Aufgabe präsentiert, die typi-
scherweise zu einer Selbstpriorisierung führt (Sui, He & Humphreys, 2012; Experiment 
7). Trotz eines klaren Selbstpriorisierungseffekts zeigte sich in einem unangekündigten 
Rekognitionstest kein Vorteil für Objekte, die konsistent mit einer mit dem Selbst asso-
ziierten Form dargeboten worden waren. Zusammenfassend lässt sich sagen, dass der 
mere ownership-Effekt von einer expliziten Zuweisung zum Selbst sowie einer zumindest 
prinzipiellen semantischen “Verarbeitbarkeit”, das heißt, von sinnvollem Stimulusmate-
rial abhängig zu sein scheint. Insbesondere fanden sich Belege dafür, dass Organisation 
ein treibender Mechanismus hinter dem mere ownership-Effekt zu sein scheint. Möglich-
erweise basiert der Effekt auf dem Organisationsprinzip der Einteilung in “ich” versus 
“nicht ich”. 
 
Schlüsselbegriffe: Selbst und Gedächtnis; Besitz; mere ownership; Verarbeitungstiefe; 
Selbstreferenz; semantische Elaboration; Organisation; Rekognition; freie Wiedergabe; 
Selbstpriorisierung; soziale Kognition 
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Abstract 
If an object becomes perceived as one’s own possession, even through arbitrary assign-
ment, it is more likely to be remembered in a subsequent memory test than an object that 
belongs to someone else (Cunningham et al., 2008). Importantly, the ownership task does 
not require conscious reflection on the stimuli or their relationship to the self, as is the 
case for the well-established self-reference effect (Rogers, Kuiper & Kirker, 1977). This 
memory advantage produced by self-referential encoding is typically interpreted in terms 
of the levels of processing framework (Craik & Lockhart, 1972) – namely, as a result of 
“deeper” and more elaborate semantic processing during encoding. A question of theo-
retical interest is whether this mere ownership effect can be accounted for in similar terms 
as the self-reference effect (Rogers, Kuiper & Kirker, 1977). This memory advantage pro-
duced by self-referential encoding is typically interpreted in terms of the levels of pro-
cessing framework (Craik & Lockhart, 1972)  . In a series of eight experiments, we in-
vestigated the mere ownership effect more closely, testing some of its boundary condi-
tions, as well as points of similarity and divergence between the mere ownership effect 
and the self-reference effect. The main focus was the role of semantic processing in pro-
ducing the mere ownership effect, especially with regards to its components of semantic 
elaboration and semantic organization (Einstein & Hunt, 1981). Following successful 
replication (Experiments 1 & 2, but see the pilot study for a failed replication), we inves-
tigated whether the mere ownership effect was contingent upon semantic processing (Ex-
periment 3). For meaningless pseudo objects, there was no mere ownership effect. Testing 
for a potential role of semantic elaboration using meaningful stimuli in an encoding task 
without verbal labels, we found evidence of spontaneous semantic processing irrespective 
of self- or other-assignment (Experiment 4). When semantic organization was manipu-
lated, the mere ownership effect vanished if a semantic classiﬁcation task was added to 
the self/other assignment but persisted for a perceptual classiﬁcation task (Experiment 5). 
Testing for semantic organization once more, we found greater clustering of self-assigned 
than of other-assigned items in free recall (Experiment 6). In a final experiment, we ad-
dressed the additional question of whether a more implicit, indirect connection to the self 
could produce a mere ownership effect-like memory advantage. To this end, we presented 
to-be-learned objects in the context of the perceptual matching task known to lead to self-
prioritization (Sui, He & Humphreys, 2012; Experiment 7). Despite a clear self-prioriti-
zation effect, a subsequent memory test revealed no advantage for objects consistently 
paired with a self-associated shape. Taken together, these results suggest that the mere 
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ownership effect depends on an explicit assignment to the self, as well as semantic “pro-
cessability” of to-be-learned items. Specifically, semantic organization appears to be a 
mechanism behind the mere ownership effect. It could be based on the organizational 
principle of a ‘‘me” versus ‘‘not-me” categorization. 
 
Key words: memory and the self; mere ownership; self-reference; levels of processing; 
semantic elaboration; organization; recognition; recall; self-prioritization; social cogni-
tion  
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1 Introduction 1 
1 Introduction  
1.1 The effect of mere ownership on memory: how a 
connection to the self conveys a cognitive benefit 
“When in the Land of Property think like a propertarian. Dress like one, eat like one, 
act like one, be one.” –Ursula K. LeGuin (1974) 
What does it mean, in cognitive terms, for an object to be considered linked to one’s own 
person? Specifically, is an object that we consider our property represented differently 
simply by virtue of being owned? And if this is the case, how can we tap into the cognitive 
mechanisms that give rise to such an altered representation?  
Indeed, ownership appears to confer a special cognitive status upon an object. It has even 
been proposed that material possessions can be considered an extension of the self (Belk, 
1991). For example, people will tend to like an object better if it is owned by themselves 
(Beggan, 1992). Possessions are also ascribed greater monetary value than items that we 
do not (yet) own. This endowment effect (Thaler, 1980) appears to be driven, at least in 
part, by a feeling of ownership (Morewedge, Shu, Gilbert, & Wilson, 2009).  
From an evolutionary perspective, a special status of possessions makes sense: This view 
assumes that the cognitive system - rather than being a general-purpose “epistemic en-
gine” (Dennett, 1991) - optimized for obtaining accurate information, is adapted to help 
the organism interact with and survive in the surrounding environment. Put pointedly, 
cognition can be thought of as “narcissistic” in that the way information processing oper-
ates is shaped by how said information relates to the organism that processes it (Akins, 
1996). 
Functionalist thinking lends credence to the notion that the self has a special cognitive 
status (for a critical review of this notion, see Gillihan & Farah, 2005). It can be predicted 
that an object will receive preferential processing if it holds relevance for one’s own per-
son. Material possessions, almost by definition, fulfill that criterion. They are relevant to 
our actions, in that they are typically at our disposal to be manipulated or utilized. They 
are furthermore important both to our (physical) thriving in that they constitute resources 
we can exploit, and to our social standing in that they can enable us to communicate 
aspects of our identity to other people. For all these purposes, objects that we already own 
constitute a much better shot at success than objects that we have not (yet) obtained. These 
aforementioned factors give ownership relevance in the Darwinian sense: It is important 
2 1 Introduction 
for us to be able to distinguish between those objects that do belong to us and those that 
do not. Therefore, it stands to reason that our cognitive system would engage with pos-
sessions in a special manner that is either quantitatively or qualitatively (or both) different 
from the way other objects are processed. We might well already be considered denizens 
of the “land of property” (LeGuin, 1974). Its ways of thinking and being seem to come to 
us effortlessly, whereas it is the idea of a planet where the concept of property is alien to 
its people, that I find difficult to imagine.  
 An effect of mere ownership? Introducing the shopping paradigm 
One area in cognitive psychology where this line of functionalist reasoning can be applied 
is memory (Nairne, 2005; Nairne & Pandeirada, 2010; Nairne & Pandeirada, 2016). Does 
ownership convey a special status on a to-be-remembered object? Cunningham, Turk, 
Macdonald, and Macrae (2008) investigated whether the apparent privileged cognitive 
status of possessions extends to the domain of recognition memory. With their “shopping 
paradigm”, they aimed to manipulate ownership in a minimal fashion. In the original im-
plementation of the shopping paradigm, participants were paired up to take part in the 
experiment together. Each participant was then assigned one of two shopping baskets, 
each of which had a different color. Thus, there were two different shopping baskets in 
front of the participant: one which was designated as one’s “own” basket and one which 
belonged to the other participant.  
Participants were instructed to imagine having won a number of goods and to take turns 
drawing from a deck of cards which showed pictures of everyday objects typically avail-
able at a supermarket. Each card was marked with a colored sticker that corresponded to 
either one’s own or the other participant’s shopping basket. Based on this information, 
participants placed each card into either their own or the other participant’s basket (see 
Figure 1). After sorting through the deck, participants performed a surprise recognition 
test indicating whether an object had been part of the deck or not. Results showed that 
recognition performance was superior for objects that had been placed in one’s own bas-
ket. Furthermore, participants were faster to recognize “owned” objects (see Figure 2). 
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This benefit in memory performance is what I mean whenever I use the term mere own-
ership effect (MOE) without qualification in the remainder of this text. In contexts where 
it is important to distinguish this phenomenon from the tendency to rate self-owned items 
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Figure 2. Recognition memory performance and response times from the seminal study by Cunningham et 
al. (2008). The diagram on the left shows recognition memory performance for self-owned as compared to 
other-owned items, the diagram on the right shows decision times for classifying self-owned vs. other-
owned items as old. These graphs illustrate both superior memory performance, i.e. the mere ownership 
effect, and faster response times for self-owned items. 
Figure 1. A graphic illustration of a trial in a computerized version of the shopping paradigm. The colored 
dot above the object indicates its owner. From Cunningham, Brady van-den-Bos, & Turk, 2011. 
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more positively described by (Beggan, 1992), which I will label the evaluative mere own-
ership effect (eMOE), I will refer to it as the mnemonic mere ownership effect (mMOE) 
specifically. 
Since in the study by Cunningham et al. (2008), ownership was randomly assigned, it can 
be assumed that the self-assigned and other-assigned objects did not differ in how desir-
able they were to the participants. Furthermore, the MOE occurred regardless of whether 
it was the “owner” themselves or the other participant who had placed the object in the 
basket.1 Thus, this memory advantage can be interpreted as a consequence of ownership, 
specifically, not of preference or performing an action. 
The mMOE effect has since been replicated a number of times (van den Bos, Cunning-
ham, Conway, & Turk, 2010; Cunningham et al., 2011; Turk, van Bussel, Waiter, & 
Macrae, 2011; Krigolson, Hassall, Balcom, & Turk, 2013; Sui & Humphreys, 2013). 
Thus, it seems a solid conclusion that imagined ownership of an item indeed enhances 
our memory for that item. 
The conditions under which an MOE occurs are remarkably simple. The encoding task 
does not make strong cognitive demands of the participants. Rather, the ownership as-
signment is a straightforward binary classification task. The correct response is deter-
mined strictly by a color cue that is not a feature of the stimulus itself. In fact, any intrinsic 
properties of the material are task-irrelevant. Since the recognition test is not announced 
before retrieval, there is little incentive to make an effort to encode the material. Partici-
pants are not required to deliberate consciously on either the meaning or the attributes of 
the stimulus objects themselves, nor on the relation between the objects and their owner. 
Furthermore, the items are assigned randomly and item lists are balanced across partici-
pants, making it implausible that the difference has anything to do with the stimulus ob-
jects having a greater significance or special meaning for the participants prior to the 
experiment. Arguably, the significance of the stimulus objects is further reduced by the 
fictitious nature of ownership: Participants are aware that the stimulus objects will not 
actually pass into their possession. Not even the social situation needs to be realistic: The 
other person to whom the objects are assigned can be purely imaginary (van den Bos et 
al., 2010). 
                                                 
1 It is somewhat surprising that the factor of who placed the object had no effect on memory in Cunning-
ham et al. (2008), despite the typical finding that self-performed actions are remembered better than 
actions that we observe being performed by others (e.g., Zimmer, 2001). 
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Yet even under experimental conditions which serve to create only a rudimentary owner-
ship2 situation that lacks concreteness, choice, personal relevance, and realism, and using 
a task that does not call for any sort of effortful or sophisticated encoding effort, there is 
an MOE. The assignment of an item to the self is sufficient to produce a subsequent 
memory advantage: recognition memory performance for self-owned items is consist-
ently superior to recognition memory performance for other-owned items. 
These attributes seem to justify characterizing the MOE as a “mere” ownership effect, 
that is, a consequence of ownership, or assignment to the self, per se. At first glance, the 
phenomenon does not appear to be reducible to other more general mechanisms of 
memory encoding, at least not if those mechanisms involve a great deal of complexity 
and conscious deliberation. Rather, it appears to suggest that there is something qualita-
tively unique about the self. Some accounts view basic cognitive operations such as per-
ception and affect, rather than more deliberate “higher order” cognition as most closely 
tied to the self (e.g., Northoff, 2015). Others have postulated that the self constitutes the 
central foundation for integrating different types of information and processing, enabling 
such higher-order cognition in the first place (Sui & Humphreys, 2015).  
 The supposed uniqueness of the self and the potential 
reducibility of the mere ownership effect 
Krigolson et al. (2013) found that a fictitious gamble for a self-assigned item involved 
the fronto-medial reward system more strongly than gambling for an other-assigned item. 
Their results suggest that the mere act of linking a simple stimulus to the self produces 
processing advantages for this stimulus. In a similar vein, Sui, He, and Humphreys (2012) 
found a perceptual self-prioritization effect for newly learned associations between the 
self and arbitrary simple objects (e.g., a triangle) as compared to associations between 
others and simple objects. Since the pairing of self and object was completely arbitrary 
and did not require any elaboration on the meaning of the stimuli, it seems implausible 
that this effect was driven by more extensive cognitive processing of the kind which typ-
ically produces strong memory. While this view has been challenged (Sui & Humphreys, 
                                                 
2What precisely constitutes the “minimal” character of an ownership situation is, of course, open to discus-
sion. Different conceptual aspects and operationalizations might be taken into account when designing 
such a task. For example, the ownership situation is designed to be “minimal” in some senses of the 
word (e.g. no actual ownership, no choice, no self-knowledge needed). However, it cannot be called 
minimal in the sense of being implicit: Ownership is the task-relevant dimension at encoding, and this 
is clearly spelled out in the instructions. While participants do not need to think deeply about the self 
and retrieve specific information about their person, they are required to hold the self-other-distinction 
consciously in mind to perform the task. 
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2013), it remains possible that the MOE is simply a function of known mechanisms of 
long-term memory, making the self special in at best a quantitative sense. In fact, this is 
the favored explanation of a phenomenon which is strongly reminiscent of the MOE: the 
self-reference effect (SRE; Rogers, Kuiper, & Kirker, 1977; for a meta-analytical over-
view, see Symons & Johnson, 1997). The SRE is the finding that trait adjectives that were 
encoded with regard to whether or not they describe the participant tend to be remembered 
better than adjectives processed with regard to an alternative semantic task (e.g., “is syn-
onymous with?”). The self-reference effect is commonly interpreted as an instance of 
“especially deep” encoding within a levels of processing framework (Craik & Lockhart, 
1972). According to this theoretical framework, the strength of later memory traces de-
pends on the type of operations performed on the stimulus material during encoding. It is 
assumed that certain forms of processing are “deeper” than others and therefore, result in 
better subsequent memory performance. For example, if a stimulus can be meaningfully 
connected to extant knowledge structures in long-term memory that contain abundant and 
readily accessible information, it will be more likely to be retrieved. This process of 
meaningfully linking new information to information already stored in long-term memory 
is known as semantic elaboration. In addition, memory performance is thought to be in-
fluenced by how well the to-be-learned material can be structured, that is, how easy it is 
to organize the encoding material into meaningful categories (Einstein & Hunt, 1980). 
According to this view, the advantage produced by a self-referential encoding task is 
simply due to the existence of a rich and easily available knowledge structure related to 
the self or to the meaningful organizational principle offered by the self (Klein & 
Kihlstrom, 1986; Klein & Loftus, 1988). This seems plausible, both on account of the self 
being a highly relevant and highly familiar concept about which we have accumulated 
extensive information over the course of our lives and on account of empirical evidence 
suggesting a role for both of these memory processes (Klein & Loftus, 1988; Symons 
& Johnson, 1997). It is possible that the MOE can be explained in a similar way and that 
mechanisms that play a part in producing the SRE also contribute to a phenomenon that 
likewise establishes an explicit connection between stimulus material and the self via task 
demands. Therefore, our main aim was to investigate whether the MOE is best accounted 
for in terms of such “deep” types of semantic processing (see Chapter 2.2). 
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 Accessing the self: What kind of connection does the mere 
ownership effect need? 
Apart from the question of the reducibility of the MOE to more general mechanisms of 
memory, there is another sense in which such an advantage might be “mere” or basic: 
Namely, in how implicit such a connection to the self can be and whether drawing a dis-
tinction of the self vs. the other is explicitly relevant to the encoding task and whether 
linking the stimulus objects to the self in a non-conceptual way can produce an MOE. For 
example, what if the connection to the self was purely incidental? Turk, Cunningham, 
and Macrae (2008) found that trait adjectives were more likely to be remembered when 
they had been presented in close proximity to a self- as compared to an other-relevant 
label, even though this dimension was not task-relevant. One interesting question is 
whether pairing stimulus objects with self- vs. other-related shapes in the perceptual 
matching paradigm (Sui et al., 2012) might produce an MOE. 
 
1.2 Overview: Is the self special? 
 What is the self? The limits of this dissertation 
While the construct of the self is a rich and controversial source of theory and debate in 
both psychology and philosophy of mind, a comprehensive discussion of this construct 
would be beyond the scope of this dissertation. For instance, the self need not necessarily 
be conceived as a “self-concept” or a knowledge structure which is predominantly ac-
cessed through conscious reflection. Rather, it has been suggested that the self is inti-
mately connected to more basic cognitive functions, such as affect (Northoff, 2015). A 
self is always tied to – or, as some would say, constituted by – a physical body existing 
in a particular space and time. This body allows us to perceive and interact with the phys-
ical world while simultaneously giving us a clear sense of a boundary between what con-
stitutes one’s own self and what instead pertains to the outside world, however permeable 
and ill-defined this boundary may be in reality (Gallagher, 2000; Neisser, 1988). As early 
as 1890, James drew the distinction between “I” and “me”. Here, “I” denotes a conception 
of the self as a subject, distinguishing it from the self as an object, or “me”. The self-as-
object, or “me”, contains information about one’s own person which can be verbally re-
ported and is, at least in principle, accessible from a third-person perspective. As such, 
this self-as-concept might not be qualitatively different from any other concepts in 
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memory. Kihlstrom, Beer, and Klein (2003) have argued precisely that, stating that the “I 
who knows the me is the same I who knows everything else” (p. 69) and that this “me” 
or self-concept only differs from other knowledge structures in a quantitative sense, that 
is, through a richer treasury of information and the fact that self-knowledge is more inti-
mately familiar. On the other hand, “I” or the self as a subject pertains to an acting and 
perceiving self that is situated in, and interacting with, the physical world at a given place 
and time. A subject can be seen as uniquely and exclusively connected to its own actions 
and experiences. That is, another person can describe “me” as a terrific football player 
but “I” has to kick the ball and score. Further refining these conceptions of self , (Neisser, 
1988) distinguished between an “ecological” and a “conceptual” self, among other facets. 
This conceptual distinction between different “selves” or facets of the self suggests that 
there are multiple empirical access routes when investigating self-memory advantages. It 
is plausible, that such “self-systems”, even if distinct, interact closely with each other 
(Boyer, Robbins, & Jack, 2005). In the case of the SRE (Rogers et al., 1977), it seems 
obvious that task demands target the self-as-object: After all, the self-reference task 
means that explicit knowledge about the self has to be retrieved by participants. It is not 
clear, however, if this applies to the MOE to the same extent. Furthermore, even in the 
presence of such task demands, an involvement of other self-facets in producing self-
memory effects cannot be ruled out.  
However, while these different conceptions of self inform my research on the MOE, this 
does not mean that, on the ontological level, a clear answer can be given to the question 
of what “the self” truly is. There is nothing even approaching a consensus on what con-
stitutes a self at the ontological level, or whether it is more apt to speak of multiple selves 
or, indeed, if there even is such a thing as a “self” and how it can be distinguished from 
other things (for further reading on these questions, see, for example, Whiton Calkins, 
1930; Parfit, 1984; Dennett, 1991; Metzinger, 2009; Tauber, 2015; Gertler, 2015; 
Northoff, 2015). For practical purposes, I will eschew involvement in these philosophical 
discussions. Rather than committing to a specific definition of the self as authoritative, I 
pragmatically draw upon theoretical conceptions applicable to cognitive psychology, as 
well as on their empirical operationalizations, as needed. In the context of this research, I 
assume a shared understanding what is implied by the term “self”. Furthermore, I draw a 
similarly pragmatic line for the psychological notion of a “self-concept”. This construct 
has inspired decades of research in both cognitive and social psychology which cannot 
be adequately summarized here. Instead, this dissertation focuses on the MOE and its 
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theoretical implications in the contexts of self-memory advantages more generally, and 
on the levels of processing framework as a tool for explaining these advantages. 
 The scope of this dissertation 
The aim of this dissertation is to shed some light on how a link to the self can bring about 
self-memory advantages. Specifically, the link employed here is ownership3, and the 
memory advantage in question is the MOE.  
To this end, Chapter 2 provides a look at the theoretical questions and current state of 
empirical evidence motivating the research using the shopping paradigm presented in this 
dissertation. I will attempt to more closely dissect the MOE and improve understanding 
of both some of its boundary conditions and the mechanisms driving it. The question “is 
the self special?” (Gillihan & Farah, 2005) may serve as a theme connecting these inquir-
ies. Broadly speaking, I am interested in whether or not self-referential processing can be 
viewed as an instance of more general cognitive processes that also underlie other 
memory phenomena, or whether it is more “special” than that. More precisely, the central 
topic of this work is the question of what it means for the MOE to be “mere“ and whether 
the MOE constitutes evidence for a qualitatively unique cognitive status of the self or is, 
ultimately, reducible to more general mechanisms of memory. 
Chapter 3 presents seven experiments using the shopping paradigm, and thus constitutes 
the main empirical section of this dissertation. There, I present research designed to ad-
dress some of the questions outlined in the previous chapters. A total of seven experiments 
will be presented in detail. This is the main line of empirical research in this thesis and 
puts the MOE in the context of research of other self-memory-biases, most importantly 
the self-reference effect (Rogers et al., 1977; for a meta-analysis, see Symons & Johnson, 
1997). To this end, I will detail and summarize research on and accounts of the SRE, most 
notably levels of processing (Craik & Lockhart, 1972). These theoretical considerations 
are the main motivations behind the pilot study and Experiments 1-6. However, side ques-
tions, such as viable and non-viable procedural details, or the role of a real social other, 
are also addressed. In the pilot experiment, we attempted to replicate both the MOE and 
test whether it extends to semantically meaningless stimuli, but failed to obtain any effect. 
After adjusting the parameters which we suspect were behind this initial null finding, we 
proceed to corroborate evidence for the MOE and to examine the boundary conditions 
                                                 
3However, Experiment 7 should be considered an exception to this. 
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under which the effect occurs. In Experiments 1 and 2, following the parameters of earlier 
shopping paradigm studies more closely, we replicated the basic finding of the MOE, 
using our version of the shopping paradigm introduced by Cunningham et al. (2008). We 
also show that the MOE seems to be independent of whether or not the social situation in 
the learning phase is real. In Experiment 3, we tested if the MOE would still occur when 
semantic processing was impeded by using meaningless stimuli. In Experiment 4, we 
employed a semantic matching task during retrieval to test whether semantic processing 
had taken place during encoding. In Experiment 5, we tested for the role of semantic 
processes in establishing the MOE by using a depth of processing manipulation. The 
MOE disappeared when the ownership assignment was combined with a semantic cate-
gorization task during encoding. In Experiment 6, we tested for the role of semantic or-
ganization in the MOE by investigating the occurrence of clustering in free recall after 
ownership assignment during encoding. Our results suggests that semantic processing, 
specifically semantic organization, is a driver of the MOE and thus, that the mechanisms 
underlying the SRE and the MOE are at least partially overlapping and not exclusive to 
self-referential encoding. The interpretation and implications of these results are more 
closely examined in the general discussion. 
Furthermore, I will contrast the line of inquiry presented in Chapters 2 and 3 with findings 
and explanations of the seemingly more basic self-prioritization effect (Sui et al., 2012) 
which is discussed in Chapter 4. This effect is another observation demonstrating how 
performance in cognitive tasks appears to benefit from self-involvement. Like in the case 
of the SRE, it is worth asking whether the self-prioritization effect can be considered a 
relative of the MOE. Are these two phenomena elicited by the same experimental manip-
ulations? Can they be assumed to be driven by shared mechanisms? The central question 
in this section pertains to the directness of the MOE: Here, I consider the possibility of 
an incidental, less conceptual connection to the self having similar cognitive impact as 
Cunningham et al.'s (2008) ownership manipulation. There already is some research that 
suggests this might be the case (Turk et al., 2008).  
Chapter 5 reports a final experiment designed to address this question. In Experiment 7, 
we combined the presentation of visual objects with a perceptual matching task (Sui et 
al., 2012) which was followed by a recognition memory test. We did not obtain clear 
evidence that a non-conceptual or incidental connection to the self is sufficient to produce 
an MOE and conclude that the MOE is likely distinct from the perceptual self-prioritiza-
tion effect.  
1 Introduction 11 
Finally, in Chapter 6 and 7, I discuss the results of all eight experiments and their theo-
retical implications in depth, as well as consider limitations and open questions that could 
inform further research.  
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2 The mere ownership effect in context: self, 
memory and levels of processing 
“In its widest possible sense, however, a man's self is the sum total of all that he can 
call his, not only his body and his psychic powers, but his clothes and his house, his 
wife and children, his ancestors and friends, his reputation and works, his lands and 
horses, and yacht and bank account. All these things give him the same emotions.”  
– William James (1890) 
2.1 A brief overview of findings on the mere ownership effect 
and the shopping paradigm 
As described in more detail in the introduction, Cunningham et al. (2008) found stronger 
recognition memory performance for objects that had been assigned to the self, as com-
pared to objects that had been assigned to another, even in the absence of complex pro-
cessing requirements or a special connection between the self and the object. 
Since the seminal study by Cunningham et al. (2008) has established the mMOE, the 
phenomenon has been investigated more closely a number of times, using both comput-
erized and non-computerized versions of the shopping paradigm. As mentioned in the 
introduction, the various replications of the MOE suggest that it is indeed a robust phe-
nomenon (van den Bos et al., 2010; Cunningham et al., 2011; Turk, van Bussel, Waiter 
& Macrae, 2011; Krigolson et al., 2013; Sui & Humphreys, 2013). 
Some studies on the MOE focus on specific populations. For example, Cunningham et al. 
(2013) demonstrated an MOE in children as young as four to six years old, in a live-
version of the shopping paradigm that involved a pair of children sorting toys, rather than 
everyday objects. This method could be an alternative to classic self-reference tasks (Rog-
ers et al., 1977) when investigating the development of self-referential processing, as the 
ownership task seems less challenging to children. Regardless of the early manifestation 
of this self-memory-bias, the MOE might not be a completely universal phenomenon: 
Sparks, Cunningham, and Kritikos (2016) investigated the MOE in both a Western and 
an Asian sample, using either strangers or a close other (the participant’s mother or a 
close friend) as the “other” category. Using the standard shopping paradigm, an MOE 
occurred only among Western participants, whereas Asian participants did not perform 
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differently for different owners. If the object had to be moved over the screen via arrow 
keys, Asians, too, exhibited an MOE, but only when the “self” was contrasted with the 
non-familiar other. For a close other, the pattern was reversed. The authors suggest that 
the more consistent MOE for Western participants might be due to an independent self-
concept which allows a clear distinction between self and others, whereas the Asian par-
ticipants might see themselves as more strongly interconnected with others, especially 
those with whom they are close (for a review on independent vs. interdependent self-
concepts and the cultural differences thought to underpin these differences in self-con-
cept, see Markus & Kitayama, 2010; for a critical perspective, see, e.g., Matsumoto, 
1999). 
As the original study (Cunningham et al., 2008) showed, the MOE was not modulated by 
whether participants actively placed the items in the basket of the respective owner, or 
whether they passively observed another participant do so, rendering an action-based ex-
planation of the MOE implausible4. However, this does not necessarily mean that the 
MOE is independent of how an “owned” object relates to one’s body and its location. For 
example, there appears to be a combined influence of action and physical proximity on 
the MOE. Truong, Chapman, Chisholm, Enns, and Handy (2016) investigated this by 
letting participants move pictures of the visual objects and by varying the position of the 
self- and other- target boxes between blocks, so that each type of object could either be 
placed near or further away from participant’s body. The MOE was enhanced for objects 
that had to be placed close to the participant, but only if the pictorial objects were actively 
dragged over the surface of an interactive touchtable, as opposed to being assigned to 
their locations via a button press. This suggests that the MOE could be susceptible to non-
conceptual influences relating to the body and its movements in space (e.g., Neisser, 
1988).  
The initial account by Cunningham et al. (2008) explains the MOE as the result of the 
formation of an associative link between the self and the stimulus object that has been 
assigned to it. In line with this view, source memory (i.e. “owned by me” vs. not owned 
by me”) for self-assigned objects appears to be improved, meaning the participants are 
                                                 
4The study by Sparks et al. (2016) potentially offers a counterpoint to this, as the Asian participants only 
displayed an MOE when they actively moved the objects using an error key. However, there could be 
different explanations for this finding, such as differences in cognitive processing styles (“focal” vs. 
“holistic”; for a review see Kitayama and Uskul 2011), or a difference in prior familiarity for the objects 
between Westerners and Asians which might have been evened out by the higher demand for attention 
in the movement condition.  
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able to explicitly link the objects to themselves at retrieval (Cunningham et al., 2011; Kim 
& Johnson, 2015). Likewise compatible with this view is the earlier finding by van den 
Bos et al. (2010) that an MOE is present in “remember” but not “know” judgments 
(Tulving, 1985; Gardiner & Richardson-Klavehn, 2000). As participants are typically in-
structed to give a “remember” judgment only when they can retrieve information specific 
to the encoding episode, a remember/know-task can be construed as a broad version of a 
source memory test. Thus, it seems as though episodic memory contributes to the MOE. 
It seems plausible that self-owned items are remembered better due to an associative link 
between the object and the encoding context. Naturally, in this task, the self category is 
an important constituent of that context. In a similar vein, source memory for self-owned 
objects might be improved when the owner is used as the to-be-remembered source in-
formation (Cunningham et al., 2011). Two further findings are compatible with this no-
tion. On the behavioral level, Turk et al. (2013) found that divided attention selectively 
impaired recognition memory for self-owned objects. When participants had to perform 
a second task (remembering a sequence of digits, or remembering the number of even 
digits in that sequence) in addition to the ownership assignment, no MOE was observed, 
in contrast to a single-task control condition. This was due to a drop in performance for 
the self-owned objects when attention was divided, while the secondary task did little to 
affect recognition memory for other-owned objects. This was true for overall recognition 
performance as well as for remember-judgments which have been found to reflect the 
MOE (van den Bos et al., 2010). These results corroborate an earlier finding by Turk et 
al. (2011), suggesting that self-ownership typically engages attentional resources that are 
not routinely allocated to the other-owned objects. This study combined electrophysio-
logical measurements with a shopping paradigm: It was found that the P300, an ERP 
component typically associated with the engagement of attention (see, e.g., Polich, 2007) 
was amplified for self-assigned objects as compared to the other-assigned objects, after 
ownership was assigned. Since attention is thought to be necessary for the formation of 
episodic associations (Naveh-Benjamin, Guez, & Marom, 2003), but not for item 
memory, this fits well with the idea that such associations drive the MOE. 
As mentioned in the introduction, a special prior relationship between an object and its 
owner was not required for an MOE – arbitrary assignment was sufficient (Cunningham 
et al., 2008; van den Bos et al., 2010). Nevertheless, there seems to be a distinct contri-
bution of choice to the MOE when this factor is manipulated (Cloutier & Macrae, 2008; 
Cunningham et al., 2011). Cloutier and Macrae (2008) tested memory for trait adjectives 
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that had been assigned to either participants themselves, or a partner they had been paired 
off with at the beginning of the learning phase. Furthermore, they varied whether or not 
an illusion of choice was elicited. In one condition, participants took turns drawing num-
bers from a bowl. Each number served as a stand-in for a trait adjective on a list which 
was then read out to them by the experimenter. In the condition without choice, pre-se-
lected numbers were placed in front of each participant before the learning phase instead. 
In this set-up, there was an interaction between the factors of “self vs. other” and “choice”: 
only when participants had selected the numbers themselves did a memory advantage 
emerge. Being made to feel like they had chosen the objects themselves, seemed to in-
crease the memory advantage for self-assigned items. Cunningham et al. (2011) explored 
the effect of choice and ownership on memory, using the shopping paradigm. Choice was 
either manipulated in a straightforward manner, by either allowing the participants to pick 
one of two items while assigning the other to their fellow participant (Experiment 1)5, or 
by manipulating illusion of choice in a manner similar to that of Cloutier and Macrae 
(2008), by selecting numbers from a grid that ostensibly stood in for the objects partici-
pants were about to “receive” (Experiment 2). They found that memory for self-owned 
objects was significantly improved when participants had been the ones to choose, while 
no such advantage emerged for the other-owned objects, both in recognition and source 
memory. Therefore choice, or the illusion thereof, seems to enhance the MOE. As the 
effect emerged even when participants did not know what the self-chosen objects were 
going to be, again, a particular relationship between the encoder and the encoded object 
does not appear necessary. Thus, it is implausible that “self-owned, self-chosen” items 
are a priori preferable or have greater overlap with extant long-term memories about the 
self. Rather, Cunningham et al. (2011) propose that owning a self-chosen item automati-
cally elicits self-referential encoding processes, leading to greater elaboration of the ob-
ject. 
One area to which the research on the MOE can contribute concerns the alleged “special-
ness” of the self. The question here is, which, if any, known mechanisms the MOE can 
be reduced to. For example, episodic memory appears important in bringing about the 
MOE (Cunningham et al., 2011; van den Bos et al., 2010), as does focused attention (Turk 
et al., 2013). Furthermore, elaborative encoding has been proposed as a candidate mech-
anism behind the MOE (Cunningham et al., 2011). One potential theoretical explanation 
                                                 
5It is obvious that this method leads to a confound between choice and preference, allowing for alternative 
explanations that can only be ruled out when participants cannot pick the items directly. 
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for the MOE which will be discussed at length later on, and which is compatible with 
enhanced recollection and source memory, is depth of processing (Craik & Lockhart, 
1972).  
Challenging this account, Sui and Humphreys (2013) report a dissociation between 
memory effects that are driven by a connection to the self, and memory effects that are 
related to semantic and episodic memory more generally. In a neuropsychological case 
study, they describe an amnesic patient who showed impairments retrieving semantic 
knowledge, but who was still able to recall biographical events after suffering extensive 
lesions. This patient exhibited an MOE and an advantage of an encoding task that required 
assessing the self-descriptiveness of the material (self-reference task), but benefitted very 
little from semantic elaboration per se. This dissociation between a mere depth of pro-
cessing manipulation and self-related encoding seems to suggest a functionally different 
role of the self. Of course, there are obvious limitations when trying to make inferences 
about general memory functions from a clinical single-case study. Nevertheless, this find-
ing casts some doubt on the hypothesis that the MOE can be reduced to known memory 
processes such as elaboration. The dissociation reported by Sui and Humphreys (2013) is 
explained in terms of their own theoretical account (Sui et al., 2012), which posits that 
self-memory biases are qualitatively similar to the effects of reward, going so far as to 
speculate whether self-assignment is “inherently rewarding”. 
The shopping paradigm has been used in neuro-imaging studies, in order to identify key 
regions underlying ownership and self-referential processing. (Turk, van Bussel, Waiter 
& Macrae, 2011; Kim & Johnson, 2012; Kim & Johnson, 2015). Kim and Johnson (2012) 
posit that there is a network of brain regions underpinning associations between objects 
and the self, including the posterior portion of medial prefrontal cortex, the caudal portion 
of the anterior cingulate, parts of anterior inferior parietal cortex, the left insula, and the 
right superior temporal gyrus. 
In line with the aforementioned idea that self-involvement is “inherently rewarding” (Sui 
et al., 2012), the assignment of an object to the self appears to heavily involve brain areas 
commonly associated with affective processing and, specifically, reward (de Greck et al., 
2008; Enzi et al., 2009; Northoff & Hayes, 2011). Assignment of ownership to the self 
has been found to elicit activity in the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC), areas commonly 
associated with these processes (Turk et al., 2011; Kim & Johnson, 2012; Krigolson et 
al., 2013; Kim & Johnson, 2015). In addition to greater mPFC activation for self-owned 
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items, Kim and Johnson (2012) also found that mPFC activation was positively correlated 
with object preference as measured by a rating task, which suggests a role of affect in 
self-referential processing. Krigolson et al. (2013) investigated whether self-assignment 
made participants more sensitive to reward, using feedback error-related negativity, 
(fERN; Miltner, Braun, & Coles, 1997), an ERP component thought to be sensitive to 
gains and losses. Importantly, the fERN was assumed to be generated in the medial-
frontal reward system. They employed a “gambling” task, where participants had to im-
agine winning prizes either for themselves or another person, as indicated by a color cue. 
They then had to pick one of four buttons, after which they were informed if they had 
“won” the object or not. When an object could be potentially self-owned, there was a 
marked difference in the fERN response, which was muted when participants gambled 
for the “other”, suggesting that self-relevance is important for engaging in affective pro-
cessing in the first place. Kim and Johnson (2015) looked at the potential neural under-
pinnings of the MOE both under normal conditions and under conditions of self-esteem 
threat. They concluded that different systems might be engaged under those different con-
ditions. Threat to self-esteem was induced by telling participants that performance on the 
experimental task was indicative of their abilities, and by announcing that they would be 
ranked in comparison with their fellow students. In the absence of threat, the MOE was 
again associated with activity in regions that are generally considered important for af-
fective processing, personal relevance, and reward, such as the medial prefrontal cortex, 
the anterior cingulate, and the insula. When participants self-esteem was threatened, how-
ever, the MOE was associated with activity in brain regions thought to reflect inhibitory 
cognitive control and regulation of negative emotions, such as the ventro- and dorsolateral 
PFC and the inferior and the middle frontal gyrus, suggesting that under threat, self-pro-
cessing is more controlled and deliberate. 
Of course, those affective processes are not incompatible with other mechanisms that 
have been proposed, such as increased attention and episodic binding, or more extensive 
elaboration, that have been surmised to contribute the MOE. At any rate, the shopping 
paradigm has both served as a new tool for investigating self-referential processing in 
general (Cunningham et al., 2013) and established the mnemonic MOE as an important 
observation in its own right, demonstrating that ownership can affect memory under re-
markably simple conditions. The topic has proven a fruitful source of both behavioral and 
physiological research, as it has inspired studies investigating theoretically important as-
pects of memory performance in relation to the self (van den Bos et al., 2010; Turk et al., 
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2011; Sui & Humphreys, 2013; Turk et al., 2013), identifying factors that can modulate 
the MOE – such as the presence or absence of choice, cultural background or physical 
proximity (Cunningham et al., 2011; Sparks et al., 2016; Truong et al., 2016) - and found 
candidates for neural systems underpinning it (Kim & Johnson, 2015; Turk et al., 2011). 
2.2 The mere ownership and other self-memory advantages: 
Finding a theoretical account 
The MOE first demonstrated by Cunningham et al. (2008) is only one of a number of 
phenomena that show how an involvement of the self modulates memory. The notion of 
the self and its special status has motivated research in cognitive psychology for a long 
time. Since a great number of studies have highlighted the preeminent role of the self for 
human memory over the course of several decades, it is beyond the scope of the present 
dissertation to give a comprehensive summary of this research. Instead, I will examine 
the theoretical suggestion that the self as a cognitive representation in declarative memory 
is employed to structure and access information. For example, the concept of autobio-
graphic memory (e.g. Conway, 2008) singles out a class of both episodic memories and 
general knowledge for its relevance to the self, thought to form a more or less coherent 
knowledge structure. In the context of theories on the structure of declarative memory 
and category representation, the notion of a self-schema has been employed to explain 
why self-relevant attributes receive processing advantages. In a by now classic study, 
Markus (1977) found that information related to participants’ specific self-schema was 
more likely to be retained, implying that the self as a concept was successfully involved 
in encoding new information. In this regard, the most important finding for the purposes 
of this thesis is the so-called self-reference effect (SRE; Rogers et al., 1977), which I 
consider a close conceptual progenitor of the MOE. Close consideration will be given to 
the theoretical framework and the mechanisms that are typically proposed to account for 
it (Klein & Kihlstrom, 1986; Klein & Loftus, 1988; Symons & Johnson, 1997; Klein, 
2012), namely levels of processing (Craik & Lockhart, 1972). 
In this chapter, the MOE will be put into the context of these findings and theories. The 
central question of this thesis is whether the MOE can be explained in similar terms as 
these earlier findings on the SRE as well as which mechanisms, precisely, appear to be 
driving it. 
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 The self-reference effect in memory 
The SRE (Rogers et al., 1977; for a meta-analysis, see Symons & Johnson, 1997; for a 
review of conceptual issues, see Klein, 2012) is a classic finding that, on the face of it, 
bears a strong resemblance to the MOE. In brief, the SRE refers to the phenomenon that 
stimulus material which is processed in a self-referential manner during encoding is typ-
ically more likely to be remembered than material on which a different encoding task has 
been performed. The original study by Rogers et al. (1977) expanded on an earlier finding 
showing that memory performance varied greatly as a function of the type of encoding 
task (Craik & Lockhart, 1975). Participants were shown a list of trait adjectives and asked 
to process them in different ways. The encoding task could be simple and refer to percep-
tual characteristics of the learning material (such as whether or not it was spelled in all-
capital-letters or, via a rhyming task, what the phonetic properties of the word are) or 
require participants to process the meaning of the word by making decisions about poten-
tial synonyms (semantic task). Generally speaking, a semantic encoding task, that is, a 
task where participants have to process the meaning of the stimulus in order to complete 
it successfully, leads to much higher memory performance in a subsequent recognition or 
recall task than does a task where participants only have to focus on perceptual features 
of the stimulus. For reasons that will become clear in the following, this previous finding 
is known as a depth-of-processing effect. Rogers et al. (1977) compared memory perfor-
mance for the tasks previously employed by Craik and Lockhart (1975) to a self-reference 
task, in which participants had to decide whether or not a word was descriptive of them-
selves. Material that had been encoded in this self-referential manner was more likely to 
be remembered during a subsequent memory test than material for which participants had 
performed any of the other tasks (see Figure 3). When I speak of the SRE without quali-
fication, I refer to the difference in memory performance between a self-descriptiveness 
task and a semantic task, specifically. 
Rogers et al. (1977) attribute the effectiveness of the self-reference task to the existence 
of a “well-structured and powerful” self-schema. They suggest that the “self-referent de-
cision activates the superordinate schema of self as well as the salient subschemata” (p. 
686) which allow for especially effective encoding due to their aforementioned proper-
ties. In essence, they explain the SRE in terms of elaborative encoding. Since the original 
study, alternative accounts have been proposed. Most notably, organizational processing 
has been suggested to be driving the SRE (Klein & Kihlstrom, 1986). I discuss this idea 
extensively in Chapter 2.2.3. 
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The SRE has since been demonstrated to be a robust phenomenon and can be said to enjoy 
the status of a classic finding in memory psychology (e.g., Symons & Johnson, 1997; 
Klein, 2012). It has been meta-analytically confirmed that memory performance for self-
referentially encoded items is consistently stronger than memory performance for seman-
tic tasks. However, memory performance can also be enhanced by different manipula-
tions that lead to similar to the performance levels. For example, the advantage for self-
referential processing is smaller, when it is compared to a task where the material’s de-
scriptiveness for another person has to be judged, especially if the relationship between 
the participant and the to-be-referenced other is highly intimate. Furthermore, evaluative 
tasks or pleasantness ratings appear to produce performance levels that are comparable to 
those of self-referential encoding which has been attributed to an evaluative component 
being inherent to the self-reference task. Interestingly, tasks that ask participants to rate 
the self-descriptiveness of an item produce a larger SRE than do tasks that require partic-
ipants to visually imagine themselves (Symons & Johnson, 1997). This could lend cre-
dence to the suggestion that the SRE is based on the self as an object or concept, and on 
explicitly accessing self-knowledge from long-term memory, rather than on the “I”, or 
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Figure 3. Graphic presentation of the original SRE reported by Rogers et al. (1977, Experiment 1). Mean 
recall is presented as a function of orienting task and type of judgment (“yes” or “no”) made by participants. 
Recall performance is computed as the proportion of recalled items for each combinaton of task and judg-
ment. Note that while the phonemic task produces an intermediate level of performance when compared to 
the semantic or structural task, it would be classified as “shallow” or “perceptual” in the context of this 
thesis. Adapted from Rogers et al. (1977). 
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the self as an experiencing subject.6 Importantly, and as discussed in detail below, com-
parison tasks that promote both semantic organization and elaboration lead to a smaller 
SRE, suggesting that the self facilitates both types of processing (Symons & Johnson, 
1997). 
Since a typical self-reference task requires conscious deliberation on the self, a view of 
the SRE as a conceptual phenomenon that is mediated by the self as a knowledge struc-
ture, seems to suggest itself. Nonetheless, it has been argued that this is too simplistic an 
approach to the self and its impact on memory: For instance, Klein (2012) suggests that, 
just like the “self” should not be viewed as a singular, coherent entity, but a multifaceted 
construct, the SRE should not be considered a single homogeneous phenomenon, but ra-
ther it should be assumed that there is a “family of related SREs that are influenced by a 
variety of variables and contexts” (p. 283). Furthermore, there is clinical evidence that 
suggests that an SRE can persist independently of impairments regarding conceptual pro-
cessing (Sui & Humphreys, 2013). It seems likely that the SRE cannot be explained by a 
single well-specified cognitive operation, such as elaborative processing (Klein & Loftus, 
1988; Symons & Johnson, 1997; Klein, 2012). 
 Levels of processing: A framework for research on self-memory 
effects? 
Typically, the SRE is explained as a depth of processing phenomenon, within the levels 
of processing framework introduced by Craik and Lockhart (1972). This framework was 
proposed as an alternative to the prevailing modular theories of memory that postulate a 
set of distinct memory stores whose properties would then determine what happened to 
an encoded stimulus. Instead of these structures, or memory “stores”, and on their number 
and properties, the focus became procedural: Encoding7 operations are viewed as key to 
                                                 
6However, see, Symons and Johnson (1997), or Lord (1980) for an alternative interpretation of this finding. 
7To a reader familiar with the theoretical discussions surrounding the levels of processing framework, it 
may appear peculiar that memory and memory strength are repeatedly discussed in the context of “en-
coding”, and considered as functions thereof. After all, the concept of memory “encoding” itself is 
contentious, especially with proponents of levels of processing (e.g., Tulving, 2002). Indeed, Lockhart 
and Craik (1990) suggest that “there is no distinct process of memorizing that can take its place among 
other cognitive operations” (p.89). This follows from a core element of the levels of processing frame-
work, the byproduct theory of memory. According to this view, there is no need to posit a process that 
is specifically responsible for the formation of the memory trace, except for the processes that are also 
required for the perception and comprehension of the study material. Instead, in the LoP framework the 
memory trace is conceived as simply a by-product of the processing operation required to perform the 
study task, thus removing the need for a specialized “encoding” process. However, I use a much more 
general definition of “encoding” than the one disputed by Lockhart and Craik (1990) and defended by 
Tulving (2002). Within the context of this dissertation, the term “encoding” simply refers to any and all 
cognitive processes that take place during the learning phase which subserve later stimulus retrieval, 
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predicting subsequent memory performance. Furthermore, the authors postulate no spe-
cialized mechanism for committing new information to memory. Rather, memory is 
viewed simply as a result of “online” processing of the presented information, such as 
perception, comprehension or categorization of study material (Lockhart & Craik, 1990). 
Later findings showing that some brain regions engaged in initial encoding become reac-
tivated at retrieval, are in line with this view (Nyberg, 2002). 
In essence, the levels of processing view states that the strength of a memory trace, and 
therefore, likelihood of successful retrieval depends on which operations are performed 
on the learning material during encoding. It is how we process a stimulus that largely 
determines the strength of its later memory trace. Importantly, processing operations are 
organized hierarchically: It is assumed that certain stages of processing precede later 
stages, and, crucially that some forms of processing are “deeper” than others and there-
fore, result in better subsequent memory performance. For example, sensory processing 
which can be classified as “shallow” is thought to occur early and relatively automati-
cally, i.e. requiring few, if any, attentional resources (see Figure 4, for an illustration). In 
contrast, semantic analyses, a “deeper” form of processing, is more time-consuming and 
requires the allocation of substantial attentional resources. Furthermore, it is assumed that 
the products of such semantic, or “deeper”, analysis are more robust and longer-lasting 
than traces that result from sensory analysis or shallower processing (Craik & Lockhart, 
                                                 
without commitment to either theoretical view. It is not intended as either a positive or negative verdict 
on the byproduct theory of memory. Rather, in the context of this dissertation, “encoding” can be un-
derstood as synonymous with “learning” or “study”. 
Figure 4. A graphic illustration of the levels-of-processing framework, showing different types of orienting 
tasks for a study item, adapted with minor changes from Ekuni et al. (2011, Figure 1, p. 334). 
Study item: "pen"
Perceptual processing/
Visual analysis:
"How many vowels does 
the word contain?"
Phonemic processing/
Auditory analysis:
"Does the word rhyme 
with 'tool'"?
Deep processing/
Semantic analysis:
"What is the object 
denoted by the word used 
for?"
Shallow level
Deeper level, 
further elaborated
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1972; Lockhart & Craik, 1990)8. In order to gather empirical support for their theoretical 
propositions, Craik and Lockhart (1975) compared memory performance for different en-
coding tasks in a series of experiments. These different encoding tasks could, for instance, 
require participants to judge either the letter case (structural task), the rhyming properties 
(phonetic task) or the meaning of the word, for example by being asked to find synonyms 
(semantic task). In line with the expectations derived from the levels of processing frame-
work, a semantic task consistently produced the highest memory performance, with better 
retention rates than either the structural task, which was the weakest, or the rhyming task 
which produced an intermediary performance level. This so-called depth of processing 
effect has since been shown to be both robust and sizeable, with manipulations routinely 
employed in memory research (Nyberg, 2002; Ekuni, Vaz, & Bueno, 2011). A common 
explanation for why the semantic task is powerful in producing memory performance, is 
that it supports elaboration or “enrichment” of a to-be learned stimulus. This means that, 
after the stimulus is identified, associations may be formed based on participants’ previ-
ous knowledge and experience, increasing the number of possible ways through which it 
can be accessed later on (Craik & Lockhart, 1972). 
It is worth noting that while levels of processing has proven exceptionally fruitful for 
memory research, there are important limitations to consider. A number of substantial 
criticisms have been raised, especially regarding the tangibility and testability of this 
framework (e.g., Tulving, 2002; Ekuni et al., 2011) which both have been called into 
question. For example, it has been pointed out that an independent measure of the central 
concept of “processing depth” is missing which has led to charges of circularity. It is 
assumed that deep processing would lead to stronger memory performance, and in turn, 
deep processing is inferred from observing this performance. While Lockhart and Craik 
(1990) themselves point out that manipulating encoding tasks can work quite inde-
pendently of measuring the memory performance that these tasks are supposed to affect, 
this still leaves open the question of what explanatory value is added by the statement that 
“deep processing” has or has not taken place. Indeed, Lockhart and Craik (1990) them-
selves have clarified that they did not intend “depth of processing” as a causal explanation 
for memory performance but rather as a placeholder for memory processes that needs to 
be disentangled and explained itself. What exactly constitutes “processing depth” is a 
                                                 
8However, it is important to note that sensory analysis, too, can lead to persistent memory under certain 
circumstances and the resulting traces appear to be more robust than initially assumed (Lockhart & 
Craik, 1990; Nyberg, 2002). 
2 The mere ownership effect in context: self, memory and levels of processing 25 
question deserving of its own research program. Depth was also never intended as a single 
continuous variable that can easily be measured along a single scale and that has a simple, 
linear relationship with memory performance. Rather, it should be seen as a result of the 
interplay between the cognitive processes involved in performing a certain task – pro-
cesses that need to be carefully specified (Lockhart & Craik, 1990). Two such more 
clearly defined processes that could contribute to processing “depth” are elaboration and 
organization (Einstein & Hunt, 1980) which I will examine more closely in Chapter 2.2.3. 
It is worth mentioning that levels of processing is typically referred to as a “framework”, 
rather than a “theory”. Tulving (2002) suggests that the main distinguishing characteris-
tics of a framework are that it is more general and less clearly defined than a theory. 
Indeed, it may be more apt to consider levels of processing as a lens through which 
memory and memory research can be viewed, rather than a set of interconnected and 
testable hypotheses. But as such, and if basic assumptions about the different kind of 
processing mechanisms are preliminarily accepted, it can be applied to a range of memory 
phenomena, including processing advantages due to an involvement of the self. 
Returning to the SRE, within the levels of processing framework self-referential pro-
cessing may be understood as an especially “deep” and elaborative form of encoding: 
Strong extant memory structures boost memory for and support retrieval of stimuli once 
they have become associated with the self. Since our knowledge on the self is abundant, 
strongly interconnected, well-structured and frequently accessed, the self-referential task 
boosts memory by integrating the material with these rich mnemonic structures. As this 
opens up multiple access routes upon retrieval, content which has been elaborated on in 
such a self-referential manner is more likely to be remembered. While semantic tasks are 
thought to produce high performance via this very same mechanism, it can be assumed 
that they achieve this in a rather less powerful manner. Self-referential information is 
typically connected to autobiographic and episodic memories, whereas semantic tasks 
typically require participants to “merely” access their world knowledge. In addition, it is 
reasonable to assume that we typically know a lot about ourselves, which is not neces-
sarily the case for the knowledge we need to access in order to complete a semantic task, 
thus potentially leading to a greater interconnectedness of information that pertains to the 
self. Furthermore, the frequency with which we need to access self-related information 
might give this type of information higher “default” activation and thus, make it more 
readily available when we search our memories. Following this line of reasoning, the self-
reference task can be seen as simply conferring a quantitative advantage over semantic 
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tasks, without the need to posit any additional, qualitatively distinct, memory processes 
aiding the encoding and retrieval of self-referential information in particular. This is ex-
actly what is implied by describing the SRE as a depth of processing phenomenon. The 
self-referential encoding task encourages a particularly large extent of elaboration, a pro-
cess which the semantic depth of processing effect is likewise assumed to rely upon. In 
short, according to this interpretation of the SRE, the self-referential task simply consti-
tutes an especially “deep” or “robust” form of processing. 
 Refining the concept of “deep” processing: Semantic elaboration 
and organization 
The levels of processing framework has been expanded to incorporate a further type of 
operations that can be thought to constitute "deep" processing. Of particular importance 
to this thesis is the concept of semantic organization (Bellezza, Cheesman, & Reddy, 
1977; Mandler, 2011). Seeking to integrate the organizational processing perspective with 
levels of processing, Einstein and Hunt (1980) proposed organization as a distinct subtype 
of the semantic processing operations that are of central importance to the framework. 
Organization can be juxtaposed with the concept of semantic elaboration which is integral 
to the initial conception of levels of processing. Einstein and Hunt conceptualize elabo-
ration as a form of "item-specific" or “intra-item” processing. In this context, this means 
that encoding operations refer to the individual stimulus item itself, and to the links that 
can be formed between this item and extant information in long-term memory. For in-
stance, one might think about, what one knows about an object, and what properties it 
has, what other objects there are like it, or about instances when one has encountered it 
before. Thus, associations are formed between the new stimulus material and content pre-
sent in declarative long-term memory. "Organization", on the other hand, refers to what 
Einstein and Hunt (1980) term "inter-item processing". This means that associative con-
nections are formed amongst the to-be-learned stimuli themselves. Those connections 
might, for instance, be based on items sharing properties (“both of these objects are typi-
cally red”) or category membership (“those are all tools”). They can either take the form 
of associations among the to-be-remembered items in a list, or of associations between a 
list item and a superordinate category to which it belongs. 
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If a task or a set of stimuli is conducive to organization, this means that some sort of 
structural template is provided9 during encoding according to which stimuli can be 
grouped together, allowing participants to efficiently "organize" the learning materials in 
memory. It follows that, at retrieval, items of a given category, or the superordinate cate-
gory itself, can function as memory cues for other items from that same category. Thus, 
successful retrieval of one such item increases the likelihood of successful retrieval of 
other items from the same category. In a free recall task this has implications for the 
structure of the output: It is to be expected that if an item is produced by a participant at 
retrieval, it is more likely to then be succeeded by an item with which it has been grouped 
together during encoding. In brief, this means that organization should affect recall more 
strongly than recognition performance, and that items of the same category can be ex-
pected to be reproduced alongside each other, that is to "cluster” together. Thus, such 
clustering can be seen as an indicator of organization in memory. Of course, this requires 
a retrieval task where participants control which item is produced at which point in time. 
A recognition task, for instance, would not permit testing for organization in this manner. 
There are several proposals for how clustering can be measured in a given recall output 
(see Appendix A). 
Unlike in the case of organization, no predictions about the ordering of the output are 
made in the case of elaboration. Here, the expectation is merely that of a high overall 
memory performance. Different orienting tasks are thought to selectively (or, at least, 
predominantly) support either elaboration or organization (see Table 1, for examples). 
Furthermore, the composition of study lists contributes to whether or not organization is 
encouraged at encoding, for example by using items that belong to the same semantic 
categories, or to different ones.  
Einstein and Hunt (1980) attempted to distinguish the contributions of elaboration and 
organization, as well as of semantic and non-semantic processing, to memory perfor-
mance. To this end, they employed study lists that were composed of items that could be 
grouped into several semantic categories, such as animals or fruits (conceptual or seman-
tic organization), or that could be grouped according to a shared a first letter (non-seman-
tic organization). Both grouping tasks were thought to promote organization, albeit on a 
different “level” (i.e. non-semantic vs. semantic). In addition, Einstein and Hunt used 
encoding tasks thought to promote individual-item processing. These tasks were either a 
                                                 
9 Or, indeed, discovered or created by participants. I would like to thank Dr. Nikolas Leichner for noting 
this point. 
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rhyming task or a pleasantness rating and thus could be assumed to differ with regards to 
their “processing depth”. Thus, they varied both the type (organizational, individual-item, 
or non) and the semantic “depth level” (semantic, non-semantic, or none) of the orienting 
tasks, resulting in nine potential encoding conditions during study. They obtained the 
highest memory performance when two semantic tasks were combined, i.e. when partic-
ipants performed both elaboration and organization on a semantic level, suggesting dis-
tinct contributions of each. Furthermore, when a semantic category orienting task was 
used, the highest levels of clustering were observed. 
Table 1. Examples of stimulus items and orienting questions thought to vary organizational processing 
independently of whether the task is semantic or self-referential (adapted from Klein & Kihlstrom, 1986). 
Condition  Example question Target Word 
 
Semantic: Unor-
ganized 
  
 
Does this word fit the sentence? “The young 
woman had very fair___” 
 
 
Skin 
Self: Unor-
ganized 
  
Does this describe you? “I would stick my 
___ out for a friend” 
Neck 
Semantic: Orga-
nized 
  
Is this an external body part? Heart 
Self: Organized 
 
 
Can you think of an incident in which you 
had an injury or illness associated with your 
___? 
Leg 
 
Returning to the topic of memory and the self, Klein and Kihlstrom (1986) first tested the 
hypothesis that organization might be underlying the SRE. They found that a self-refer-
ential task produced greater clustering than a standard semantic task, suggesting that self-
reference might foster organization more or less automatically. In a series of experiments, 
in which they attempted to vary the degree of organizational processing independently of 
whether the task was semantic or self-referential (see Table 1), they found only an advan-
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tageous effect of organization. From this, they concluded that organization, not elabora-
tion, is chiefly responsible for the SRE. A later study, however, suggests a role for both 
mechanisms. Klein and Loftus (1988) varied whether study lists contained semantically 
related items and whether the orienting task was elaborative, organizational, or self-ref-
erential. They found that when list items were unrelated, the benefit of self-reference par-
alleled that of an organizational task, but when the list items were related, self-reference 
conveyed a similar benefit as the elaborative task, suggesting that the self might support 
both mechanisms. Thus, self-reference should confer a mnemonic benefit only to the ex-
tent that either (or both) of these components are not already present. Indeed, from later 
studies, it can be concluded that the self as a concept facilitates both organization and 
elaboration and that therefore, both contribute to the SRE (Klein & Loftus, 1988; Symons 
& Johnson, 1997): Typically, if a comparison task can be assumed to enhance either of 
these processes, the SRE is reduced, but not eliminated. It is thought that performance 
after a self-referential task is strong precisely because the self as a concept simultaneously 
supports both of these processes which then improve memory in combination with each 
other. While both processes can be facilitated by other tasks, it seems remarkable that the 
self appears to produce high memory performance, presumably via these processes, even 
if presentation and task conditions are conducive to neither (Klein, 2012). 
 Where does the mere ownership effect fit in with regards to levels 
of processing and the self-reference effect? 
As mentioned above, the MOE and the SRE share an obvious resemblance: Both refer to 
improvements in memory performance that occur when a stimulus is explicitly linked to 
the self during encoding. At first glance, both appear to suggest that the self has a special 
cognitive status. This then raises the question whether those two phenomena can be ac-
counted for in the same terms. The SRE is typically seen as a depth of processing phe-
nomenon, with strong evidence that both semantic organization and elaboration contrib-
ute to the effect (Klein & Loftus, 1988; Symons & Johnson, 1997). 
There are, of course, important differences between the SRE and the MOE: For example, 
the SRE is a difference between two encoding task and occurs regardless of whether or 
not an item has been described as self-descriptive or not. On the other hand, the MOE is 
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a difference between two different response categories (self vs. non-self) in the same en-
coding task10. Crucially, the shopping task is much simpler than a standard self-reference 
task. In a self-reference task, participants are explicitly required to consciously think 
about the self and its relation to the stimuli, and then make their response based on their 
extant self-knowledge. In this sense, self-reference is studied under quasi-experimental 
conditions, with responses depending on participant characteristics. In the shopping par-
adigm, no such thought processes are required to perform the task successfully – the re-
lationship between the stimulus and the self (“owned by me” vs. “not owned by me”) is 
experimentally controlled in an arbitrary fashion and the correct response can be made 
based on a simple color cue. Therefore, it would seem that fewer conditions need to be 
met for an MOE to emerge than are typically present in a self-reference set-up. 
Does this mean that the MOE is, unlike the SRE, not a product of elaborative processing? 
Does this mean that recourse to a rich and well-structured self-schema is unnecessary for 
the MOE? There is research that appears to highlight a role for the self which is more 
direct and less driven by concepts stored in declarative memory (e.g., Sui et al., 2012; Sui 
& Humphreys, 2013). As already mentioned, Sui and Humphreys (2013) report the case 
of an amnesic patient who did not exhibit a standard semantic depth of processing effect, 
but showed both an MOE and an SRE. So, it seems possible that self-involvement can 
confer a memory benefit that is distinct from any effects of “deep” semantic processing. 
Those results are worth mentioning here as they seem to suggest that there might be dis-
tinct mechanisms or modules that are specifically dedicated to the self, or self-related 
information, and that it might be extraneous to draw on complex semantic processes in 
order to explain self-memory-advantages. 
Yet, in the case of both the MOE and the SRE, relating the stimulus material to the self 
during encoding translates into a benefit during the retrieval task. This raises the question 
if, and to what extent, those phenomena are brought about by the same overlapping pro-
cesses. For example, is semantic processing a driver of the MOE, or is meaning inconse-
quential to the impact of ownership? If semantic processing does underlie the MOE, what 
                                                 
10 In this context, it is important to note, however, that for the self-reference task, there appears to be an 
advantage for items that have been classified as self-descriptive as compared to items that have been 
classified as uncharacteristic for the participant (Rogers et al. (1977). Rogers et al. explain this as a 
consequence of the relative ease with which schema-consistent information can be integrated, that is, in 
terms of elaboration. This effect of judgment type (“yes” vs. “no”) within the same task might be con-
strued as paralleling the MOE. 
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exactly does it look like in terms of cognitive operations? Does ownership induce an in-
tegration of the owned object into extant memory structures about the self, helping it to 
become highly interconnected in long-term memory and thus, highly accessible? Does 
ownership support the grouping-together of owned objects as a well-defined category, 
subserving a distinction between the self and the world? In short, can the MOE, like the 
SRE be seen as a product of either, or both elaboration and organization? Or is it some-
thing else entirely, perhaps independent of such explicit conceptual processes? In order 
to address these questions, we conducted a series of seven experiments using the shopping 
paradigm. 
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3 Empirical research using the shopping paradigm 
“My ‘curious little scientist’ brain was working through what seemed to be a particular 
pressing question: ‘What happens when you stick a finger into a fan?’ The answer, as it 
turned out, was that it hurts – a lot. At the age of 3, we intuitively know that to answer 
questions you need to collect data, even if it causes you pain.” – Andy Field (2013) 
3.1 Overview of experiments 
This section consists of seven separate experiments, that is, a pilot study and Experiments 
1-6. All seven experiments each employ a version of Cunningham et al.'s 2008 shopping 
paradigm and constitute the main line of research in this dissertation. These experiments 
focus on teasing apart the mnemonic processes underlying the MOE and on gaining a 
better understanding of the role of semantic processes in producing it. In the pilot exper-
iment, we attempted to replicate both the MOE and test whether it extends to semantically 
meaningless stimuli. However, the pilot study did not produce any clearly interpretable 
results. It is included in this dissertation both for the sake of completeness, and because I 
believe it can offer valuable insight into the procedural aspects that need to be considered 
when designing an MOE experiment. Experiments 1-6 constitute the main line of inquiry 
in this work: After adjusting the parameters (which we suspect are behind the initial null 
finding), we proceeded to gather corroborating evidence for the robustness of the MOE, 
and to examine the boundary conditions under which the effect occurs. In Experiments 1 
and 2, we used a version of the shopping paradigm that was more closely modeled on the 
initial shopping procedure introduced by Cunningham et al. (2008). We also investigated 
whether the social situation in the ownership task needs to be realistic, or whether an 
MOE would still occur when the other person was both imaginary and abstract. In both 
these Experiments, we replicated the basic finding of the MOE. In Experiment 3, we 
tested if the MOE would still occur when semantic processing was impeded by using 
meaningless stimuli. In Experiment 4, we were interested in whether assignment-to-the 
self prompts semantic elaboration processes. To this end, after completing the shopping 
task, participants performed a semantic matching task in addition to the memory test. Our 
rationale was that, if semantic processing for self-assigned items had taken place during 
encoding, this should result in participants retrieving the meaning of these stimuli with 
greater ease. In Experiment 5, we tested for the role of semantic processes in establishing 
the MOE using a depth of processing manipulation. Specifically, we were interested in 
34 3 Empirical research using the shopping paradigm 
the role of semantic organization and whether it is independent of the MOE. To this end, 
in Experiment 5, for each stimulus object, either a perceptual or conceptual classification 
task was combined with the shopping task. We reasoned that, if the MOE is due to the 
self being an effective organizing structure for the stimulus materials, offering another 
meaningful organizing scheme as an alternative to the ownership assignment would 
weaken the MOE. The MOE disappeared when the ownership assignment was combined 
with a semantic categorization task during encoding. In Experiment 6 we tested for the 
role of semantic organization in the MOE in a different way, namely by investigating the 
occurrence of clustering in a free recall task administered after the shopping task.  
An overview of the pilot study and Experiments 1-6 including their respective aims is 
provided in Table 2. Experiments 1-6 of this section have already been published in a 
journal article (Englert &Wentura, 2016). Appendix C provides lists of the stimulus ma-
terials used, while the original instructions for the experiments can be found in Appendix 
D.  
Table 2. A cursory overview of the experiments presented in this dissertation, the broad method that was 
used, and the questions they were intended to address. 
Experiment  
 
Method Aim 
 
Pilot study 
 
 
shopping paradigm with 
meaningful and mean-
ingless stimuli 
 
 
Replicate MOE, investigate the role of se-
mantic processing  
 
Experiment 1 
 
shopping paradigm with 
improved procedure and 
real social situation 
Replicate MOE under maximally favora-
ble conditions 
 
Experiment 2 
 
 
shopping paradigm with 
imaginary, abstract other 
 
Corroborate robustness of MOE and test 
whether it extends to “minimal” social 
conditions 
Experiment 3 
 
shopping paradigm with 
semantically meaning-
less pseudo-objects 
Is semantic “processability” as a boundary 
condition of the MOE? 
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Experiment 4 
 
shopping paradigm fol-
lowed by semantic 
matching task during 
test phase 
 
Is the MOE due to semantic elaboration? 
Test for aftereffects of elaboration at re-
trieval 
Experiment 5 shopping paradigm com-
bined with depth of pro-
cessing manipulation 
Is the MOE due to semantic organization? 
Is the MOE independent of the “depth” of 
an additional encoding task? 
 
Experiment 6 
 
 
shopping paradigm fol-
lowed by free recall , 
clustering as dependent 
measure 
 
Is the MOE due to semantic organization? 
Are self-assigned stimuli disproportion-
ately grouped together in memory? 
3.2 Pilot study 
The goal of the pilot study was to conceptually replicate the MOE using an adaptation of 
the shopping paradigm. Since a test of the role of semantic processability was intended 
in this first experiment, both meaningful and meaningless objects were used, in order to 
allow for a direct comparison of MOEs for the respective classes of items. This required 
a slight modification of the original shopping paradigm: Rather than imagining that they 
or a fellow player owned the respective objects themselves, participants were instructed 
to imagine that they had been dealt a stack of playing cards on which the visual stimuli 
were shown. A further difference between the original study by Cunningham et al. (2008) 
and our pilot study was that no verbal labels were used, as they were not applicable to the 
semantically meaningless items. 
 Method 
Participants. Forty-three students of Saarland University (28 female, 15 male, aged 18-
32, median age = 22) took part in the pilot study. They were compensated with a payment 
of six Euros. 
Design. We used a within-subjects design with self- versus other-assigned items as the 
sole factor. Three item lists were assigned as self, other, and unstudied list (for the recog-
nition phase) according to a Latin square design. 
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Materials. Seventy-five meaningful pictorial objects and 75 meaningless pseudo-objects 
(Zimmer, 2012) were chosen and divided into three lists containing 50 pictures (25 mean-
ingful, 25 meaningless) each. In a counter-balanced design, each of the stimulus set lists 
served as a self-assigned, other-assigned, or new stimulus set (for the recognition task). 
For a list of the stimuli used in the pilot study, see Appendix C1. 
Procedure. Participants performed the task separately on a computer in a closed cubicle. 
Before the study phase, participants were instructed to imagine that they were taking part 
in a card game. One stack of cards (either the red or the blue stack) would be designated 
as their own, whereas the other stack of the same size belonged to their fellow player. 
They were told that their task would be to sort the cards correctly according to who they 
belonged to. As there is some indication that an illusion of choice increases memory for 
self-chosen items (Cunningham et al., 2011), participants were asked to indicate via 
mouse click whether they would like the red stack or the blue stack for themselves. They 
were always assigned their preferred color, however, this did not affect which items were 
assigned to them and the “fellow player”, respectively. 
The study phase consisted of 100 trials. Each participant sorted through 50 meaningful 
and 50 meaningless stimuli. Half of each type of stimulus belonged to the participant 
themselves whereas the other half belonged to their fellow player. At the beginning of 
each trial, a fixation cross was presented for 250ms at the center of the screen. After that, 
a picture of a “card” was presented in the same place. Each card consisted of one of the 
pictorial objects which was surrounded by either a red or a blue frame, indicating its 
owner. This frame appeared and disappeared concurrently with the pictorial object. After 
2000ms, the “card” was replaced by a picture depicting a red and a blue stack of cards. 
Participants were asked to indicate via button press whether the card belonged on their 
own or the fellow player’s stack, that is, whether it belonged on the red or the blue stack. 
An example of a shopping trial for the pilot study is shown in Figure 5. 
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After the sorting phase was completed, participants were asked to perform a surprise 
recognition test. All items from the study phase as well as an additional 50 (25 meaning-
ful, 25 meaningless) not previously encountered items were included in the test phase. At 
Figure 6. An illustration of the trial procedure used in our version of the shopping paradigm during the 
encoding phase of the pilot study. 
 
Figure 5. An illustration of the recognition memory task used in the pilots study, as well as Experiments 1, 
2, 3, 5, and 7. 
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the beginning of each trial, a picture was presented at the center of the screen. Participants 
had to indicate per button press whether the picture was “old” or “new”, that is, whether 
the picture had been presented in the study phase irrespective of whether it was self-as-
signed or other-assigned (see Figure 6, for an illustration). If a “new” response was made, 
the next trial started immediately. If an “old”-response was made, the recognition test was 
followed by a Remember/Know/Guess (RKG) procedure following the recommendations 
by (Gardiner, Richardson-Klavehn, & Ramponi, 1997; see also Gardiner, Kaminska, 
Dixon, & Java, 1996). Participants were asked to gauge the experience underlying their 
decision (Tulving, 1985; for a review, see Gardiner & Richardson-Klavehn, 2000). They 
were instructed to select the “remember” option if they could recall the specific encoding 
episode, to select “know” if they remembered that an item had been presented but could 
not retrieve any specific details about the episode, and to select “guess” if they had merely 
guessed when selecting the “old” option. This procedure was included to investigate 
whether the findings of  van den Bos et al. (2010), who used this procedure as well, could 
be replicated. Since in the present study, we could not replicate the MOE to begin with, 
the results of the RKG procedure in the pilot study will not be discussed. 
  Results 
Unless otherwise noted, all effects referred to as statistically significant throughout this 
dissertation are associated with p-values of <.05, two-tailed. 
Recognition memory. Mean hit rates for self-assigned and other-assigned items as well 
as false alarm rates for new items are shown in Appendix B. Pr-scores (Snodgrass & 
Corwin, 1988) were computed by subtracting the false alarm rates for new items (i.e., 
items not presented during encoding) from the respective relative hit rates of meaningful 
and meaningless self-assigned and other-assigned items (see Figure 7). Overall memory 
performance as measured by Pr was significantly above chance, t(42) = 12.34, p < .001. 
A two-factorial MANOVA for repeated measures with the factors owner (self vs. other) 
and item type (meaningful vs. meaningless) on the Pr-scores yielded a main effect of item 
type, F(1,42) = 18.13, p < .01, ηp² = .30, no main effect of owner F(1,42) < 0.1 , p = .97 
and no interaction between the two F(1,42) =.19, p = .67. Descriptively, memory perfor-
mance for meaningful stimuli was better than memory performance for meaningless 
items. There was no main effect of owner and no interaction. Separate planned compari-
sons were computed testing the respective MOEs for the meaningful and the meaningless 
items. The difference between the recognition performance for the self-assigned items 
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and the other-assigned items was not significant, for either the meaningful or the mean-
ingless objects, with an MOE of near zero in each case, t(42) = .33, p = .74, and t(42) = 
.31, p = .76, respectively. 
Remember/Know/Guess Procedure. Since we already failed to obtain an MOE in the 
recognition memory performance, this renders further investigation of potential noetic 
states connected to the MOE obsolete. Therefore, the results of the remember/know/guess 
procedure are not reported here. 
  Discussion 
Intending to create a conceptual replication of the shopping paradigm (Cunningham et 
al., 2008), we failed to obtain an MOE in this first study for both the meaningful and the 
meaningless items. While this result, when viewed in isolation, might suggest that the 
MOE is not, in fact, a robust phenomenon, there are several potential methodological 
causes that might explain this failure to replicate. Thus, it seems necessary to compare 
the parameters of our experiment to those used in other studies using the shopping para-
digm. The most glaring difference appears to be the absence of a real social other. In the 
initial study by Cunningham et al. (2008), the role of the person being awarded the other 
half of the gifts was filled by another participant. In later studies (e.g. Krigolson et al., 
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Figure 7. Mean recognition performances for self- vs. other-assigned meaningful and meaningless items 
in the pilot study . The Pr-score is computed as the difference between relative hit rate and relative false 
alarm rate. Error bars indicate 95%-confidence intervals for dependent measures according to Jarmasz & 
Hollands (2009). 
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2013), that role was filled by the experimenter whom participants had just met and who 
was either present in the room or nearby. In two studies I am aware of in which that was 
not the case (Turk et al., 2013; van den Bos et al., 2010), the imaginary other person was 
at least given a name (“John”). This arguably made them more tangible and therefore, the 
social situation more “real”. In our experiment, the other was simply introduced as a max-
imally abstract fellow player and neither present in the room, nor made more concrete by 
using a name or giving any other kind of information. While at first glance it seems plau-
sible that a realistic social situation is a crucial facet of the mere ownership paradigm, this 
cannot account for our failure to obtain an MOE, since the presence or concreteness of a 
social other had no impact on the MOEs that we found in Experiments 1 and 2. Another 
possibility concerns the role of verbal labels: Given our hypothesis about the role of se-
mantic processing it is possible that the absence of labels in the pilot study reduced any 
potential MOE. 
3.3 Experiment 1: replicating the mere ownership effect by 
staying “true” to the initial shopping paradigm 
After failure to obtain an MOE in the pilot study, Experiment 1 was modeled more closely 
on the parameters of previous mere ownership experiments. The goal of Experiment 1 
was to provide a solid background for the subsequent shopping paradigm experiments. 
The aim was to create maximally favorable conditions for the MOE and to recreate key 
features of the experimental set-up employed by Cunningham et al. (2008). With Exper-
iment 1 we replicate the mere ownership effect given standard conditions. That is, the 
“other” to whom one half of stimuli was assigned was a real person. Typically, partici-
pants are instructed to view a specific person as the “other”, for example, the experi-
menter, another participant, or a person they know. The presence of another person might 
make the social categories more salient and, thus, facilitate associations between the self 
and the stimuli. Therefore, with Experiment 1 we aimed to replicate the mere ownership 
effect under maximally favorable conditions. 
 Method 
Participants. Thirty-eight students of Saarland University (33 female, 5 male, aged 18-
39, median age = 23) took part in Experiment 1. They were compensated with a payment 
of six Euros. 
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In order to determine an appropriate sample size, an a priori power calculation was com-
puted using the G.Power tool (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007). The MOE effect 
in the study by Cunningham et al. (2008) was dZ = 0.53, which corresponds roughly to 
what Cohen (1988) termed a medium-sized effect (dZ = 0.50). To detect an effect of dZ = 
0.53 with α = .05 and power 1-β = .80, N = 30 participants are needed. (Factual power 
with n=38 was 1-β=.89). 
Design. We used a within-subjects design with self- versus other-assigned items as the 
sole factor. Three item lists were assigned as self, other, and unstudied list (for the recog-
nition phase) according to a Latin square design. Player color (red vs. blue), player num-
ber (player 1 vs. 2) and player’s own side (right vs. left) were varied systematically but 
are not of theoretical interest and will not be discussed further. 
Materials. One-hundred-fifty pictorial objects (Zimmer, 2012) were chosen and divided 
into three lists containing 50 pictures each. The objects were chosen in such a way that 
each could reasonably be a possession of the participant (see Appendix C2 for a list). 
Thus, in Experiment 1, we used only semantically meaningful stimulus items. In a coun-
ter-balanced design, each of the stimulus lists served as a self-assigned, other-assigned, 
or new stimulus set (for the recognition task). 
Procedure. For each session two participants were teamed up and were each handed a 
cardboard sign that labeled them either as “player one” or as “player two”. They were 
then seated opposite each other, each at a different computer. The computer screens were 
positioned in such a way that participants were facing each other and that each participant 
could only see their own computer screen. On each team, one player was assigned the 
color red while the other player was assigned the color blue. While participants believed 
they both worked through the same set of materials, they were instructed not to communi-
cate during the task which each participant worked through separately. Before the study 
phase, participants were instructed to imagine that they had won half the objects that were 
about to be presented to them in a raffle, while their fellow player had won the other half 
of objects. 
The study phase consisted of 100 trials. To rule out primacy effects for the experimental 
materials, and to familiarize participants with the study task, there was for each partici-
pant an additional set of six practice trials, using items that did not appear in the subse-
quent memory test. To rule out recency effects for the experimental materials, the study 
trials were followed by six trials using items which, again, were not used in the test phase. 
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At the beginning of each trial, a fixation cross was presented slightly above the center of 
the screen for 250 ms. Then, an object was presented in the same place. Below the picture, 
a written label was shown, denoting the object. In the right- and left-bottom corner of the 
screen, pictures of two boxes were presented, representing the participant’s own and the 
fellow player’s box, respectively. After 1500 ms, either a blue or a red frame appeared 
around the object, indicating ownership. Depending on the color of the frame, participants 
had to click either on their own or their fellow players’ box. After a response was made, 
the next trial started. Participants worked through 50 self- and 50 other-assigned objects 
in randomized order. An example of a shopping trial is shown in Figure 8.  
After the sorting phase was completed, participants were asked to perform a surprise 
recognition test. All items from the study phase as well as additional 50 not previously 
Figure 8. An illustration of a shopping trial in the encoding phases of  Experiment 1 and Experiment 2. 
The trial procedure employed in Experiment 2 is the standard we adopted for further experiments using 
the shopping paradigm. 
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encountered items were included in the test phase. At the beginning of each trial, a picture 
was presented at the center of the screen, this time without a verbal label. Participants had 
to indicate per button press whether the picture was “old” or “new”, that is, whether the 
picture had been presented in the study phase (irrespective of whether it was self-assigned 
or other-assigned). If a “new” response was made, the next trial started immediately. If 
an “old”-response was made, the recognition test was followed by a Remem-
ber/Know/Guess (RKG) procedure following the recommendations by (Gardiner et al., 
1997; see also Gardiner et al., 1996). This procedure was included as a second attempt to 
replicate the finding by van den Bos et al. (2010) and was identical to the RKG procedure 
we used in the pilot study. 
 Results 
Recognition memory. Mean hit rates for self-assigned and other-assigned items as well 
as false alarm rates for new items are shown in Appendix B. As in the pilot study, Pr-
scores (Snodgrass & Corwin, 1988) were computed by subtracting the false alarm rates 
for new items from the respective relative hit rates of the self-assigned and the other-
assigned items (see Figure 9).11 The difference between the recognition performance for 
the self-assigned items and the other-assigned items was significant, with better memory 
for the self-assigned than for the other-assigned items, t(37) = 2.48, p = .018, dz = .40.  
                                                 
11 Due to a slight ambiguity in the instructions of Experiment 1 (that was removed in the subsequent stud-
ies), nine participants consistently performed the sorting task with a reversed assignment, resulting in as-
signing own items seemingly to the fellow player and vice versa (that is, they had between 96 % and 100% 
"errors" during the sorting phase whereas the remainder of the sample had between 0 % and 2 % errors.)  It 
is reasonable to assume that those participants reversed the response mapping but still consistently per-
formed a self- versus other assignment task. Thus, for those participants the hit rates in the memory test 
were swapped accordingly. Note that excluding those participants from the analysis did not change the 
pattern of results. 
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Remember/Know/Guess Procedure. In addition to recognition performance, we esti-
mated the relative contributions of recollection and familiarity using the proportions of 
“remember”, “know”, and “guess” judgments for “old” answers. Mean proportions of 
“remember”, “know” and “guess” judgments are shown in Table 3. We used the corrected 
hit rates for each judgment type by subtracting the false alarms from the hits for each (van 
den Bos et al., 2010). From those, relative estimates for the respective contributions of 
recollection and familiarity were computed according to the independent remember/know 
method (Yonelinas & Jacoby, 1995; Jacoby, Yonelinas, & Jennings, 1997). The propor-
tion of “remember” judgments is used directly as an indicator of recollection, defining 
recollection as the corrected hit rate for “remember” judgments. However, familiarity 
cannot be estimated in the same straightforward manner: Rather, it is assumed that the 
proportion of “know” responses underestimates the contribution of familiarity. Since par-
ticipants can be expected to select the “know” option only if they have no conscious rec-
ollection of the encoding episode, this inverse relationship between “remember” and 
“know” responses means that the assumption of process independence is violated if re-
sponse proportions are taken as direct indicators of recollection and familiarity processes. 
Instead, familiarity is estimated as the ratio between the corrected hit rate for “know” 
judgments and the corrected hit rate for “old” responses that are not associated with a 
“remember” judgment. 
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Figure 9. Mean recognition performances for self- vs other-assigned items in  Experiments 1 and 2. The 
Pr-score is computed as the difference between relative hit rate and relative false alarm rate. Error bars 
indicate 95%-confidence intervals for dependent measures according to Jarmasz & Hollands (2009) 
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Recollection estimates were significantly higher for self-assigned than for other-assigned 
items, t(37) = 3.07, p = .004, dz = .50. There was no difference in familiarity estimates 
between self- and other-assigned items, t(37) = .25, p = .80. 
Using a tangible social situation with a real and present “other” we were able to replicate 
the MOE found by Cunningham et al. (2008) as well as the finding that ownership affects 
recollection specifically (van den Bos et al., 2010). This is evidence both for the robust-
ness of the phenomenon and its applicability to our own materials and procedure, as well 
as to a German-speaking sample. 
Table 3. Mean proportion of “remember”, “know” and “guess” judgments after “old” answers in Experi-
ment 1. SD in parentheses. 
Self-assigned Other-assigned False alarms 
Remem-
ber 
Know Guess Remem-
ber 
Know Guess Remem-
ber 
Know Guess 
.64 
(.21) 
.29 
(.18) 
.07 
(.10) 
.58 
(.24) 
.34 
(.20) 
.08 
(.09) 
.14 
(.24) 
.43 
(28) 
.43 
(.32) 
 
 Discussion 
Using a tangible social situation with a real and present “other” we were able to replicate 
the MOE first described by Cunningham et al. (2008) as well as the finding that ownership 
affects recollection specifically (van den Bos et al., 2010). This is evidence both for the 
robustness of the phenomenon and its applicability to our own materials and procedure. 
The contrast between this result and the lack of an MOE in the pilot study presumably 
also highlights the necessity of ensuring appropriate procedural parameters: Apparently, 
ensuring attention to the stimulus item and prevention of recoding into a non-ownership-
related task are crucial for the occurrence of the MOE. 
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3.4 Experiment 2: Is there a mere ownership effect without a 
real social presence? 
After replicating the mere ownership effect in Experiment 1, we wanted to extend the 
finding beyond real social situations. Typically, the “other” in a mere ownership set-up is 
a real person who is present in the experimental situation. Experiment 2 investigated 
whether the MOE would still be obtained if the social other with whom to contrast the 
self was maximally abstract and participants had minimal information about them. In the 
existing research, the social “other” is typically a real person that is either present in the 
laboratory (such as another participant or the experimenter) or somebody familiar to the 
participant.12 
 Method 
Participants. Thirty-eight students of Saarland University (18 female, 20 male, aged 19-
36, median age = 24) took part in the experiment. They were compensated with a payment 
of six Euros. Sample size was based on the same calculation as in Experiment 1. 
Design, Materials and Procedure. The design, materials and procedure were the same 
as in Experiment 1, with the following exceptions: Rather than being teamed up in pairs 
at the beginning of the experiment, participants performed the task alone in a closed cu-
bicle. Participants were not handed cardboard signs indicating their color or number. They 
were simply instructed to imagine that there was another person, referred to as “fellow 
player”, who had won half of the items. The assignment of a color to each player was part 
of the written instructions provided on screen. An example of a shopping trial is shown 
in Figure 8. 
 Results 
Recognition Memory. Mean hit rates for self-assigned and other-assigned items as well 
as false alarm rates for new items are shown in Appendix B. Pr-scores (Snodgrass & Cor-
win, 1988) were computed as in Experiment 1 (see Figure 9). The difference between the 
                                                 
12One exception to this rule is the study by van den Bos et al. (2010) where a fictitious “other” was used. 
However, it can be argued that this “other” was still rather concrete as he was given a name.  
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recognition performance for the self-assigned items and the other-assigned items was sig-
nificant, with better memory for the self-assigned than for the other-assigned items, t(37) 
= 2.77, p = .009; dz = .45. 
Remember/Know/Guess Procedure. Mean proportions of “remember”, “know” and 
“guess” judgments are shown in Table 4. Recollection and familiarity estimates were 
computed as in Experiment 1. Recollection estimates were significantly higher for self-
assigned than for other-assigned items, t(37) = 3.41, p = .002, dz = .55. There was no 
difference in familiarity estimates between self- and other-assigned items, t(37) = .94, p 
= .351.  
Table 4. Mean proportion of “remember”, “know” and “guess” judgments after “old” answers in Experi-
ment 2. SD in parentheses. 
Self-assigned Other-assigned False alarms 
Remem-
ber 
Know Guess Remem-
ber 
Know Guess Remem-
ber 
Know Guess 
.64 
(.20) 
.30 
(.18) 
.05 
(.07) 
.58 
(.21) 
.35 
(.20) 
.06 
(.10) 
.08 
(.13) 
.52 
(.35) 
.39 
(.36) 
 
 Discussion 
Experiment 2 replicated the mere ownership effect both for old/new recognition judg-
ments and for recollection/familiarity estimates under minimal social conditions, thereby 
demonstrating the effect to be independent of the presence of a real and concrete “other”. 
 
3.5 Experiment 3: Is there a mere ownership effect for 
semantically meaningless materials? 
In a next step, we examined whether the MOE depends on using meaningful stimuli. Our 
rationale was that meaningless stimuli should be less likely to be processed semantically 
and thus, if the MOE is driven by semantic processing, it should be reduced or eliminated 
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under these conditions. To this end, we presented participants with meaningless pseudo-
objects, employing the same study and recognition task as in the previous experiments. 
Since we expected that the effect might disappear with meaningless stimuli, we took three 
measures to make a possible null result interpretable: (1) We recruited a larger sample 
than in Experiment 1 and 2 to have a power of 1-β = .95 to detect the smaller of the two 
effects that we have found in Experiments 1 and 2. Thus, a non-significant result will 
signal that if there is an MOE for meaningless pseudo-objects at all, it must be (with high 
certainty) at least smaller than those that we have found in the previous experiments. (2) 
To be prepared to find a more subtle, implicit variant of the MOE (i.e., a more positive 
evaluation for self-owned items compared to other-owned items; Beggan, 1992), we 
added a valence rating of objects to the procedure. (3) Since the procedure of Experiment 
3 is identical to Experiment 2, we planned a cross-experiment comparison to see whether 
a possible null effect is significantly smaller in Experiment 3 compared to Experiment 2. 
 Method 
Participants. Seventy-two students of Saarland University (51 female, 21 male, aged 18-
31, median age = 23) took part in the experiment in exchange for a payment of six Euros. 
The MOEs of Experiment 1 and 2 were dZ = .40 (Exp. 1) and dZ = .45 (Exp. 2), respec-
tively. To detect an effect of dZ = .40 with α = .05 (one-tailed) and power 1-β = .95, N = 
70 participants are needed. 
Materials. One-hundred-twenty colored pictures taken from Zimmer (2012) were used. 
To remove intrinsic meaning, these pictures had been created by merging and distorting 
pictures of real-life objects from the same database. Using a smaller number of items 
seemed appropriate because we expected poorer recognition performance for the mean-
ingless stimuli (Wiseman & Neisser, 1974; Ameli, Courchesne, Lincoln, Kaufman, & 
Grillon, 1988) than for the previously used meaningful objects. In order to further reduce 
the resemblance with familiar objects, we further distorted some of the pictures using the 
GIMP 2.6 image editing software (The GIMP Team, 1997-2016; see Appendix C3 for a 
list of stimuli). As in the previous experiments, these 120 items were assigned to three 
equal-sized lists which, in a counter-balanced design, each functioned as self-assigned, 
other-assigned, and new items. 
Design and Procedure. The design and the procedure for the study and the recognition 
phase were the same as in Experiment 2 with the following exceptions: Instead of being 
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told that they won the depicted objects, participants were asked to imagine that they and 
their fellow player had won paintings from an art collection13. Since there was no a priori 
meaning to the pictorial stimuli presented, no labels were shown beneath the picture. Af-
ter completing the recognition test for all stimuli, participants were also asked to rate the 
valence of the stimuli on a 9-point self-assessment manikin (SAM) scale (Lang, 1980; 
see Figure 10). 
 
Figure 10. The self-assessment manikin (Lang, 1980) used in the valence rating tasks of Experiments 3 
and 6. The scale additionally featured intermediate levels, marked by square boxes, between each pair of 
manikins, resulting in a 9-point scale. 
 Results 
Memory performance. Mean hit rates for self-assigned and other-assigned items as well 
as false rates for new items are shown in Appendix B. Pr-scores were computed by sub-
tracting the false alarm rates for new items from the respective relative hit rates of the 
self-assigned and the other-assigned items (see Figure 11). The difference between the 
recognition performance for the self-assigned items and the other-assigned items did not 
approach significance, t(71) = .57, p = .285 (one-tailed), dz = .01. To provide further sup-
port for this conclusion, we calculated the Bayes factor using the Bayes-ANOVA module 
of JASP (Love et al., 2015). The Bayes factor in favor of the null model is BF01 = 6.60. 
According to the rules of thumb given by Raftery (1995), the value is considered “posi-
tive” evidence for the null hypothesis. This lack of an MOE cannot be attributed to a lack 
of memory in general, since both mean Pr-scores were significantly deviant from zero, 
t(71) = 11.35, p < .001, dz = 1.34 for self-assigned items, t(71) = 12.35, p < .001, dz = 1.46 
for other-assigned items.  
                                                 
13As an anonymous reviewer for Englert and Wentura (2016) has pointed out, the framing as art does not 
completely remove the possibility of assigning meaning to the stimuli as “artwork” or “painting” are 
meaningful concepts. However, since this concept is applied to all stimuli equally, the stimulus objects 
cannot be individuated or discriminated on the basis of semantic content. Furthermore, the relatively 
poor memory performance we report in the results section suggests that participants did indeed not 
process the pictures semantically. 
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Remember/Know/Guess Procedure. Mean proportions of “remember”, “know” and 
“guess” judgments are shown in Table 5. Recollection and familiarity estimates were 
computed as in Experiment 1. There were no differences between self-assigned and other-
assigned items in either recollection or familiarity estimates, t(71) = 1.41, p = .16 and 
t(71) = .64, p = .53, respectively. 
 
Table 5. Mean proportion of “remember”, “know” and “guess” judgments after “old” answers in Experi-
ment 3. SD in parentheses. 
Self-assigned Other-assigned False alarms 
Remember Know Guess Remember Know Guess Remember Know Guess 
.44 
(.28) 
.46 
(.23) 
.10 
(.31) 
.44 
(.29) 
.52 
(.37) 
.04 
(.49) 
.08 
(.16) 
.64 
(.32) 
.28 
(.31) 
 
Mere ownership effect across experiments. To compare the MOEs for meaningful and 
meaningless stimuli, the mean differences in memory performance between self- and 
other-assigned items, that is, the MOEs, for Experiment 2 and 3 were contrasted in an 
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Figure 11. Mean recognition performances for self- vs other-assigned items in  Experiment 3. The Pr-score 
is computed as the difference between relative hit rate and relative false alarm rate. Error bars indicated 
confidence intervals according to Jarmasz & Hollands (2009). 
3 Empirical research using the shopping paradigm 51 
independent samples t-test. The MOE for meaningful objects (Experiment 2) was signif-
icantly larger than the MOE effect for meaningless objects (Experiment 3), t(108) = 2.83, 
p < .01, d = .57, see Figure 12. 
 
Figure 12. Mean mMOEs as computed by the difference in Pr-scores between the self- and other conditions 
for Experiments 2 and 3. Error bars indicate mean standard error. 
Valence ratings. Valence ratings for self-assigned, other-assigned, and new items, re-
spectively, were averaged to obtain a mean valence score for each condition (see Figure 
13). A MANOVA for repeated measures revealed a main effect of item status (self-as-
signed, other-assigned, or new), F(2,70) = 7.85, p = .001, ηp² = .10. A priori Helmert 
contrasts revealed that valence ratings were significantly more negative for new items (M 
= 4.65, SD = .64) than for old items (i.e., self-assigned items, M = 4.77, SD =.59, and 
other-assigned items, M = 4.80, SD = .59, combined), F(1,71) = 11.80, p = .001, ηp² = 
.14. This finding replicates the well-known mere exposure effect (e.g., Zajonc, 2001) by 
demonstrating an influence of previous encoding on evaluation. However, there was no 
significant difference between self-assigned items and other-assigned items, F < 1. 
Hence, there was no MOE in either recognition performance or evaluation in Experiment 
3. 
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Figure 13. Mean valence ratings for self-assigned, other-assigned and new items in Experiment 3. Error 
bars indicate 95%-confidence intervals for dependent measures according to Jarmasz & Hollands (2009). 
 Discussion 
In Experiment 3, with meaningless stimuli we clearly did not find a mere ownership ef-
fect. This was despite the fact that the power to find an effect comparable to the ones 
found in Experiments 1 and 2, was high (1 – β = .95). Furthermore, the effect in Experi-
ment 2 was significantly larger than the one found in Experiment 3. Finally, although we 
replicated a mere exposure effect with our valence ratings, we did not find evidence for 
an implicit MOE in these ratings. Thus, our tentative conclusion is that the MOE is con-
strained to meaningful (“semantically processable”) items; it does not appear to be based 
on a mere binding of semantically non-elaborated perceptual entities. However, there was 
one further difference between Experiment 2 and 3 beyond the variation of meaningful 
and meaningless stimuli: In Experiment 2, stimuli were accompanied by verbal labels in 
the encoding phase which were missing in Experiment 3.Therefore, to be on the safe side, 
with Experiment 4 we conceptually replicated Experiment 2, that is, we presented mean-
ingful picture stimuli, but without a semantic label in the encoding phase now. 
3.6 Experiment 4: Investigating the role of labels and the 
potential aftereffects of semantic elaboration 
With Experiment 4, we conceptually replicate Experiment 2, that is, we presented mean-
ingful pictorial stimuli, but this time, however, without a semantic label in the encoding 
phase. This arrangement allows us to add a further component to the experiment which 
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might yield tentative evidence for the role of semantic processing during the encoding 
phase. If participants tend to spontaneously encode the items semantically, we might find 
evidence for this process later in the test phase. If semantic encoding occurred, then the 
meaning of the stimulus should be more readily available to participants. 
Therefore, in the recognition test of Experiment 4, we employed a double task: First, 
stimuli were presented together with the matching label and participants had to quickly 
decide whether the pictured object and the label match. Then, immediately afterwards, 
the recognition task followed. Of course, non-matching trials were added to make the task 
meaningful. There are two different possible hypotheses associated with this task: First, 
the MOE might occur only under conditions of at least minimal semantic processing of 
items during encoding, that is, it might depend on semantic “processability”. This hypoth-
esis (the “weak hypothesis”) means that – while replicating the MOE – we should find 
some evidence for semantic processing of objects presented in the encoding phase. More 
concretely, in this case matching responses to old items (i.e., both self-assigned and other-
assigned items) should be faster than responses to new items. Second, the MOE itself 
might be mediated by semantic processing (the “strong hypothesis”). In this case, we 
should find a memory advantage of self-assigned items just because this assignment 
causes deeper semantic processing. Therefore, the meaning of self-assigned items should 
be more readily available than the meaning of other-assigned items. As a consequence, 
there should not only be a memory advantage for self-assigned items but matching re-
sponses for self-assigned items should also be faster than matching responses to other-
assigned items. 
 Method 
Participants. Forty-five students of Saarland University (31 female, 14 male, aged 18-
31, median age = 23) took part in the experiment in exchange for a payment of six Euros. 
Data of a further participant were discarded because she performed at chance level (ac-
curacy rate = .52) in the matching task. 
The MOE of Experiment 1 and 2 were dZ = .40 (Exp. 1) and dZ = .45 (Exp. 2), respec-
tively. To detect an effect of dZ = 0.40 with α = .05 (one-tailed) and power 1-β = .80, N = 
41 participants are needed. 
Design. The self-, other-, and new-conditions followed the same design as Experiment 2. 
In the matching task, every item was presented twice, once in the matching and once in 
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the non-matching condition. For each list, one half of items was presented in the matching 
condition in the first block and in the non-matching condition in the second block. The 
order of conditions in which each half of the items was presented first was varied as a 
between-subjects factor. 
Materials. One-hundred-fifty pictures of real-life objects were selected from (Zimmer, 
2012) and divided into three lists. The stimulus set was largely overlapping with the one 
used in Experiments 1 and 2; some objects, however, had to be replaced by objects that 
were more clearly nameable. One-hundred-fifty verbal labels naming objects that were 
not shown in the picture set were chosen for the non-matching trials in the semantic 
matching task. Labels were matched for word length and chosen from the same broad 
semantic categories as the depicted objects (e.g., “axe” and “rake”; see Appendix C4, for 
a list of stimulus pictures and their respective matching and mismatching labels). 
Procedure. The study phase was identical to that of Experiment 3, that is, objects were 
presented without verbal labels. After the study phase, an old/new-recognition task was 
combined with a semantic matching task in which participants were asked to decide 
whether a written label correctly denoted the pictorial object. At the beginning of each 
trial, the instruction “Does the label match the picture? Keep ready.” appeared on screen. 
After 1200ms, it was replaced by a fixation cross which was shown for 600ms. After-
wards, a picture appeared in the same place with a verbal label beneath it, which could 
either correctly denote the pictured object or not. Participants were instructed to indicate 
via button press (“j” for “yes” and “f” for “no”) whether the pairing was correct or not. 
After that, a feedback slide was presented for 1000ms that contained either the word “cor-
rect” in blue font after a correct response or “incorrect” in red font after an incorrect 
response. If responding took longer than 1500 ms, a feedback slide was shown instead 
that said “unfortunately, you were too slow” in red font. The semantic matching task for 
any given item was always followed by a recognition test for that same item. First, the 
question “Did the picture already occur in the sorting phase?” appeared for 1000 ms on 
the center of the screen. Then, this question remained at the top of the screen while the 
same object as in the previous matching task was shown again at the center of the screen. 
Below the object were two boxes with a “no” and a “yes” respectively. Participants had 
to indicate per button press whether the item had already been presented in the study 
phase or not (“j” for “yes” and “f” for “no”). For an illustration of a trial during the test 
phase, see Figure 14. 
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Figure 14. A graphic illustration of the semantic matching and recognition task employed in Experiment 4. 
In this example, a matching trial is shown. 
In the first block of the test phase, participants worked through 150 trials containing each 
item once, with one half of the pictures combined with a correct label and the other half 
combined with an incorrect label. After that, participants worked through a second block 
of 150 trials in which the items previously paired to matching labels were now paired to 
non-matching labels and vice versa. 
 Results 
In the following, we mainly focus on the matching trials. For the matching task itself, the 
response times for correct “no, non-matching” responses cannot be unequivocally inter-
preted since the label never referred to an old item and therefore the information provided 
by the pictures may be at odds with the information provided by the labels. Moreover, the 
recognition task that followed a non-matching trial might be negatively influenced since 
a wrong label might activate a competing object representation, making the question of 
whether the item is old or new ambiguous. Moreover, the rejection of a non-matching 
object-label might bias the subsequent recognition judgment. Nevertheless, we briefly 
report the results for the non-matching trials as well. Table 7 gives a more detailed report 
of the recognition data. 
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Matching trials. In order to test for an MOE, Pr-scores were computed by subtracting 
the false alarm rates for new items from the respective relative hit rates of the self-as-
signed and the other-assigned items (see Appendix B, for hit and false alarm rates, and 
Figure 15, for mean Pr values in the matching trials).  
We employed a 2 (type of item: self-assigned vs. other-assigned) × 2 (block: first vs. 
second) ANOVA for repeated measures to account for the following fact: For half of the 
items (i.e., items of Block 1) the first recognition decision was used whereas for the other 
half of items (i.e., items of Block 2) the second recognition decision was employed (i.e., 
they were already tested once for recognition during the non-matching trials of Block 1). 
The analysis yielded a significant main effect of type of item (i.e., an MOE), F(1,44) = 
5.59, p = .023, ῃp2 = .11, a significant main effect of block, F(1,44) = 28.22, p < .001, ῃp2 
= .62 (Pr-scores were larger in the first block; see Table 7), but no interaction, F(1,44) = 
2.36, p = .132, ῃp2 = .05. 
For the analysis of the matching task, only reaction times for which a correct response 
was made were used in the analyses. Trials with reaction times below 318 ms and trials 
with reaction times above 1139 ms were excluded from the analyses using the Tukey 
criterion for outliers (Tukey, 1977). Mean correct reaction times and accuracy rates are 
shown in Table 6. 
Table 6. Mean response times (in ms; accuracy in parentheses, in %) for self-assigned, other-assigned, 
and new items in Experiment 4. 
 Old Items  
 Self-assigned Other-assigned New Items 
Matching trials 700 (.88) 700 (.89) 709 (.89) 
Non-matching trials 750 (.89) 751 (.90) 753 (.90) 
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A one-factorial (type of item: new vs. self-assigned vs. other-assigned) MANOVA for 
repeated measures on RTs yielded a main effect of item type that missed the conventional 
level of significance, F(2,43) = 2.64, p = .08, ηp² = .11. However, a priori Helmert con-
trasts (that correspond to the “weak” and “strong” hypotheses, see above) yielded clear-
cut results: First, there was not the slightest response advantage for self-assigned over 
other-assigned items, F < 1 (Bayes factor in favor of the null model is BF01 = 6.19; i.e., 
“positive” evidence for the null according to Raftery, 1995). Thus, there was no evidence 
for the strong hypothesis. Second, responses to old items (i.e., items presented in the sort-
ing phase as either self-assigned or other-assigned) were significantly faster than re-
sponses to new items, F(1,44) = 5.34, p = .026, ηp² = .108. For accuracy, there was no 
effect, F < 1. 
Non-matching trials. In the non-matching trials, self-assigned items were associated 
with a nominally better recognition performance than other-assigned items (MS = .31 vs. 
MO = .29). However, the difference was not significant, t(44) = .89, p = .381, dz = .13. 
For the matching task, there was neither a main effect for response times nor for accuracy, 
both F < 1. 
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Figure 15. Mean recognition performances for self- vs other-assigned items in Experiment 4 (matching 
trials only). The Pr-score is computed as the difference between relative hit rate and relative false alarm 
rate. Error bars indicate 95%-confidence intervals for dependent measures according to Jarmasz & Hol-
lands (2009). 
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Table 7. Mean Pr-scores for self- and other-assigned items by block for Experiment 4. SD in parentheses. 
 Matching trials Non-matching trials 
 Self-assigned Other-assigned Self-assigned Other-assigned 
Block 1 .36 (.21) .35 (.17) .37 (.18) .34 (.17) 
Block 2 .27 (.18) 22 (.17) .25 (.19) .24 (.17) 
 
 Discussion 
In Experiment 4, we again found a recognition memory advantage for self-assigned ob-
jects over other-assigned objects, that is, an MOE, comparable to the effects in Experi-
ment 1 and 2, albeit without presenting verbal labels in the encoding phase (as in Exper-
iment 3). This result, combined with the findings of Experiments 1-3, corroborates our 
tentative conclusion that the MOE in recognition memory depends on the meaningfulness 
(i.e., semantic “processability”) of the self- and other-assigned items. A second result 
indeed indicates the role of spontaneous semantic processing in the genesis of an MOE. 
If participants had spontaneously processed objects semantically during the sorting phase, 
they should be faster to verify matching object-label pairs in the matching task. Indeed, 
mean correct matching responses for objects that had appeared in the encoding phase 
were faster than responses for new objects. This result corroborates the view that objects 
were semantically processed during the study phase. Note that the result was specific for 
the matching trials when the label denoted the correct concept (i.e., it was not found for 
the non-matching trials). This detail makes it implausible that the response time ad-
vantage for old objects is due to a mere facilitation of perceptual processing (see, e.g., 
Tulving, 2000), which would have facilitated non-matching responses a well. With some 
caution, the result suggests that the mere ownership advantage seems to not be located at 
a purely perceptual level. This interpretation is corroborated by the fact that the MOE in 
Experiment 4 was clearly present only in matching trials, that is, in a retrieval context that 
provides item picture and label as a cue. The MOE dropped to a non-significant level if 
the item picture served as a cue in a conflicting semantic context. Although there are 
certainly arguments why recognition performance might be diminished if the recognition 
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task is preceded by a non-matching object-label pair (e.g., the compound cue of object 
and wrong label might only create a weak familiarity signal, e.g., Ratcliff & McKoon, 
1988), one might argue that an MOE located at a purely perceptual level should not have 
been influenced by the type of preceding matching trial. Interestingly, mean correct 
matching responses for self-assigned objects that had appeared in the study phase were 
clearly not faster than matching responses for other-assigned objects. This result is at odds 
with a view that semantic processing is the mediator between self- versus other-assign-
ment and the memory effect: We have found no evidence to suggest that assignment to 
the self simply triggers (deeper) semantic elaboration, which is then the proximal cause 
of the memory advantage. 
3.7 Experiment 5: Investigating the role of semantic 
organization using a depth of processing manipulation 
The results of Experiment 3 and 4 suggest that the mere ownership effect in recognition 
memory depends on the meaningfulness (i.e., semantic “processability”) of the self- and 
other-assigned items. Thus, it seems reasonable to surmise that the mere ownership effect 
is indeed driven by some form of semantic processing. If this is indeed the case, then 
forcing semantic encoding via task requirements should make the ownership assignment 
redundant with regards to how deeply a stimulus is processed and thus, reduce or elimi-
nate the MOE. 
On a theoretical level, semantic processing is by no means a homogeneous construct: 
Different types of encoding are postulated depending on task specifics and stimulus prop-
erties. Einstein and Hunt (1980) distinguish semantic elaboration from semantic organi-
zation (see also Chapter 2.2.3). The classical explanation posits that semantic elaboration 
typically drives depth of processing phenomena. Semantic elaboration can be thought of 
as a kind of “intra”-item processing and to rely predominantly on extant declarative 
memory: Elaboration takes place when an item is connected to other concepts in long-
time memory. Since the self is itself an important and rich concept, that is frequently 
activated, information that gets connected to the self benefits from many and easily ac-
cessible associative connections that enhance subsequent memory for the item (Rogers et 
al., 1977). 
An alternative hypothesis following from the older literature on the self-reference effect 
focuses on organization between study items instead of item-specific elaboration as the 
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memory-enhancing mechanism (Klein & Kihlstrom, 1986; Klein & Loftus, 1988; Sy-
mons & Johnson, 1997). The basic idea behind this distinction is that encoding instruc-
tions might either lead to item-specific elaboration processes, independent from the 
remaining study items, or to an organization of the list items into meaningful categories 
(Einstein & Hunt, 1980). It is known that providing participants with a semantically 
meaningful organization principle (e.g., “Is the pictured item a type of food?”) typically 
leads to better memory performance compared to a control situation with categorization 
according to an arbitrary, non-semantic feature (e.g., “Is the pictured item framed?”; see 
Foos & Golkasian, 2008). For the explanation of the self-reference effect the former prin-
ciple means that a given item is related to the rich and complex structure of the self-
concept (i.e., abstract self-knowledge, autobiographical episodes etc.). The latter princi-
ple means that the study items are organized into two meaningful categories, the me-
category and the not-me-category. Though the two principles are not completely disjunct 
(Einstein & Hunt, 1980), they are sufficiently discriminable. 
Going back to the MOE, we might focus on the organization process since the hypothesis 
of an elaboration process is burdened (although not falsified) by the result of Experiment 
4 (i.e., by the result that matching responses were not significantly faster for self-assigned 
compared to other-assigned items). Thus, we hypothesize that the assignment of objects 
to the self or to an abstract other leads to a memory organization of items belonging to 
me versus belonging not to me. Of course, to explain the MOE, we have to assume that 
the categorization as self-assigned versus other-assigned is asymmetrically meaningful, 
that is, the self vs. other categorization functions as a task which encourages organization 
especially for the self-owned items. 
This is not a far-fetched hypothesis since the representations of two categories being con-
trasted need not be symmetrical. For example, it seems plausible that greater salience is 
associated with the self category due to its relevance. Note, that in experiments using a 
category dichotomy for the test of organization processes, such asymmetries are typically 
either not examined or – if examined – not emphasized, since the comparison of the two 
poles of the category dichotomy is usually only of quasi-experimental character and has 
to be taken with caution. 
To test the hypothesis that semantic organization is the driving principle behind the MOE, 
we combined the mere ownership task with a manipulation that required participants to 
classify pictures either according to a meaningful semantic feature (i.e., “Is the object 
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natural or artificial?”; semantic organization task) versus an arbitrary superficial feature 
(i.e., “Is the object colored green or purple?”; non-semantic organization task). 
We expected the semantic categorization task to provide an efficient organizing scheme 
for the stimulus material that would lead to improved recognition performance, whereas 
perceptual categorization should at best provide a weak organizing principle, since it was 
completely arbitrary and did not draw on any meaningful characteristics of the items. 
Thus, it was expected to provide a weaker organizing scheme. 
Additionally, participants had to categorize the objects as self-assigned versus other-as-
signed as in the experiments before. We hypothesize that in the context of the perceptual 
categorization task, the self/other-assignment task is the stronger principle of organization 
and a mere ownership will be obtained. However, the semantic categorization task already 
provides a strong and, most notable, non-arbitrary principle of organization (i.e., objects 
are natural or artificial in contrast to the arbitrary assignment to self or other), and might 
therefore dampen the tendency to use self/other assignment for the purpose of organizing 
the study items. Thus, if the MOE is mainly due to organization, there should be a reduc-
tion of the effect if objects were already categorized according to their meaning. 
 Method 
Participants. Seventy-three students of Saarland University (61 female, 12 male, aged 
18-36, median age = 22) took part in the experiment in exchange for a payment of ten 
Euros. 
The rationale for the choice of sample size was as in Experiment 3: Since the MOE might 
disappear in the context of the semantic organization task, we choose a power of 1-β = 
.95. To detect an effect of dZ =.40 (see Experiment 1 and power planning for Experiment 
2) with α = .05 (one-tailed) and power 1-β = .95, N = 70 participants are needed. 
Design. The design for the self, other, and new assignment was the same as in Experiment 
1. For the additional categorization task, each participant classified one half of the stimuli 
according to their color and the other half to their meaning (natural/artificial). Which half 
of the items were assigned to which task was varied as a between-subjects factor. The 
factors ownership (self vs. other) and depth of processing (perceptual vs. semantic) were 
varied orthogonally. 
Materials. Two hundred and forty pictures of objects were chosen from Zimmer (2012) 
to serve as stimuli in the experiment. Half of these objects could be clearly categorized 
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as artificial objects, while the other half could be clearly categorized as natural objects. 
Each of these pictures was edited into a monochrome scale using the Gimp 2.8 image 
editing software (The GIMP Team, 1997-2016). Half of the artificial objects and natural 
objects, respectively, were converted into green monochromes (120 on the color wheel), 
the respective other half were converted into purple monochromes (300 on the color 
wheel). For the self-other assignment, black frames on a white background, shaped either 
as squares or circles, were used to indicated ownership (instead of red and blue frames as 
in Experiments 1 to 4, since color was a task-relevant feature in one of our study tasks in 
Experiment 5). For a list of stimuli used, see Appendix C5. 
Procedure. Before the study phase, participants were asked to imagine that they had won 
half the objects that were about to be presented to them in a raffle, while their fellow 
player had won the other half of objects. 
The study phase consisted of 160 trials. To rule out primacy effects for the experimental 
materials, and to familiarize participants with the study task, there was for each partici-
pant an additional set of 16 practice trials using items that did not appear in the subsequent 
memory test. To rule out recency effects for the experimental materials, the study trials 
were followed by 16 trials using items which, again, were not used in the test phase. 
Figure 16 shows an exemplary illustration of the encoding tasks. At the beginning of each 
trial, a question indicated to participants whether they should perform the perceptual or 
the semantic categorization task. For the perceptual task, participants were asked whether 
the presented object was green or purple whereas for the semantic encoding task, partic-
ipants were asked whether the presented object was natural or artificial. The question 
remained on screen for 1500ms after which one of the pictorial objects was presented for 
another 1500ms, along with the category labels corresponding to the task. After the item 
had disappeared from the screen, participants indicated whether the object was green or 
purple by pressing “w” or “s” (perceptual categorization task) with their left index finger 
or whether the object was natural or artificial by pressing “o” or “l” with their right index 
finger (semantic categorization task). The time period during which the item was availa-
ble for encoding was the same for the semantic and the perceptual task. 
Throughout the course of the first task, the labels “green” and “purple” for the perceptual 
task or the labels “natural” and “artificial” for the semantic task were presented directly 
above and below the area in which the picture was presented, respectively. After a re-
sponse had been made, the screen went blank for 600ms. Then, the second task started 
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with a second question appearing on the screen, namely to whom the item belonged. The 
same item was presented again for 1500ms. In the right- and left-bottom corner of the 
screen, pictures of two boxes were presented, representing either the participant’s own or 
the fellow player’s box, indicated by a square or a circle symbol, respectively. After 
1500ms, either a circular or a squared frame appeared around the object, indicating own-
ership. Depending on the shape of the frame, the participants had to click either on their 
or the fellow player’s box. After a response was made, the next trial started. Participants 
worked through 80 self- and 80 other-assigned objects. On half of the items in each group, 
the perceptual task was performed, whereas the semantic task was performed on the other 
half. 
After the study phase was completed, participants were asked to perform a surprise recog-
nition test. All items from the study phase as well as an additional 80 not previously 
encountered items were included in the test phase. For each trial, a picture was presented 
at the center of the screen. Participants had to indicate per button press whether the picture 
was “old” or “new”, that is, whether the picture had been presented in the study phase or 
not. Thus, participants did not need to recall details about the orienting task or the own-
ership assignment in order to complete the memory test. If a “new” response was made, 
the next trial started immediately. If an “old”-response was made participants were asked 
to perform the same Remember/Know/Guess procedure as in Experiment 1 and 2. 
 
 
Figure 16. A graphic illustration of the encoding tasks (either perceptual or semantic classification and 
ownership assignment) used in Experiment 5. Since the first encoding task could involve color, ownership 
is now indicated via geometric shape. 
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 Results 
Mean hit rates for self-assigned and other-assigned items as well as false alarm rates for 
new items are shown in Appendix B. For the memory performance, Pr-scores were com-
puted by subtracting the false alarm rates for new items from the respective relative hit 
rates of the self-assigned and the other-assigned items. Pr-scores were computed sepa-
rately for items in the perceptual and the semantic categorization condition (see Figure 
17). 
Recognition Performance. We conducted a 2 × 2 repeated measures ANOVA with the 
orienting task (semantic vs. perceptual) and ownership-assignment (self vs. other) as 
within-participants factors and with recognition performance as indicated by Pr-scores as 
the dependent measure. There was a main effect of orienting task, with better memory 
performance for items that had to be judged semantically compared to items that had to 
be judged perceptually, F(1,72) = 115.83, p <.001, ῃp2 = .62. There was no main effect of 
ownership assignment, F < 1. Crucially, there was a significant interaction between the 
factors orienting task and ownership assignment, F(1,72) = 3.76, p = .028 (one-tailed),14 
ῃp2 = .05. As hypothesized, there was an MOE for items in the perceptual task condition, 
t(72) = 1.71, p = .045 (one-tailed), dZ =.19; the MOE was completely eliminated (numer-
ically even reversed) in the semantic task condition, t(72) = -1.33, p = .19. 
To rule out that the absence of the MOE after the semantic task was simply a ceiling effect 
due to the comparatively high performance level in that condition, we conducted an ad-
ditional analysis, using Experiments 1 and 2 as comparisons for recognition performance 
and the MOE. We conducted a linear regression with a binary dummy variable coding 
Experiment (1/2 vs. 5 [semantic condition]) and overall recognition performance as in-
dexed by the Pr-score as predictors and the MOE as the dependent variable. We found 
that the variable Experiment, but not the overall recognition performance significantly 
predicted the size of the MOE, β = .29, p < .001 and β = .11, p = .187, respectively. Thus, 
the absence of the MOE in the semantic condition of Experiment 5 does not appear to be 
due to the high overall performance. 
                                                 
14Since an F-test with 1 df in the enumerator is equivalent to a t-test and, given our specific predictions, a 
one-tailed test is permissible (see Maxwell and Delaney, 2004, p. 164). 
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Figure 17. Mean recognition performance for self- and other-assigned items by task in Experiment 5. The 
Pr-score is computed as the difference between relative hit rate and relative false alarm rate. Error bars 
indicate 95%-confidence intervals for dependent measures according to Jarmasz & Hollands (2009). 
Remember/Know/Guess-Procedure. Mean proportions of “remember”, “know” and 
“guess” judgments are shown in Table 8. Recollection and familiarity estimates were 
computed as in Experiments 1 and 2, and entered into a 2 × 2 repeated measures ANOVA 
with the orienting task (semantic vs. perceptual) and ownership-assignment (self vs. 
other) as within-participants factors and recollection and familiarity estimates, respec-
tively, as dependent measures. For both the recollections and the familiarity estimates, 
there was a main effect of orienting task: both recollection and familiarity estimates were 
significantly higher for pictures that had been classified conceptually rather than percep-
tually F(1,71) = 38.79, p < .001, ῃp2 = .35, and F(1,70) = 8.45, p = .005, ῃp2 = .11, 
respectively. No other effects reached significance. 
Note that the main effect of orienting task for recollection is in line with earlier research 
whereas the main effect of orienting task for familiarity might appear to be at odds with 
other findings (e.g., Rajaram, 1993; Gardiner, 1998; but see, Toth, 1996, and Sheridan & 
Reingold, 2012, for a differing view). However, Gardiner (1998) and Rajaram (1993) 
simply used the corrected proportion of “know” responses as an indicator of familiarity, 
whereas we computed familiarity according to the independent remember/know method 
(Yonelinas & Jacoby, 1995; see our Experiment 1). If we follow Gardiner and Rajaram 
and employ the proportion of “know” responses15 as the dependent variable, orienting 
task had a significant effect that was, however, reversed as compared to the independent 
                                                 
15As false alarms cannot be differentiated according to orienting task or ownership, they do not differ across 
conditions, making a statistical comparison of uncorrected proportions equivalent to a comparison of 
corrected proportions. 
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remember/know procedure F(1,71) = 14.88, p < .001, ῃp2 = .17. Proportion of “know” 
responses was higher after the perceptual task than after the semantic task, likely 
reflecting a tradeoff between “remember” and “know” responses. The debate on the cor-
rect method is beyond the scope of the present dissertation (e.g., Mayes, Montaldi, & 
Migo, 2007; Migo, Mayes, & Montaldi, 2012). 
Table 8. Mean proportion of “remember”, “know” and “guess” judgments after “old” answers in Experi-
ment 5. SD in parentheses. 
 Self-assigned Other-assigned False alarms 
 Remem-
ber 
Know Guess Remem-
ber 
Know Guess Remem-
ber 
Know Guess 
perceptual 
task 
.53 
(.25) 
.38 
(.23) 
.09 
(.11) 
.53 
(.24) 
.36 
(.21) 
.10 
(.17) 
.22 
(.30) 
.49 
(.33) 
.29 
(.30) 
semantic 
task 
.63 
(.23) 
.32 
(.22) 
.05 
(.07) 
.62 
(.24) 
.32 
(.22) 
.05 
(.07) 
   
Note. The false alarm rate cannot be differentiated between the perceptual and the semantic encoding task 
and is therefore the same in both conditions. 
 Discussion 
In Experiment 5, we found that the categorization of objects into meaningful semantic 
categories reduced the MOE to a null level: When participants made a semantic judgment 
before ownership was assigned, the advantage for self-assigned items disappeared, while 
an MOE (albeit a weak one) persisted after a non-semantic (i.e., perceptual) judgment. 
(However, it should be admitted that we did not obtain this pattern for the recollection 
estimates upon which only the type of orienting task had a significant influence.) Thus, it 
seems that a semantic task that already promotes organization impedes the additional ad-
vantage for self-assigned items. There is a further detail of the results that should be noted. 
The MOE (for items in the perceptual judgment condition) was of a smaller magnitude 
than in previous experiments. This could be a hint that the color task also enhanced or-
ganization of the material, albeit less effectively so. Our results suggest that the self, as a 
3 Empirical research using the shopping paradigm 67 
category, can be used to provide structure in the absence of a more or equally powerful 
organizational scheme. 
 
3.8 Experiment 6: Testing for organization by analyzing 
clustering in a free recall test 
The results of Experiment 5 suggest that semantic organization might be underlying the 
mere ownership effect. If the self is indeed used as an organizing concept, this should not 
simply produce superior memory but also stronger associations among self-assigned 
items compared to associations among other-assigned items. To test this hypothesis more 
directly, we employed a free recall test instead of recognition. Whereas in the case of 
recognition tests, the order in which items are retrieved is beyond the control of the par-
ticipant, in free recall tasks, by necessity, participants themselves determine how the re-
produced material is structured. Rather than being random, it can be assumed that subjects 
reproduce stimulus items systematically (i.e., more clustered, see Appendix A), in an or-
der reflecting their internal organization (Einstein & Hunt, 1980; Klein & Kihlstrom, 
1986; Mandler, 2011). 
 Method 
Participants. Sixty-two students of Saarland University (45 female, 17 male, aged 18-
34, median age = 22) took part in the experiment in exchange for a payment of six Euros. 
Design. We used a within-subjects design with assignment of items as the sole factor. 
Four item lists were assigned to self, other, “no winner” and unstudied list (needed for 
the valence rating, see below) according to a Latin square design. In addition to the self, 
other, and new categories, we assigned a quarter of the stimuli to a “no winner” list, 
meaning that participants were asked to imagine that the object was not handed out. This 
category was added due to our interest in finding clustering differences between the self 
and other categories. Given this goal, more than two categories are necessary to ensure 
that the amount of clustering in one category is not perfectly determined by amount of 
clustering in the other one. Since the retrieval task was a recall test, no new items were 
presented during retrieval. However, we used a list of unstudied items to establish a base-
line in the valence rating (see below). 
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Materials. Eighty pictures of objects were chosen from Zimmer (2012) to serve as stimuli 
in the experiment (see Appendix C6, for a list). These were assigned to four different lists 
which were constructed in such a way that there were no obvious between-list differences 
with regard to semantic category membership of the items. Furthermore, we tried to make 
sure that the items would all be distinctly named on the typical level of granularity used 
by participants during pilot testing (e.g., participants would typically recall both a rose 
and a dandelion as a “flower” during recall, thereby making it unclear which items was 
referred to; therefore, only one type of flower was kept in the final stimulus list). The 
shortening of lists compared to the preceding experiments seemed warranted due to the 
relative difficulty of the recall task and the performance of participants during pilot test-
ing. For the valence rating task, we used the same scale as in Experiment 3 (Lang, 1980; 
see Figure 10). 
Procedure. The study phase was identical to the study phase of Experiment 2 with the 
following exceptions: Participants only worked through 60 study trials and were not pre-
sented with any primacy or recency items (both the relatively low number of stimuli and 
the dropping of primacy- and recency items seemed warranted due to pilot testing). Fur-
thermore, a third of the presented items now had to be classified as “no winner” items. If 
an item belonged to the no winner category, a black frame appeared around the picture 
after the 1500 ms presentation period. Participants than had to click on a box with the 
label “no winner” written on it in black letters, which was presented in the center between 
the self- and other boxes for all participant. Immediately after participants had completed 
the study phase, the free recall test started. Participants were handed a pen and a sheet of 
paper and were instructed to write down whatever items they remembered from the study 
phase during a period of five minutes. In order to be able to assess the order of recall, 
participants were instructed to write each item in a consecutive line on the sheet. They 
were further informed that the owner of the object was irrelevant to their task and asked 
to put down synonyms if they could not recall the identifying label an object had been 
presented with. After five minutes, the experimenter collected the sheets with the partic-
ipant’s responses and instructed them to continue the experiment using the computer. 
Finally, participants completed a valence rating task for the 80 pictorial objects. The pro-
cedure of the rating task was identical to the procedure of the valence rating task in Ex-
periment 3. 
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 Results 
Mere Ownership Effect. Mean number of recalled items for the “self”, “other” and “no 
winner” condition, respectively, are shown in Figure 18. On average, participants recalled 
more self-assigned than either other-assigned or “no winner”-objects, F(2,60) = 9.59, p < 
.001, ηp²=.24, for a MANOVA for repeated measures. Bonferroni-Holm adjusted t-tests 
yield significant comparisons for self versus other, t(61) = 4.14, p < .001, d = .53 and for 
self versus “no winner”, t(61) = 3.91, p < .001, dz =.50, but no significant difference for 
other versus “no winner”, t(61) = .51, p = .61. Thus, the MOE seems to extend to free 
recall tasks. 
 
Clustering. For an index of clustering for single categories, we followed Bower et al. 
(1969) as well as Robbins and Nolan (2001) who independently suggested two indices 
(MRR by Bower et al., c by Robbins & Nolan; see Appendix A for a closer look at 
measures of clustering), which are formally equivalent. To recapitulate the rationale of 
the index provided by Robbins and Nolan (2001): The number of “runs” c – that is, of 
uninterrupted sequences of same-category items – is relativized by the number of recalled 
items for the given category (n) according to the following formula: 
𝑐 =  
𝑛 − 𝑟
𝑛 − 1 
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Figure 18. Mean recall performance for self- and other-assigned items as well as “no winner”-items in 
Experiment 6. Error bars indicate 95%-confidence intervals for dependent measures according to Jarmasz 
& Hollands (2009). 
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If, for example, 4 self-assigned items are recalled in a single sequence (i.e., r = 1), c equals 
1. If, however, the 4 self-assigned items are always followed by at least one other-as-
signed or “no winner”-item (i.e., r = 4), c equals 0. Note that the index is not biased by 
the total amount of recalled items for the category. That is, the fact that on average more 
self-assigned items are recalled compared to other-assigned items does not bias the com-
parison of amount of clustering. Thus, it allows for a comparison of the relative amount 
of clustering between different categories in the same output list of recalled items. Note 
that the index cannot be computed if n = 1 (and, of course, one should refrain then from 
computing c if n = 0). We calculated c for self-assigned and other-assigned items, leaving 
out the “no winner”-items both for reasons of statistical power (only n = 36 participants 
had recalled enough items in each category) and due to complex interdependencies be-
tween the categories precluding an ANOVA with all three indices16. A subsample of n = 
40 participants had valid c values for both categories. Clustering scores are shown in 
Figure 19. The amount of clustering was larger for self-assigned (McS = .347) than for 
other-assigned (McO = .191) items in a Wilcoxon test (which was employed due to slight 
deviance from normality), z = 2.66, p = .008, r = .30. 
                                                 
16 In our experiment, a statistical independence is only possible for two indices. Avoiding a dependence 
between the self- and other category was the reason why the third, “no winner”-category was added to the 
design in the first place. To illustrate the point, take the following example (we assume for this case that at 
least two items are recalled for each category): If the self-assigned items are recalled in one sequence (i.e., 
c = 1), the index for other-assigned items can still vary between 0 (i.e., each other-assigned item is at least 
followed by one “no winner”-item) and 1 (i.e., the other-assigned items are recalled in one sequence as 
well). However, the index for the third category is constrained: if c(self) = c(other) = 1, obviously c(“no 
winner”) must be 1 as well. If c(self) = 1 and c(other) = 0 then c(“no winner”) equals 0 as well if the number 
of recalled other-assigned items and “no winner”-items are equal. In case that the number of “no winner” 
items is larger than the number of other- assigned items (the converse cannot hold if c(other) = 0), 0 < c(“no 
winner”) < 1 holds. 
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Figure 19. Clustering scores as measured by c for self- and other assigned items in the free recall test in 
Experiment 6. Error bars indicate 95%-confidence intervals for dependent measures according to Jarmasz 
& Hollands (2009). 
Valence ratings. Valence ratings for self-assigned and other-assigned items, respec-
tively, were averaged to obtain a mean valence score for each condition (see Figure 20). 
On average, participants self-assigned objects were evaluated more positively than other-
assigned objects, M = 5.87, SD = .53 and M = 5.73, SD = .51, respectively, t(61) = 2.17, 
p = .034, d = .28. This finding replicates the evaluative MOE (Beggan, 1992) for mean-
ingful stimuli.  
 
Figure 20. Mean valence ratings for self-assigned, other-assigned, “no winner”, and new items in Experi-
ment 6. Error bars indicate 95%-confidence intervals for dependent measures according to Jarmasz & Hol-
lands (2009). 
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Evaluative Mere Ownership effect across Experiments. To compare the MOEs for 
meaningful and meaningless stimuli, the evaluative MOEs, that is the difference between 
valence ratings for self- and other-assigned items for Experiment 3 and 6, were contrasted 
in an independent samples t-test. The evaluative MOE for meaningful objects (Experi-
ment 6) was significantly larger than the evaluative MOE for meaningless objects (Ex-
periment 3), t(92.20) = 2.33, p = .022, d = .40 (see Figure 21). This conforms to the pattern 
found for recognition performance when comparing the MOEs of Experiments 2 and 3. 
 
Figure 21. Mean eMOEs as computed by the difference in valence ratings between the “self”- and “other” 
conditions for Experiments 3 and 6. Error bars indicate mean standard error. 
 Discussion 
Experiment 6 corroborates and extends the findings of Experiment 5 to a different 
memory task. First, we found higher recall of self-assigned as compared to other-assigned 
items, showing the MOE to occur not only in recognition memory, but also in free recall 
tasks. Second, and even more importantly, we found significantly higher clustering of 
self-assigned as compared to other-assigned items, suggesting that semantic organization 
contributes to the MOE and that the self as an organizing concept improves inter-item 
processing for self-assigned stimuli. 
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4 Self-prioritization and mere ownership: do inci-
dental connections to the self give rise to self-
memory advantages? 
“We argue here that the presence of a self-representation does indeed do something for 
us – notably it acts as an integrative hub for information processing, helping to bind to-
gether different types of information and even different stages of processing” – Jie Sui 
and Glyn W. Humphreys (2015) 
4.1 Pushing the limits of self-involvement: A “merest” 
ownership effect? 
In the case of the SRE and the self-referential task, the connection with the self is mean-
ingful and explicit. To a certain extent, this is also true for the shopping paradigm (Cun-
ningham et al., 2008). While no conscious reflection on the self or the stimuli is required 
of participants, they are still instructed to imagine the study objects as their own posses-
sions and ownership is the task-relevant dimension of the encoding task. In the introduc-
tion, I have raised the question of what it means for the MOE to be “mere”, that is, in 
what way it could be viewed as “purely” due to a connection to the self, and little more. 
The shopping paradigm already eliminates confounding factors such as preference and 
choice, and its task demands do not call for participants to elaborate on the objects or 
themselves, or to retrieve knowledge of their own person from long-term memory. How-
ever, the link between the self and the to-be-learned stimuli is still made explicit and 
meaningful: Participants are instructed to imaging owning half of the presented objects. 
Furthermore, ownership is task-relevant: During the shopping task, participants are asked 
to assign stimuli to the correct owner. What would happen to memory performance if 
objects were tied to the self in a more indirect fashion and this connection was completely 
incidental to the task? Turk et al. (2008) looked into this question comparing the effects 
of self-referential stimuli when they were either task-relevant or incidental to the task. 
Participants were presented with either their own name or photograph or the name or 
photograph of a celebrity as a reference cue. Above or below this cue, a number of trait 
adjectives were shown one at a time. Participants had to either decide whether the adjec-
tive described the cued person (explicit self-referential condition) or whether the adjective 
was presented below or above the cue on the screen. This procedure was followed by a 
recognition memory task: In both conditions, memory performance was higher for stimuli 
that had been presented together with a self-cue. Therefore, a self-memory advantage can 
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occur even if the self is irrelevant to the task at hand, and the stimuli are not explicitly 
linked to the self via instructions. In contrast, Cloutier and Macrae (2008) found no 
memory advantage of ownership alone when stimulus objects were indirectly associated 
with the self via lottery-like numbers. In one condition, participants could either draw 
several numbers which they believed would determine “their” prizes, or simply be handed 
out an arbitrary selection of numbers by the experimenter. Here, the MOE was conditional 
on perceived choice: Recognition memory for self-assigned objects was greater than for 
other-assigned objects only when participants were given an illusion of choice by being 
allowed to draw their own numbers. While the additional choice factor complicates the 
interpretation of these findings, this result suggests that an indirect connection between 
objects and the self might not always be sufficient to produce an MOE.  
4.2 The self-prioritization effect in perceptual matching: 
A(nother) relative of the mere ownership effect? 
One phenomenon that shows a cognitive benefit of self-assignment under very rudimen-
tary conditions is the perceptual self-prioritization effect (Sui et al., 2012). Sui et al. found 
an advantage for newly learned associations between the self and arbitrary simple objects 
(e.g., a triangle) as compared to associations between simple objects and other persons or 
a neutral object. In this task, participants are instructed that they, themselves, are one 
geometric shape, such as a circle, while other persons or things “are” each a different 
shape. Often, the self-association will be compared to a condition where a shape is paired 
with a familiar other – such as the participant’s mother - and another more distant object 
or person (such as a chair or an acquaintance). After learning these pairings, participants 
are presented with various combinations of a geometric shape and a word labeling a per-
son or object. Their task is to decide whether any given pairing is correct, that is, whether 
it corresponds to the assignment given in the instructions (see Chapter 5.1.1, Figure 22, 
for an illustration). Typically, participants are faster to respond with “yes” to a correct 
pairing that involves the self and are more accurate in deciding whether a pairing involv-
ing the self-assigned shape is correct (e.g. Sui et al., 2012; Sui & Humphreys, 2013; 
Schäfer, Wentura, & Frings, 2015; Schäfer, Wesslein, Spence, Wentura, & Frings, 2016). 
Since the pairing of self and object was completely arbitrary and did not require any elab-
oration on the meaning of the stimuli, it seems implausible that this effect is driven by 
more extensive conceptual processing of the materials. Indeed, Sui et al. (2012) locate the 
self-prioritization effect at the conceptual level, suggesting that associating a stimulus to 
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the self automatically causes this stimulus to become more salient and, thus, be processed 
faster when it is encountered again. The self-prioritization effect is remarkable because a 
cognitive benefit is conveyed through a very simple, arbitrary, and, it can be argued, not 
very meaningful manipulation. Yet, a prioritization of the self is reliably found in the 
perceptual matching task. With regards to the MOE and in what sense it can be truly 
assumed to be “merely” an effect of self-assignment, this raises the question whether the 
perceptual matching task can be utilized to test the limits of the MOE. Could such an 
association of a shape to the self be then extended to other stimuli which, through simple 
co-occurrence, become linked to that shape? Could this then give rise to an MOE-like 
memory advantage for those objects, even though their connection to the self is indirect, 
implicit and task-irrelevant? Such a finding would be interesting because it would suggest 
that the MOE is indeed very basic, and requires very few conditions to be met. Further-
more, it could provide evidence that different tests of self-involvement on cognition cap-
ture at least partially overlapping mechanisms. It has been suggested, that the self could 
act as some sort of “integrative glue” (Sui & Humphreys, 2015, p. 719) allowing the 
binding-together of information, even across different stages of information processing. 
The perceptual salience thought to underlie the self-prioritization effect and explicit 
recognition memory can be seen as pertaining to such distinct processing stages. An im-
pact of the type of self-assignment used in the perceptual matching task (Sui et al., 2012) 
on both, would provide evidence in favor of this view of the self being “integrative”. On 
the other hand, if no MOE was observed in the presence of a self-prioritization effect, this 
might be interpreted as evidence that they are based on different mechanisms and do not 
necessarily target the same construct. Such an observation would fit in well with views 
proposed by Klein (2012) or Neisser (1988) that the self is not a homogeneous entity. In 
a final experiment (Experiment 7), we combined the perceptual matching task (Sui et al., 
2012) with the presentation of visual object stimuli which were incidental to the task. We 
hypothesized that objects that had been consistently presented together with the self-
shape would be more likely to be remembered in a subsequent recognition test. 
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5 Empirical research using the perceptual matching 
paradigm 
“The warden said, "Hey, buddy, don't you be no square 
If you can't find a partner use a wooden chair"” – Jerry Leiber and Mike Stoller (1957) 
5.1 Experiment 7: A mere ownership effect for incidental 
connections to the self? 
The goal of Experiment 7 was to test whether an MOE could be obtained using a link to 
the self that was completely incidental and that was not explicitly established by instruc-
tions and task demands (see, e.g., Turk et al., 2008). To this end, we employed the per-
ceptual matching task introduced by Sui et al. (2012) during encoding.17 In this task, par-
ticipants have to decide whether an identity label (e.g. self or other) presented together 
with a geometric shape matches with a mapping learned during instruction. We combined 
this matching task with incidental presentation of visual objects similar to those we used 
in the preceding experiments employing the shopping paradigm. We then tested whether 
subsequent recognition memory was improved for objects consistently presented with the 
shape that was assigned to the self. A brief, summary overview of the method and aim of 
Experiment 7 is provided in Table 9. 
Table 9. A summary overview over Experiment 7, the broad method that was used, and the question it was 
intended to address.
                                                 
17I would like to thank Dr. Sarah Schäfer for her collaboration in planning, designing, and implementing 
Experiment 7, as well as for processing the reaction time data in the matching task for further analyses, 
and for her help analyzing data pertaining to the self-prioritization effect. 
Experiment  
 
Method Aim 
Experiment 7 Perceptual Matching 
Task combined with in-
cidental encoding of vis-
ual objects 
 
What is the relationship between the MOE 
and the self-prioritization effect. Is an inci-
dental connection to the self sufficient for 
the MOE? 
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 Method 
Participants. Thirty-eight students of Saarland University (27 female, 11 male, aged 19-
31, median age = 25) took part in Experiment 7. They were compensated with a payment 
of six Euros. The data of one further participant was discarded as he did not follow task 
instructions18. In order to determine an appropriate sample size, an a priori power calcu-
lation was computed using the G.Power tool (Faul et al., 2007). The mean MOE from our 
Experiments 1 and 2 was dZ = 0.43, which was somewhat lower than the effect found by 
Cunningham et al. (2008) but still roughly corresponds to what Cohen (1988) termed a 
medium-sized effect (dZ = 0.50). To detect an effect of dZ = 0.43 with α = .05 and power 
1-β = .80, N = 37 participants are needed. Factual power with n=38 was 1-β=.82. 
Materials. For the encoding and memory test phases, one-hundred-twenty pictorial ob-
jects (Horner & Henson, 2009) were chosen, given black, instead of their original white, 
backgrounds, and divided into two lists containing sixty pictures each, which, in turn, 
were divided into three sublists containing twenty pictures, resulting in a total of six sub-
lists. The objects were chosen in such a way that each could reasonably be a possession 
of the participant.  
For the matching task, the geometric shapes were square, circle, and hexagon19. Stimuli 
used as identity labels were the German words “Ich” [“I”], “Mutter” [“mother”], and 
“Bekannter” [“acquaintance”]. Shape outlines and labels were presented in white on a 
black background.  
For a list of the visual objects and geometric shapes used in Experiment 7, see Appendix 
C7. 
Design. For each participant, one list of sixty items served as study list, with the other list 
serving as foils in the recognition task. Which list served as the “old” or the “new” item 
set was balanced across participants. Within each list of sixty items, a subset of twenty 
pictures was assigned to the circle, square and hexagon shapes, respectively. This assign-
ment between study items and geometric shapes remained the same across participants. 
                                                 
18This participant exhibited hit and false alarm rates of 100% each, indicating only “old” responses, and 
performed at almost exactly chance level in the matching task, indicating “no match” responses. Since he 
showed no discrimination in either the matching or the memory task, this did not affect the results. 
19 Typically, a triangle is used instead of a hexagon. We made this change in order to have a larger area for 
placing pictures inside the geometric shape.  
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For each participant, each shape (i.e. square, circle and hexagon) was assigned to an iden-
tity label (“I”, “mother” and “acquaintance”) via a one-to-one mapping. The assignment 
between shape and label was varied between participants according to a Latin square de-
sign, resulting in three distinct combinations of “shape + identity”-assignments. Thus, the 
label or identity (i.e. “self”, mother or acquaintance) each picture was assigned to was 
varied following the assignment conditions of labels and geometric shapes. Therefore, for 
the matching task, we used a 2 x 3 x 3 mixed design with matching condition (matching 
vs. non-matching) and identity (self vs. mother vs. acquaintance) as within-subject fac-
tors, and “shape+ identity”-assignment as a between-subject factor. For the recognition 
task, this corresponded to a 2 x 3 x 2 design with item status (old vs. new) as a within-
subject factor, and label identity (self vs. mother vs. acquaintance) as a nested factor for 
only the old items, and list condition (which list was used as study vs. distractor list) as a 
between-subject factor. 
Procedure. Participants performed the task on their own in a closed cubicle, in front of a 
computer monitor. Written task instructions were given on the screen. The experiment 
consisted of a practice phase for the perceptual matching task, an encoding phase dou-
bling as a perceptual matching task, and a surprise recognition test. Before the practice 
task started, the three label-stimulus assignments (one assignment for each label) were 
shown on the display for sixty seconds. For a given participant this instruction might have 
read: 
“I am the hexagon. 
My mother is the square. 
An acquaintance is the circle.” 
Participants were instructed to place the index finger of the left hand on the S-key (non- 
matching response) and the index finger of the right hand on the L-key (matching re-
sponse).  
The practice phase consisted of 96 trials. It was intended to familiarize participants with 
the matching task. Therefore, we presented only shapes and (matching or non-matching) 
identity labels, without further visual objects, during that phase. The study phase con-
sisted of 240 trials. Half the trials were matching and the other half were non-matching 
trials. Each geometric shape and, thus, each type of label appeared with equal frequency. 
To rule out primacy effects for the experimental materials, there was for each participant 
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an additional set of twelve practice trials, using six items that did not appear in the sub-
sequent memory test. To rule out recency effects for the experimental materials, the study 
trials were also followed by twelve trials using a further six study items which, again, 
were not used in the test phase. There was no consistent mapping of the twelve primacy 
and recency items on the one hand, and geometric shape on the other hand. 
An exemplary illustration of the perceptual matching task is given in Figure 22. At the 
beginning of each trial, a blank screen followed by a fixation cross which was positioned 
slightly above the center of the screen were presented for 500 ms each. Then, one of the 
study images appeared slightly above the position of the fixation cross. After 300 ms, the 
geometric shape and a written matching or non-matching label (“I”, “mother” or “ac-
quaintance”) appeared. The shape always enclosed the image and the identity label was 
always presented below that, slightly below the position of the fixation cross. After 
500ms, this was replaced by a blank screen which remained for a maximum of 1500ms. 
Participants could respond to the matching combination within a time window of 2000ms, 
starting with onset of the geometric shape and label. Each visual object was presented 
four times, twice in the matching and the non-matching condition, each. 
500 ms 
Mother 
+ 
1500 ms or keypress 
+ 
500 ms 
300ms 
500 ms 
Figure 22. Overview of a perceptual matching trial. The participant’s task is to decide whether the pairing 
of “mother” with circle is correct, that is, as learned in the instructions. 
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After the matching phase was completed, participants were asked to perform a surprise 
recognition test. At the beginning of each trial, a picture was presented at the center of 
the screen. Participants had to indicate per button press whether the picture was “old” or 
“new”, that is, whether the picture had been presented in the study phase (irrespective of 
whether it was self-assigned or other-assigned). If a “new” response was made, the next 
trial started immediately. If an “old”-response was made, the recognition test was fol-
lowed by a Remember/Know/Guess (RKG) procedure following the recommendations 
by (Gardiner et al., 1997; see also Gardiner et al., 1996). All items from the study phase 
as well as an additional 60 not previously encountered items were included in the test 
phase. Thus, participants worked through 120 recognition trials. 
 Results 
Matching Task. Mean correct response times for the matching trials were computed for 
the self-, mother- and acquaintance-conditions respectively, after removing outliers ac-
cording to the Tukey criterion (Tukey, 1977, see Table 10). A one-way MANOVA for 
repeated measures revealed a main effect of assignment on reaction times (F2,36=25.56, 
p<.001; η2=.59). Planned comparisons revealed marginally faster reaction times for the 
self-assigned shape than for the mother, t(37) = 2.00; p = .027, one-tailed, and signifi-
cantly faster reaction times for the self-assigned than for the acquaintance-assigned shape, 
t(37) = 6.12; p < .001 , as well as significantly faster matching RTs in the “mother” than 
the acquaintance condition , t(37)= 5.60; p < .001. Mean accuracies for both the matching 
and the non-matching trials were computed for the self-, mother- and acquaintance-con-
ditions, respectively (see Table 5). A one-way MANOVA for repeated measures revealed 
a main effect of assignment on accuracy (F2,36=28.82, p <.001; η2=.62). Planned compar-
isons revealed significantly higher accuracies for the self-assigned shape as compared to 
the mother- (t(37)= 3.25; p = .002 ) and stranger-assigned shape (t(37) = 7.68 ; p < .001), 
as well as significantly higher accuracies for the “mother”-assigned than the stranger-
assigned condition (t(37) = 5.00; p < .001 ). Thus, a self-prioritization effect reliably 
emerged for both outcome measures. 
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Table 10. Mean correct response times (in ms) and accuracy rates in the perceptual matching task of Ex-
periment 7. SD in parentheses. 
 Matching trials Non-matching trials Recognition 
 RT (ms) Accuracy RT (ms) Accuracy Mean Pr 
Self 536 (122) .84 (.21) 617 (160) .73 (.21) .22 (.26) 
Mother 563 (139) .76 (.22) 626 (158) .72 (.17) .23 (.23) 
Acquaint-
ance 
617 (162) .62 (.22) 615 (156) .74 (.17) .21 (.26) 
 
Recognition memory. Mean hit rates for self-assigned and other-assigned items as well 
as false alarm rates for new items are shown in Appendix B. Pr-scores (Snodgrass & Cor-
win, 1988) were computed by subtracting the false alarm rates for new items from the 
respective relative hit rates of the self-assigned and the other-assigned items (see Figure 
23). Overall recognition performance was significantly above chance (M=.22, SD= .21; 
t(38) = 6.58, p < .001), indicating that the objects had indeed been encoded during the 
matching task. A one-way ANOVA for repeated measure revealed no main effect of as-
signment. A planned comparison revealed that the difference between the recognition 
performance for the self-assigned items and the other-assigned items was not significant 
(F(1,37) = .003, p = .958), with roughly similar memory for the self-assigned than for the 
other-assigned items (i.e., self-assigned items, M = .23, SD = .26, other-assigned items, 
M = .23, SD = .23 and stranger-assigned items, M =.21, SD = .26). Hence, there was no 
MOE in the recognition data. None of the individual comparisons approached signifi-
cance, with t < .58, p > .56. 
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Figure 23. Mean recognition performance for self-, mother-, and acquaintance-assigned items in Experi-
ment 7. The Pr-score is computed as the difference between relative hit rate and relative false alarm rate. 
Error bars indicate 95%-confidence intervals for dependent measures according to Jarmasz & Hollands 
(2009). 
Remember/Know/Guess Procedure. Mean proportions of remember, know and guess 
judgments after “old” answers for self-shape-assigned, other-shape-assigned and new 
items are shown in Table 11. We used the corrected hit rates for each judgment type (van 
den Bos et al., 2010) by subtracting the false alarms from the hits for each. A one-way 
ANOVA for repeated measures revealed no main effect of assignment on the frequency 
of either “remember” (F2,33 = .97, p = .388) or “know” judgments (F2,33 = .57, p = .569).  
Table 11. Mean proportion of “remember”, “know” and “guess” judgments after “old” answers in Experi-
ment 7. SD in parentheses. 
Self-assigned Other-assigned False alarms 
Remem-
ber 
Know Guess Remem-
ber 
Know Guess Remem-
ber 
Know Guess 
.39 
(.28) 
.46 
(.27) 
.15 
(.26) 
.37 
(.27) 
.49 
(.22) 
.14 
(.22) 
.27 
(.31) 
.48 
(.28) 
.25 
(.29) 
Note. “Remember”, “know” and “guess” rates for “other”-assigned items in Experiment 7 are computed as 
the mean between the respective rates of the “mother” and the “acquaintance” condition. 
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 Discussion 
Using the perceptual matching paradigm introduced by Sui et al., (2012) which we com-
bined with a presentation of visual objects and a subsequent recognition task, we repli-
cated the self-prioritization effect, but found no evidence of an MOE using this set-up. 
An incidental, implicit connection to the self via matching shapes did not appear sufficient 
to produce a memory advantage for self-assigned items. This is compatible with earlier 
results by the author trying to establish an implicit link between study items and the self 
using the rubber hand illusion (Englert, 2013; Englert & Wentura, 2013) which showed 
no consistent effects of ownership on memory performance. 
While interpreting a null result is difficult, one tentative conclusion from this dissociation 
might be that the self-prioritization effect and the MOE are in fact distinct phenomena, 
and driven by distinct cognitive processes. Furthermore, this result is in line with the 
notion that items must be processed in a meaningful way in relation to the self for an 
MOE to emerge. 
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“Possession of anything begins in the mind”- Bruce Lee (quoted in Little, 1997) 
6.1 A summary of results on the mere ownership effect 
In a series of eight experiments, seven of which employed the shopping paradigm (Cun-
ningham et al., 2008), we tested for the MOE under varying conditions that might influ-
ence its occurrence (see Table 12, for a brief summary of experiments and results). De-
pendent variables included memory performance in recall and recognition, subjective 
judgments of noetic states, evaluative judgments, reaction times in a semantic matching 
decision and an index for category clustering in free recall. While we did not obtain an 
MOE for every test, we consistently observed an MOE when the following conditions 
were met: 
(a) Experimental conditions made it likely that participants paid attention to the ob-
jects that were presented and the ownership task was not likely to be recoded 
into a simpler color-categorizing task by the participants. 
(b) Neither the shopping nor the retrieval task were interfered with by additional 
tasks which required participants’ attention and could plausibly interfere with 
the MOE. 
(c) The objects that were assigned to either the participants or another person were 
meaningful objects that could easily be labelled. 
(d) The assignment to the self was explicit and direct. 
When steps were taken to ensure that the encoding task was performed as intended, we 
were able to replicate the recognition memory advantage for self-assigned stimuli de-
scribed by Cunningham et al. (2008) in our Experiments 1 and 2. When the stimuli as-
signed to the participant or a real fellow player were semantically meaningful objects, an 
MOE reliably emerged. Experiment 2 shows that the presence of a real fellow player is 
not a necessary condition for the MOE. Establishing an imaginary “other” was enough to 
produce an MOE. Indeed, in Experiments 1 and 2, we obtained MOEs of comparable 
size, regardless of how the social other was implemented. Making the other person max-
imally abstract by being neither named nor physically present did not affect the size of 
the MOE. 
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Interestingly, we did not find any evidence for an MOE without semantic processing: 
Testing whether semantic processing in some form or another is required for the MOE, 
in Experiment 3 we conducted a shopping paradigm experiment using stimulus objects 
that had no discernible meaning or purpose and could be assumed to be both unfamiliar 
and have no corresponding lexical entry that would have enabled participants to verbally 
label them. Under these conditions, the MOE was eliminated. This was true for both the 
memory and the evaluation task. Therefore, it appears that, in order for an MOE to 
emerge, subjects must be able to process the meaning of the stimuli in some form. Fur-
thermore, we did not obtain any evidence for an MOE-like phenomenon when the con-
nection between the self and the learning material was not made explicit. In Experiment 
7, we presented visual objects along with geometrical shapes, which could be linked to 
the self or another person, in a perceptual matching task (Sui et al., 2012). While we 
obtained the self-prioritization effect characterized by a faster and more accurate affirm-
ative responses of self-assigned shapes with their respective labels, a subsequent recog-
nition test revealed no trace of an MOE. Therefore, it seems that the self-prioritization 
effect and the MOE are not merely products of the same underlying process, but rather 
distinct phenomena. An explicit and at least minimally meaningful connection between 
the self and the to-be-learned object appears to be a prerequisite for the MOE. Tentative 
evidence for spontaneous semantic processing was found in Experiment 4 where we pre-
sented picture stimuli without a semantic label in the encoding phase. We not only again 
found an MOE but also evidence for spontaneous semantic processing, since 
(a) response times in an object-label matching task were faster for old items com-
pared to new ones and  
(b) the MOE was restricted to matching trials.  
However, we found no difference in matching response times for self- and for other-as-
signed objects. This means that the MOE, that is the difference in memory performance 
between self- and other-assigned items, cannot simply be explained in terms of such spon-
taneous semantic processing. While the MOE seems to be clearly situated at the semantic 
level, it remains to be seen exactly what types of processes underlie it. In the depth of 
processing literature, semantic elaboration (or intra-item processing) and semantic organ-
ization (inter-item processing) have been distinguished (Einstein & Hunt, 1980; Mandler, 
2011). Organization enhances memory by facilitating associations within the to-be-
learned stimulus lists or between the stimuli and their superordinate category. This type 
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of processing can be contrasted with semantic elaboration, which is thought to foster as-
sociations between the stimuli and extant knowledge in long-term memory. Both elabo-
rative and organizational processing are thought to drive or at least contribute to the self-
reference effect (Klein & Kihlstrom, 1986; Klein & Loftus, 1998; Symons & Johnson, 
1997). 
With Experiments 4 to 6, we explored potential contributions of these two processes. 
First, the results of the matching task in Experiment 4 give some provisional evidence 
that elaboration might not play a major role in the MOE20. Second, in Experiment 5, an 
MOE was obtained when an arbitrary perceptual categorization principle was set in com-
petition to the self/other-assignment during encoding, but not if a semantic categorization 
task was the additional competitor. The semantic orienting task can be assumed to pro-
mote semantic organization more strongly than semantic elaboration, since it required 
participants to group the stimulus material into different categories, but not to retrieve 
further information about the stimuli from long-term memory. Thus, the results fit with 
an interpretation of the MOE in terms of organization of self-assigned items. Experiment 
6 corroborated this assumption by demonstrating greater clustering for self-assigned 
items than other-assigned items in a free recall task, wherein the amount of clustering can 
be thought to reflect the amount to which items of a certain category are grouped together 
(i.e., organized), in memory. 
 
Table 12. Overview of experiments and conclusions suggested by the respective findings.  
Experiment  
Dependent Variable 
Results/Conclusion 
Pilot Study 
Recognition 
 
Failed replication, MOE depends on procedural parameters  
Experiment 1 
Recognition 
MOE seems robust 
  
                                                 
20However, as there are obvious problems with drawing inferences from a null result, this conclusion should 
be taken with a grain of salt. 
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Experiment 2 
Recognition 
MOE does not require the presence of a real person 
 
Experiment 3 
Recognition 
 
MOE is restricted to meaningful objects 
 
Experiment 3 
Valence Rating 
 
eMOE is restricted to meaningful objects 
 
Experiment 4 
Recognition 
 
MOE without verbal labels, but potentially weakened 
 
Experiment 4 
Matching RTs 
 
No independent evidence for semantic elaboration as driving 
the MOE 
 
Experiment 5 
Recognition 
 
Semantic, but not perceptual classification eliminates MOE, se-
mantic organization might be driving the MOE 
 
Experiment 6 
Free Recall 
 
MOE extends to free recall 
 
Experiment 6 
Clustering Scores 
 
Further evidence organization might be driving the MOE 
 
Experiment 6 
Valence Rating 
 
eMOE seems robust for meaningful material 
 
 
Experiment 7 
Recognition 
 
No MOE in the presence of a perceptual self-prioritization ef-
fect, evidence for their distinctness  
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Taken together, the results show the MOE to be situated at the semantic level, thus mak-
ing it seem plausible that conceptual, declarative self-knowledge plays a part in producing 
it. Furthermore, the results implicate organization as a likely candidate for the mecha-
nism(s) behind the MOE. This suggests that the processes driving the MOE and the SRE 
are at least partially overlapping, and that, therefore, the levels of processing framework 
might be useful for better understanding and interpreting the MOE. 
One starting point for the present line of experiments were the apparent similarities be-
tween the SRE (Rogers et al., 1977) and the MOE (Cunningham et al., 2008). Specifi-
cally, would the MOE lend itself to a depth of processing account? 
We were able to replicate the recognition memory advantage for self-assigned stimuli 
described by Cunningham et al. (2008) with Experiment 1 and 2. To reiterate, when the 
stimuli assigned to the participant or a real or fictitious other person were semantically 
meaningful, an MOE reliably emerged, while we did not ﬁnd any evidence for an MOE 
without semantic processing: The MOE did not emerge for semantically meaningless 
stimuli in Experiment 3. Therefore, it appears that, in order for an MOE to emerge, sub-
jects must be able to process the meaning of the stimuli in some form.  
Tentative evidence for spontaneous semantic processing was found in Experiment 4, 
where we presented pictorial objects without a semantic label in the encoding phase. We 
not only again found an MOE but also obtained evidence for spontaneous semantic pro-
cessing, since  
(a) response times in an object-label matching task were faster for old items compared to 
new ones and 
(b) the MOE was restricted to matching trials.  
While the MOE seems to be clearly situated at the semantic level, it remains to be seen 
exactly what types of processes underlie it. In the depth of processing literature, semantic 
elaboration (or intra-item processing) and semantic organization (inter-item processing) 
have been distinguished (Einstein & Hunt, 1980; Mandler, 2011). Organization enhances 
memory by facilitating associations within the to-be-learned stimulus lists or between the 
stimuli and the category. This type of processing can be contrasted with semantic elabo-
ration, which is thought to foster associations between the stimuli and extant knowledge 
in long-term memory. Both elaboration and organization are thought to drive or at least 
contribute to the self-reference effect (Klein & Kihlstrom, 1986; Klein & Loftus, 1988; 
Symons & Johnson, 1997). With Experiments 4–6, we explored the contribution of these 
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processes. First, the results of the matching task in Experiment 4 give some provisional 
evidence that elaboration does not play the major role in the MOE. Second, in Experiment 
5 the MOE replicates in a condition with an arbitrary perceptual categorization as an en-
coding principle set in competition to the self vs. other assignment, but not if semantic 
categorization was the competitor. The semantic orienting task can be thought to promote 
semantic organization more strongly than semantic elaboration, since it required partici-
pants to group the stimulus material into different categories but not to retrieve further 
information about the stimuli from long-term memory. Thus, the results ﬁt in well with 
the interpretation that the MOE is due to enhanced organization of self-assigned items. 
Experiment 6 corroborated this assumption by demonstrating greater clustering for self-
assigned items than other-assigned items in a free recall task, wherein the amount of clus-
tering can be assumed to reﬂect the amount to which items of a certain category are 
grouped together (i.e., organized) in memory. Therefore, organization remains a likely 
candidate mechanism behind the MOE. This seems especially plausible since the owner-
ship assignment is essentially a task in which participants are asked to organize the stim-
ulus material into two distinct categories. Corresponding to this assumption, in Experi-
ment 5, the MOE was eliminated when participants performed a semantic classiﬁcation 
task in addition to the ownership assignment (as opposed to an arbitrary perceptual 
classiﬁcation task). Rather than being due to any specialized mechanism pertaining only 
to the self, we found evidence that the MOE is at least partially driven by organization, 
something that can be encouraged through means other than self-involvement. 
6.2 Mere ownership and depth of processing: a relative of the 
self-reference effect? 
 The mere ownership effect and semantic processing 
One starting point for the present line of experiments were the apparent similarities be-
tween the SRE (Rogers et al., 1977) and the MOE (Cunningham et al., 2008). Specifi-
cally, would the MOE lend itself to a depth of processing account? 
We were able to replicate the recognition memory advantage for self-assigned stimuli 
described by Cunningham et al. (2008) only when the stimuli were semantically mean-
ingful. Therefore, it appears that, in order for an MOE to emerge, subjects must be able 
to process the meaning of the stimuli in some form.  
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At ﬁrst glance, the results of Experiment 3 seem at odds with ﬁndings on the self-priori-
tization effect (Sui et al., 2012), where a clear beneﬁt has been demonstrated for seem-
ingly meaningless objects that were associated with the self. However, there is reason to 
assume that the perceptual self-prioritization effect and the MOE are distinct phenomena. 
The self-prioritization effect is the fact that  
(a) participants give faster correct responses in matching trials where the self-assigned 
shape is displayed together with the self-label and  
(b) participants are more accurate in trials with the self-assigned label in separating 
matching from non-matching displays, always compared to trials with the other shapes. 
This effect is seen predominantly as a prioritization in perceptual processes, not in 
memory strength. Furthermore, the tasks differ considerably: In the matching paradigm, 
only three shapes (e.g., rectangle, circle, triangle) are explicitly identified by the instruc-
tions either as the self, an intimate other (such as the participant’s mother), or an insignif-
icant other (such as an unspecified acquaintance). It is taken for granted that all three 
assignments are accessible by participants subsequently to the instruction whereas a mere 
ownership-like test would be to display the three shapes mixed with three new shapes and 
to ask for recognition.  
Experiment 7 provides evidence that the MOE and the self-prioritization effect are indeed 
distinct phenomena, as we obtained a standard self-prioritization effect, but no MOE. 
However, even if the perceptual prioritization effect and the MOE turn out to be based on 
partially overlapping processes, this would not necessarily mean that the MOE is not lo-
cated at a semantic level, since it is far from clear that the self-prioritization effect is 
indeed a non-conceptual phenomenon (Schäfer, Wentura, & Frings, 2015). In either case, 
the ﬁndings from both paradigms are not necessarily incompatible.  
 The mere ownership effect and semantic elaboration 
While the MOE seems to be clearly situated at the semantic level, it remains to be seen 
exactly what types of processes underlie it. As mentioned before, semantic elaboration 
(or intra-item processing) and semantic organization (inter-item processing) have been 
distinguished in the literature on levels of processing. (Einstein & Hunt, 1980; Mandler, 
2011). As I have previously explained, organization enhances memory by facilitating 
associations within the to-be-learned stimulus lists or between the stimuli and the cate-
gory. This type of processing can be contrasted with semantic elaboration, which is 
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thought to foster associations between the stimuli and extant knowledge in long-term 
memory. Both elaboration and organization are thought to drive, or at least contribute to, 
the self-reference effect (Klein & Kihlstrom, 1986; Klein & Loftus, 1988; Symons 
& Johnson, 1997). With regards to the MOE, an elaboration-based account of the advan-
tage for self-owned objects has been proposed (Cunningham et al., 2011). We investi-
gated a potential role of semantic elaboration by using a semantic matching task. If self-
assignment indeed triggers the elaboration of a stimulus and its integration with existing 
memory structures on the self, it should later benefit from the accessibility and intercon-
nectedness of that integration. We hypothesized that if a self-assigned item had been elab-
orated on to a greater degree than an other-assigned item, its meaning should be more 
readily accessible later on. However, this was not the case. Participants did not access the 
meaning of self-assigned stimuli with greater ease than they did the meaning of other-
assigned stimuli. This means that we found no evidence that semantic elaboration can 
account for the MOE. If this finding can be corroborated, this would be a point of diver-
gence from the SRE, which is widely thought to be partially caused by elaboration (Klein 
& Loftus, 1988; Symons & Johnson, 1997). However, the importance of a single null 
result should not be overstated. A contribution of elaboration should be tested for using 
different methods, such as manipulating the extent of elaboration independently of own-
ership via task demands (Einstein & Hunt, 1980; Klein & Kihlstrom, 1986), before it can 
be conclusively ruled out as an explanation.  
On the other hand, we did find evidence for organization as an underlying mechanism of 
the MOE, pointing to a similarity with the SRE. In Experiment 5, the MOE replicates in 
a condition with an arbitrary perceptual categorization as an encoding principle set in 
competition to the self vs. other assignment, but not if semantic categorization was the 
competitor. The semantic orienting task can be thought to promote semantic organization 
more strongly than semantic elaboration, since it required participants to group the stim-
ulus material into different categories but not to retrieve further information about the 
stimuli from long-term memory. Thus, the results ﬁt well with the interpretation that the 
MOE is due to enhanced organization of self-assigned items. Experiment 6 corroborated 
this assumption by demonstrating greater clustering for self-assigned items than other-
assigned items in a free recall task, wherein the amount of clustering can be assumed to 
reﬂect the amount to which items of a certain category are grouped together (i.e., orga-
nized) in memory. Therefore, organization remains a likely candidate mechanism behind 
the MOE. This seems especially plausible since the ownership assignment is essentially 
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a task in which participants are asked to organize the stimulus material into two distinct 
categories. Corresponding to this assumption, in Experiment 5, the MOE was eliminated 
when participants performed a semantic classiﬁcation task in addition to the ownership 
assignment (as opposed to an arbitrary perceptual classiﬁcation task). Therefore, a family 
resemblance between the MOE and the SRE can be attested for their apparent reliance on 
semantic organization, if not for an undifferentiated concept of “processing depth”. 
 Categorizing the world as “self” and “not self”: the mere 
ownership effect and semantic organization 
It has long been thought that organization plays a key role in self-memory effects like the 
SRE. The results of Experiments 5 and 6 suggest that this applies to the MOE as well. 
Organization can be seen as a likely contributor to the MOE. As mentioned, the ownership 
assignment is essentially a task in which participants are asked to organize the stimulus 
material into two distinct categories: self and other. It can be seen as imposing organiza-
tional processing through task demands, making a contribution of this process especially 
plausible. And indeed, it seems that a competing organizational principle can interfere 
with the effectiveness of the ownership manipulation. In Experiment 5, the MOE was 
eliminated when participants performed a semantic classiﬁcation task in addition to the 
ownership assignment (as opposed to an arbitrary perceptual classiﬁcation task). This 
suggests that the “self”- vs. “not self”-categorization in the ownership task functions as 
an organizing principle according to which the study material is grouped and encoded. 
Within this organizing scheme, we can observe a clear asymmetry: the “self” category is 
a well-deﬁned and relevant category whereas the “not self”- category (i.e., ‘‘other”) is a 
fuzzier and more negatively deﬁned category (i.e., “anything not belonging to me”). 
Hence, the “self” category is more salient and therefore leads to enhanced attention for 
the category and the items that are associated with it. Evidence that binary categories are 
often processed in an asymmetrical fashion comes from reaction time paradigms (e.g., 
Wentura, 2000; Rothermund & Wentura, 2004). In the older literature on the levels of 
processing framework, it is often observed that memory was enhanced for items that were 
associated with a “yes” response in the study phase (e.g. Craik & Tulving, 1975). Insofar 
as the orienting task was related to semantic categories (e.g., “Is the word an animal 
name?”), one might see this, too, as corroborating evidence. Following an evolutionary 
psychological approach, Nairne, Thompson, and Pandeirada (2007) asked participants to 
rate all items with regard to how relevant each of these words would be in a survival 
94 6 General Discussion 
situation (which can be seen as a proxy for a binary categorization of “relevant for sur-
vival” vs. “not relevant for survival”). Memory performance was positively correlated 
with rating scores. It is possible that attention is guided by the salience of the category 
during encoding, thereby – in the case of the MOE – enhancing subsequent memory for 
items associated with the self (Turk et al., 2008). Furthermore, within a more clearly de-
fined and narrowly circumscribed category, it might be easier to associate items mean-
ingfully with each other, leading to better accessibility.  
 Welcome to the family? 
Our research suggests that, similar to a self-reference task (Rogers et al., 1977), the own-
ership assignment task enhances semantic organization. While an unspecified concept of 
“deep” semantic processing cannot adequately capture the MOE, a more refined take on 
the levels of processing (Craik and Lockhart, 1972) has proven helpful in gaining insight 
into the phenomenon, enabling us to link the MOE to a more general mechanism of 
memory. This is in line with the view that the self as a construct draws on some of the 
same memory processes thought to underlie a range of different tasks (e.g., Klein 
& Loftus, 1988; but see also Sui & Humphreys, 2013). This would seem to suggest the 
tentative answer that the self is not so “special” after all, at least not in the sense of draw-
ing on cognitive mechanisms that are unique to the self only. Rather, known mechanisms 
and strategies might be recruited with greater efficiency when the self is concerned. In 
the case of the MOE, it would appear that semantic organization is facilitated. Further-
more, both self-referential encoding and the ownership task appear to strengthen recol-
lective experience, as reflected in the rate of “remember” judgments in an RKG task 
(Conway & Dewhurst, 1995; Conway, Dewhurst, Pearson, & Sapute, 2001; van den Bos 
et al., 2010), which we again confirmed for the MOE, suggesting an involvement of epi-
sodic memory.  
Of course, our findings do not touch on the possibility that other processes implicated in 
the self’s impact on memory and cognition, such as attention and salience, or affect and 
reward (Turk et al., 2011; Krigolson et al., 2013) also contribute to the MOE. Evidence 
for such a contribution would by no means be an indictment of levels of processing or 
processing depth: “Deep” processing is not synonymous with semantic processing, after 
all. In fact, it was never conceived as a unitary single dimension (Lockhart & Craik, 
1990), and the definition allows for multiple different constituting processes. Neither 
should the SRE be interpreted in this manner (Klein, 2012). The SRE, too, can be viewed 
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as a phenomenon constituted by a number of different components which the researcher 
is tasked to identify. It is plausible that a similar approach is apt for the MOE. In any case, 
it seems justified to say that the MOE and the SRE share meaningful similarities in terms 
of how they are brought about. However, our findings do not warrant the stronger con-
clusion that they are merely different instances of the same phenomenon. Crucially, while 
it seems that the ownership assignment enhances organization of study material, its 
inﬂuence with respect to semantic elaboration is less clear. Therefore, while the phenom-
ena seem clearly related, it remains possible that there is only a partial overlap between 
the processes reﬂected in the self-reference and the mere ownership effect. 
6.3 The self-prioritization effect and incidental self-
involvement: the mere ownership effect has its limits 
While the present series of experiments suggests that there are more than just superficial 
similarities between the MOE and the SRE, with semantic organization as a mechanism 
likely contributing to both (Klein & Loftus, 1988; Symons & Johnson, 1997), the same 
cannot be said for the MOE and the self-prioritization effect first described by Sui et al. 
(2012). In Experiment 7, we used a perceptual matching task in which geometric shapes 
were paired with either the self or another person. Typically, the pairing involving the 
self and the designated shape is confirmed as correct with greater ease by participants 
(e.g., Sui et al., 2012; Sui & Humphreys, 2013; Schäfer et al., 2015). This was true in our 
experiment as well: a self-prioritization effect reliably emerged. However, we addition-
ally attempted to utilize this perceptual matching task as an encoding phase for a subse-
quent surprise recognition test. By consistently presenting visual objects with one of ei-
ther the “self”-shape or the “other”-shapes, we attempted to find out whether such an 
incidental pairing would create something resembling an MOE. This was, however, not 
the case. Instead, we observed a dissociation. Participants were no better at remembering 
objects that had been paired with the “self”-shape than objects that had been paired with 
either of the “other”-shapes. There was no trace of an MOE, even though we found a clear 
self-prioritization effect. Our result seems to suggest that the MOE and the self-prioriti-
zation effect are distinct phenomena and are not based on the same mechanisms21. In 
Chapter 4.2, I already detailed some differences between the perceptual matching task 
                                                 
21Of course, the usual caveats about drawing inferences from null results still apply. As a potential coun-
terpoint to this, however, it is worth noting that memory performance across the different conditions 
was virtually identical in Experiment 7. 
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and the self-prioritization effect on the one hand, and the shopping paradigm and the MOE 
on the other hand, all of which might contribute to these diverging results. It might be 
that the self-prioritization effect is indeed not situated at the semantic level. While there 
is some evidence for a conceptual component of the perceptual matching task22 (Schäfer 
et al., 2015), the self-prioritization effect has initially been conceptualized as a prioritiza-
tion in perceptual processes, not in memory strength. The general idea is that by tagging 
a shape as belonging to the self, its salience is increased. The self-prioritization effect 
typically takes the form of faster correct responses in matching trials involving the “self”-
shape, and of higher accuracy rates for the matching decision in trials using the “self”-
shape, as compared to trials involving the other shapes. Furthermore, the MOE and the 
self-prioritization effect happen on different timescales. While the MOE is measured as 
an aftereffect of self-involvement in a memory test that is administered after the owner-
ship assignment task, the perceptual self-prioritization effect is more immediate. During 
the matching task, participants need to hold the correct pairings active in their minds. In 
the matching paradigm, only three shapes (e.g., rectangle, circle, triangle) are bound ex-
plicitly by instruction to a person or object (e.g. the self, the participant’s mother, and an 
acquaintance). It is taken for granted that all three assignments are accessible by partici-
pants. If one were to use the shapes in a mere ownership-like test, one would display the 
three shapes mixed with three new shapes and then ask for recognition which would be 
likely to produce uninterpretable results due to ceiling effects. 
This null finding hints at the boundary conditions of the MOE. There are apparent limits 
to how implicit or “mere” the MOE really is. A completely incidental pairing between an 
object and a shape associated with the self seems insufficient to produce an MOE (but see 
also Turk et al., 2008). Perhaps the connection between the self and an object has to be 
direct, explicit and task-relevant for an MOE to emerge. On a related note, perhaps the 
self-as-concept, rather than the self-as-subject needs to be targeted by the encoding task 
(e.g., James, 1890; Neisser, 1988). The conceptual distinction between different “selves” 
or facets of the self suggests that there are multiple empirical access routes when investi-
gating self-memory advantages. At first glance it is plausible that such “self-systems”, 
even if distinct, interact closely with each other (Boyer et al., 2005). Thus, it might be 
hypothesized that the processes producing the MOE might be tapped into via a route to 
                                                 
22Schäfer et al. (2015) found that the prioritization effect described by Sui et al. (2012) does not seem to be 
modulated by varying the perceptual features of the geometrical shapes, suggesting that an association 
was formed between the self and the concept of a shape rather than the speciﬁc visual stimulus, sug-
gesting a potential role for concepts. 
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the self that relies neither on an explicit assignment to the self nor on declarative memory 
of the kind that is later called upon for retrieval. However, previous research we con-
ducted in this vein (Englert, 2013; Englert & Wentura, 2013) has proven inconclusive. 
Seeking a potential bodily “access” route to the self, we employed the so-called rubber 
hand paradigm (Botvinick & Cohen, 1998). In brief, the rubber hand illusion is a phe-
nomenon where a foreign object – typically a realistic fake hand – is integrated into the 
internal representations of a person’s body by means of sensory integration and a match 
with existing body representations (Armel & Ramachandran, 2003; Tsakiris & Haggard, 
2005). If eliciting such a bodily illusion was sufficient to produce an MOE, this would 
have provided evidence that even a maximally implicit connection to the self has far-
reaching cognitive consequences, it would have provided justification for the “mere” 
qualifier in the MOE label (see also Englert, 2013). However, no clear influence of such 
an illusion on memory has been shown. Combining an incidental presentation of visual 
objects with stimulation meant to elicit or disrupt ownership of a fake hand with a surprise 
recognition test, no clear evidence of an MOE could be obtained. Three experiments 
yielded partially conflicting results that either failed to produce a statistically significant 
effect or produced effects that were not (clearly) attributable to ownership. The most ob-
vious explanation for this failure to obtain an MOE under these conditions is, of course, 
that there is simply “nothing there”. Such an implicit, body-based route to the self may 
just be insufficient to produce a memory advantage. However, it cannot be ruled out at 
present that this lack of conclusive evidence was due to procedural variables and the pre-
sent lack of clear standards for conducting rubber hand experiments (e.g., Trojan, Riemer, 
& Fuchs, 2016) that precluded the effectiveness of the experimental manipulation. 
In any case, further research into the boundary conditions of the MOE is needed. How-
ever, it seems clear that those limits cannot be pushed indefinitely. Apart from meaningful 
stimulus material, it seems that the connection between the stimulus objects needs to be 
explicitly spelled out to participants (e.g. “you own this”) for a self-memory advantage 
to emerge. For the time being it makes the most sense to me to conclude that the MOE 
pertains to the self as a concept in declarative memory and requires an encoding manip-
ulation that is both direct and explicit. Put another way, the ownership task could be in-
terpreted as predominantly targeting the “me”, rather than the “I” (James, 1890; 
Kihlstrom et al., 2003). 
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6.4 Limitations of the present experiments and directions for 
future research 
While the present research sheds some light on the boundary conditions of the MOE, as 
well as the kinds of encoding mechanisms likely to underlie it – specifically, semantic 
organization – there are limitations and open questions to consider. 
 Robustness, size, generalizability and universality of the mere 
ownership effect 
First off, there are now a number of results attesting to the robustness of the MOE (van 
den Bos et al., 2010; Cunningham et al., 2011; Turk et al., 2011; Krigolson et al., 2013; 
Sui & Humphreys, 2013), and I believe that confidence in the MOE is warranted. How-
ever, since the reliability of results in experimental psychology in general, and in social 
cognition research in particular, has increasingly been called into question during recent 
years (e.g., Earp & Trafimow, 2015), further solidifying these findings - or contesting 
them - through aggregation and replication remains desirable. Given that there is now a 
considerable body of research on the MOE, the field would likely benefit from approach-
ing the phenomenon via meta-analysis. This would enable more precise predictions about 
the size of the MOE, as well as a more comprehensive assessment of factors that introduce 
variability, both of which can provide valuable guidance for researchers new to the field.  
Related to the question of the overall reliability of the MOE, there is the question of its 
universality. That is, is there an MOE across different populations and how variable is it? 
Markus and Kitayama, 2010, among others, have emphasized the distinction between “in-
terdependent” and “independent” self-concepts which they connect to the distinction be-
tween “communal” and “individualistic” cultures (see, Oyserman, Coon, & Kemmel-
meier, 2002, for a meta-analysis; for a critical perspective, see Matsumoto, 1999, or Vo-
ronov & Singer, 2002). In brief, an independent self-concept can be seen as more likely 
to guide a person’s focus on their own thoughts and feelings, and toward drawing a 
sharper distinction between the (social) world and the self as an entity separate from it. 
Someone with an interdependent self-concept, on the other hand, would be expected to 
view themselves first and foremost as part of a social group, and thus, give more consid-
eration to other people in that group. They might have fuzzier boundaries between the 
self and the world, thus not viewing themselves as separate from other people. It would 
be interesting to see if such differences in self-concept indeed correspond to smaller or 
larger MOEs. It is also possible that a more permeable or “interdependent” self-concept 
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is associated with a reduced or eliminated MOE, but only in the case of close others. This 
has already been demonstrated in the case of the SRE: For example, in at least two studies 
involving a Chinese population, the SRE was eliminated when the other-referential task 
was about a close friend or a parent (Zhu & Han, 2015). Previous research has shown that 
when the self-reference task is compared to a task referencing an intimate other, as op-
posed to a distant stranger, the SRE is reduced even in a Western sample (Symons 
& Johnson, 1997). In the case of the SRE, a plausible explanation for this would be the 
amount of knowledge one has about the person one is referencing: In the case of semantic 
elaboration, the existence of rich and accessible memory structures about that other per-
son would be assumed to strengthen memory in the same way as the self does. However, 
arguably an analogous phenomenon exists in the case of the perceptual prioritization ef-
fect (Sui et al., 2012). Typically, response times and accuracy rates in the matching task 
take an intermediary position for the intimate other (e.g. “mother”) condition. Participants 
do not affirm correct “shape + mother” pairings with the same ease as they do correct 
“shape + self” pairings, but performance is still significantly better than for “shape + dis-
tant other” pairings. Given the shallow nature of the matching task, an explanation in-
volving the rich memory representations of both the self and the people close to us, seems 
less plausible here. Similar gradations might exist for the MOE, as some preliminary ev-
idence suggests (Sparks et al., 2016). If the MOE turned out to be reduced when the other 
recipient in the shopping task was one’s mother or best friend, this would then raise the 
question of why this is the case. Perhaps the self-concept is permeable enough to allow 
the integration of an intimate other. Perhaps our concept of an intimate other is so well-
structured that it, too, gives rise to semantic elaboration and organization processes that 
strengthen memory. 
 The mere ownership effect and the self-reference effect: open 
questions on depth of processing and episodic memory 
Similarities and differences between the SRE and the MOE, as well as their theoretical 
implications, should provide ample directions for further investigation. As mentioned 
above, the present research suggests a strong involvement of semantic processing in pro-
ducing the MOE. The same has long been believed of the SRE, both due to the nature of 
the self-referential task, and the large amount of empirical research into the nature of the 
SRE (Rogers et al., 1977; Symons & Johnson, 1997). However, semantic processing is a 
broad concept which can be further refined into semantic elaboration and organization 
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(Einstein & Hunt, 1980). In the case of the SRE, the self-reference task is assumed to 
support both processes at once, which then combine to produce exceptionally good 
memory performance after self-referential encoding (Klein & Loftus, 1988; Symons 
& Johnson, 1997). While we obtained positive evidence for an influence of semantic or-
ganization on the MOE, the evidence presents a much less clear case for semantic elabo-
ration: In an experiment designed to pick up on aftereffects of semantic elaboration (Ex-
periment 4), we found no indication that self-assigned items had indeed been elaborated 
upon to a greater degree than other-assigned items. Of course, one possible explanation 
is that there is simply nothing to detect and that ownership does not increase semantic 
elaboration. However, such a conclusion would be based on a single null result, involving 
a paradigm that, to my knowledge, has not been widely used as a sensitive test of semantic 
elaboration. This single negative result is, to my mind, insufficient to rule out a contribu-
tion of semantic elaboration to the MOE. Therefore, research into a potential contribution 
of this mechanism should not yet be abandoned altogether. Rather, it should be investi-
gated using different designs. The most straightforward way to do this would be to ma-
nipulate the extent of elaboration experimentally at encoding, via the orienting task. Such 
an experiment would have the additional advantage of providing another test for semantic 
organization. An investigation along those lines could follow the methods of Klein 
and Kihlstrom (1986) or Klein and Loftus (1988), who used tasks and stimulus materials 
designed to selectively encourage organization, elaboration, or both and found evidence 
that indeed both contribute to the SRE. Since this type of research into the SRE typically 
employs word stimuli (see, e.g., Symons & Johnson, 1997), MOE experiments might 
have to be adapted for verbal material. Experiment 6, where participants had to write 
down the names of objects encountered during encoding, shows that at least retrieving 
stimuli in verbal form presents no obstacle for the MOE.  
Apart from the relative contributions semantic elaboration and organization, there is a 
further characteristic of the SRE which it shares with the MOE. Self-referential encoding 
has been shown to strengthen recollective experience, and self-referentially encoded 
items tend to be associated with higher rates of “remember” judgments at retrieval than 
semantically encoded items (Conway & Dewhurst, 1995; Conway, Dewhurst, Pearson, 
& Sapute, 2001). This self-reference recollection effect also seems to persist over longer 
retention intervals. Remarkably, it was also present when no significant SRE in terms of 
general recognition memory performance was found. As there is already some evidence 
that ownership appears to disproportionately improve source memory and episodic 
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memory more generally (van den Bos et al., 2010; Cunningham et al., 2011), one question 
would be if this tendency remains stable or even increases over longer retention intervals, 
as is the case for the self reference recollection effect. A speculative theoretical connec-
tion could be drawn from evidence regarding the MOE and source memory and recollec-
tive experience on the one hand, and the MOE and organization on the other: Both types 
of encoding involve associative connections between the material and the learning con-
text in the widest sense. For example, organization can imply that stimulus materials are 
associated with each other, but also that they are associated with their superordinate cat-
egory. This superordinate category, that is, the self, is one of the potential sources partic-
ipants need to remember in a source memory task. As for episodic recollection, one might 
view the remember option as testing for source memory, where the participant is com-
pletely free to pick any source. The fact that divided attention at encoding can eliminate 
the MOE (Turk et al., 2008) is precisely what one would predict from an effect that is 
based on the binding-together of to-be-learned information. Therefore, the relationship 
between episodic memory and organization in the MOE, and whether the ownership as-
signment causes both in essentially the same manner, could constitute an interesting line 
of research. 
 The mere ownership effect and forgetting 
The SRE is both a reliable and sizeable finding, but how resistant are self-referentially 
encoded memories to the passing of time and disruptive influences? Across studies, the 
SRE increases in size as retention intervals get longer (Symons & Johnson, 1997). As 
mentioned in the previous section, the self-reference recollection effect persists over 
longer retention intervals (Conway & Dewhurst, 1995; Conway et al., 2001). Further-
more, it seems that self-referential encoding can impede forgetting even when participants 
try to intentionally suppress an item (Tempel, 2010; Yang et al., 2013). Thus, it seems 
that self-referential encoding indeed has the power to ward off forgetting to a greater 
degree than, for instance, semantic encoding. But what happens to self-referentially en-
coded memories when they come “under attack” by an experimental manipulation de-
signed to lead to their forgetting?  
One way to address this question is via retrieval induced forgetting. This refers to the 
observation that retrieving a subset of recently learned stimuli can cause the forgetting of 
other stimuli from that set (Anderson, Bjork, & Bjork, 1994; Murayama, Myatsu, Buchli, 
& Storm, 2014). Typically, participants are instructed to learn lists of words pertaining to 
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different semantic categories. Afterwards, there is a “retrieval” practice during which par-
ticipants need to remember a subset of items, typically, half the items of a subset of the 
categories. This is usually followed by a recall task. Interestingly, unpracticed items from 
practiced categories are less likely to be remembered than items from categories that were 
not practiced. That is, retrieval of some items causes the forgetting of other items in the 
same stimulus subset. Self-referential encoding might counteract this. For example, a 
study by Macrae and Roseveare (2002), which I describe in detail below, did not find any 
retrieval-induced forgetting when the encoding task involved the self. However, despite 
findings suggesting greater durability of self-referentially encoded memories, the data on 
retrieval –induced forgetting suggests that the situation is complicated. One should steer 
clear of any blanket statements that self-reference categorically immunizes memories 
against retrieval-induced forgetting. For example, Barnier, Hung, and Conway (2004)23 
obtained standard retrieval-induced forgetting for autobiographical memories, while 
Wessel and Hauer (2006) did not observe retrieval-induced forgetting for positive mem-
ories, but did obtain it for negative ones. While the pattern of results on self-encoding 
tasks and retrieval induced forgetting hints at a somewhat complicated picture, it seems 
that self-reference can reduce forgetting to some extent, provided that certain conditions 
are met (Tempel, 2010). Anderson (2003) explains retrieval-induced forgetting in terms 
of inhibitory control: It is argued that, during retrieval practice, when an item from a given 
category is practiced, the other items from the same category are also activated because 
they share the same retrieval cue as the target. Therefore, these items need to be sup-
pressed in order to avoid their erroneous retrieval. Subsequent poorer memory of unprac-
ticed items from practiced categories could thus be interpreted as an aftereffect of that 
suppression. In line with this view, there is some evidence that forgetting self-referentially 
encoded information is more effortful when attempted on purpose (Yang et al., 2013). 
This would be in line with the suggestion that a lack of, or greater demand for, inhibitory 
control is behind an immunizing effect of self-reference on retrieval induced forgetting. 
Regardless of whether this is indeed the driving mechanism, the impact of the self on 
forgetting merits further exploration. One question is whether similar effects on forgetting 
can be observed in the case of a mere ownership situation. The aforementioned study by 
Macrae and Roseveare (2002) on retrieval-induced forgetting, which used an encoding 
                                                 
23However, they did not contrast this with a different type of encoding, leaving open the possibility that the 
amount of retrieval-induced forgetting in a suitable comparison task would have been larger. 
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manipulation very similar to the shopping paradigm, suggests that it might. When partic-
ipants were instructed to imagine that they themselves had purchased the item as a gift, 
these items did not suffer from the usual retrieval-induced forgetting effect in a subse-
quent recall test. In this condition, memory performance for unpracticed items from prac-
ticed categories was no worse than memory performance for items from entirely unprac-
ticed categories. For participants who had instead been instructed to imagine that another 
person was buying the gifts, the usual retrieval-induced forgetting effect was observed. 
This finding has since been replicated by (Hongsheng & Zhu, 2004, qtd. in Tempel, 
2010).  
Adapting our ownership task for the retrieval-induced forgetting paradigm seems like a 
straightforward next step in investigating the role ownership plays in forgetting. Catego-
ries, such as the origin of an object, could be directly linked to either the self or another 
person. That way, the category of the item could replace the color cue in the ownership 
task. This would permit manipulating both ownership and retrieval practice as within-
factors, rather than varying self- or other-relevance between subjects, by means of differ-
ent encoding tasks (Macrae & Roseveare, 2002). It should also be considered that Macrae 
and Roseveare used semantic categories (indoor and outdoor items) as cues in their re-
trieval practice task. This type of meaningful classification can be assumed to promote 
organization and to interfere with ownership-induced memory facilitation based on the 
self as an organizing structure. In our Experiment 5, we found that an additional encoding 
task involving semantic categorization, but not a task involving non-semantic categoriza-
tion, eliminated the MOE. Hence, experimenters should avoid that the categories accord-
ing to which items are grouped in a retrieval-induced forgetting task are meaningfully 
connected to the items themselves. One possibility to implement such categories could 
be by having participants imagine that they are buying from fictional stores24. Different 
items could originate from those different sources, which in turn, could thus be directly 
and consistently associated with a particular owner (e.g. items from certain shops are 
owned by the oneself, items from other stores are owned by the other person). In such a 
design, ownership would be task-relevant during encoding and retrieval, but could be 
varied orthogonally to the presence or absence of retrieval practice.  
                                                 
24 I would like to thank Dr. Tobias Tempel for this suggestion. 
104 6 General Discussion 
Finally, the role of valence in this context should be investigated more clearly. For the 
self-reference task, previous research suggests that it can eliminate retrieval-induced for-
getting for positive, but not negative, learning material (Barnier et al., 2004; Wessel 
& Hauer, 2006). Since the cover story by Macrae and Roseveare (2002) involved gift-
buying, they arguably restricted themselves to testing for retrieval-induced forgetting for 
positive valence. Experiments using the shopping paradigm to study retrieval-induced 
forgetting could vary the affective content of the stimulus material and test whether the 
pattern observed with a self-referential encoding task holds true for the ownership ma-
nipulation as well. The hypothesis then would be that ownership would reduce retrieval-
induced forgetting for desirable, but not undesirable objects. 
 Multiple conceptions of the self: What can we learn from the mere 
ownership effect? 
It might also prove fruitful to contrast the MOE with other phenomena pertaining to the 
impact of the self on cognition. In Experiment 7, there was a dissociation between the 
perceptual self-prioritization effect (Sui et al., 2012) and the MOE. Similarly, previous 
research we conducted (Englert, 2013; Englert & Wentura, 2013) did not yield evidence 
that an MOE can be produced by establishing an implicit, bodily connection to the self 
via a rubber hand illusion (Botvinick & Cohen, 1998). It is worth noting that trivial ex-
planations for these findings, such as an ineffective experimental manipulation, or an in-
sufficiently distinct control condition cannot be ruled out yet. This is due to the fact that 
many procedural questions regarding the rubber hand paradigm are not yet resolved and 
there is no clear consensus on how best to conduct a rubber hand experiment (e.g. Trojan 
et al., 2016). However, in the absence of clear-cut evidence, it seems sensible to provi-
sionally assume that the shopping task taps into different cognitive processes than both 
the perceptual matching task or the rubber hand illusion. On the other hand, there appears 
to be a fair bit of overlap between the processes driving the MOE and the SRE (Rogers 
et al., 1977). Such dissociations and convergences have potentially interesting implica-
tions for theories of the self. It has been widely suggested that, far from being a single 
homogeneous entity, there really are multiple facets of the self, underpinned by different 
cognitive systems (Neisser, 1988; Boyer et al., 2005; Klein, 2012). Studying discrepan-
cies and similarities in the effects of different tasks designed to tap into the “self” could 
help with more clearly identifying and characterizing different facets of the self, as well 
as with explicating the cognitive functions they are tied to. An understanding of which 
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type of self-related task has which effect on cognition, and how these tasks interact with 
each other, could provide insight into what, precisely, constitutes the self, or “selves”. For 
example, in the case of independent systems, we would expect double dissociations be-
tween tasks that only target one system, whereas a single dissociation (e.g., if we some-
times observed perceptual self-prioritization without an MOE, but never an MOE in the 
absence of perceptual self-prioritization) could point to a more hierarchical relationship.  
 Theorizing on memory, the self and the mere ownership effect 
Finally, both the construct of the self and the kind of “deep” processing implicated in a 
self-reference task would benefit from further explication and attempts at theoretical re-
duction. As Lockhart and Craik (1990) have themselves felt compelled to point out, depth 
of processing should be viewed as a concept that itself needs explanation and specifica-
tion, rather than something that can, by itself, account for memory phenomena. To me, 
this appears at least equally true of the concept of “self”. While at first glance, it may 
seem self-evident what precisely is meant by “depth of processing”, “self” or even “own-
ership”, they are ultimately broad and fuzzy terms. They may serve as stand-ins for other 
processes, that could explain more precisely how ownership gives rise to memory ad-
vantages, but are yet to be determined. But by themselves, these broad concepts have little 
to offer in the way of explanatory power and testable predictions. At worst, they could be 
misunderstood as full-fledged theoretical accounts that neither need nor permit further 
explanation. If we take this view, these broad theoretical constructs might well obscure 
more than they elucidate. A more reductionist, mechanistic approach to psychology 
seems more promising to me. Similar arguments have been made by Herschbach and 
Bechtel (2014), as well as Kim and Hommel (2015). Breaking down a construct such as 
“deep processing” into smaller constituent parts and the functions they perform seems 
necessary to gain insight into it. To some extent, the posited mechanisms of semantic 
“elaboration” and “organization” accomplish this in the case of processing depth. They 
specify routes through which memories are formed and yield testable hypotheses about 
how their effects on memory output should look like. For instance, positing organization 
as a driving mechanism behind the MOE yielded the straightforward prediction of in-
creased clustering of self-owned items in a free recall task. Positing elaboration yielded 
the similarly straightforward – yet unconfirmed - prediction that the meaning of a self-
assigned object should be accessible with greater ease. As mentioned, the same holds true 
for the self. If the self as a psychological construct – or indeed, a collection of constructs 
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(Klein, 2012) – and its impact on human memory are to be better understood, research 
into underlying mechanisms needs to be pursued further, and reductionist theoretical ac-
counts of how these mechanisms could operate need to be spelled out in detail and put to 
the test. 
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“Self-pity can make one weep, but so can onions.” – Jerry Fodor (quoted in Pinker, 1997)  
 
The mere ownership effect (Cunningham et al., 2008) is an example of how involvement 
of the self can impact memory. The MOE is remarkable because it is brought about by 
means of a very simple experimental manipulation. Imagining that we ourselves, as op-
posed to somebody else, become the owner of a randomly-selected object, is sufficient to 
make us more likely to remember it. However, the mere ownership effect still depends 
on some crucial boundary conditions: For instance, the MOE seems to be situated at the 
semantic level: Both meaningful study material and a direct, explicit assignment of stim-
uli to their respective “owner” seem to be required for an MOE to emerge. There are a 
number of experimental observations in psychology that might be termed self-memory-
effects, some of which share more similarities with the MOE than others. For example, 
we did not obtain evidence for a shared basis of the MOE and the perceptual self-priori-
tization effect (Sui et al., 2012). However, there is good reason to view the MOE as a 
close relative of the SRE (Rogers et al., 1977). Like the SRE, it has proven fruitful to 
view the MOE from a levels of processing perspective (Craik & Lockhart, 1972). This is 
how I approached the phenomenon in the series of experiments presented in this thesis. 
Specifically, I looked into the role that semantic processing plays for the MOE, with par-
ticular interest in semantic elaboration and organization (Einstein & Hunt, 1980), both of 
which are thought to underlie the SRE (Klein & Loftus, 1988; Symons & Johnson, 1997). 
As mentioned above, the experiments presented here suggest that the MOE is situated at 
the conceptual level and that both an explicit self-assignment and some form of semantic 
“processability” is required for a memory advantage to emerge. Furthermore, the results 
suggest that semantic organization clearly contributes to the MOE. The self might func-
tion as an organizing principle, enabling us to clearly distinguish between “me” and “not 
me” and to more efficiently structure the content of the “me” category (Englert & Wen-
tura, 2016). Unsurprisingly, there is no definite answer to the question asked at the outset, 
namely, whether the self is special. However, in terms of accounting for the MOE, the 
evidence we found points toward more general mechanisms of memory being at least 
partially responsible for the MOE. These are processes that can, at least in principle, also 
be encouraged by encoding tasks that do not involve the self. Further research is required 
to determine or rule out the respective contributions of other processes, such as semantic 
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elaboration or reward, and to give a more detailed account of how the self engages these 
mechanisms to cause improved memory performance.  
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Appendices25 
Appendix A: Quantifying organization: measures of clustering 
in free recall 
If organizational processing is assumed to have taken place during encoding, it can be 
predicted that this will affect the order of the output in a free recall task. Such a task is 
required since, in the case of recognition tests, the order in which items are retrieved are 
beyond the control of the subject. However, in a free recall task, by necessity, participants 
themselves determine how the retrieved material is structured. Rather than being random, 
it is assumed that subjects reproduce stimulus items systematically, in an order reflecting 
their internal organization. Specifically, it is thought that if items are grouped together in 
memory, they will be more likely to be reproduced in close proximity to each other. For 
example, if one particular item is reproduced, it could then function as a memory cue for 
further related items. If one wants to assess or compare the amount of such clustering in 
a given memory output, or compare clustering between different tasks, a formal way of 
computing the amount of clustering is necessary. Several ways of quantifying and com-
paring clustering have been proposed. I will introduce some of them in the following, and 
discuss them with regard to their suitability for quantifying the amount organization in 
the mere ownership paradigm. 
Some measures focus on the overall amount of clustering in a given output, comparing it 
to the amount of clustering that would be expected by chance. In its simplest form, pair 
frequencies are taken as the indicator of clustering, whereas other measures also take into 
account the length of a given progression of items of the same category (Mandler, 2011). 
Thompson and Abramczyk (1975) provide an overview and a comparison of classical 
measures of clustering used in free recall tasks. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
25 For references cited in the appendices, see the general list of references of this dissertation. 
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Table A 1. Examples of clustering indices and their anchoring values adapted from (Thompson 
& Abramczyk, 1975). 
Measure Observed = Expected Observed = Maximum 
3x6 2x9 3x6 2x9 
MRR (Bower Lesgold & Tieman) 0.33 0.50 1.00 1.00 
Bousfield & Bousfield 0.00 0.00 10.00 8.00 
Gerjuoy & Spitz 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
Note. The respective values taken on by each index are given when clustering is either at expected or max-
imum level, and measured in either a list of either 6 recalled items from 3 different categories, or a list of 9 
recalled items from two different categories. 
These indices differ mainly with respect to whether and how they take different factors 
into account, including: 
(a) the expected amount of clustering that should occur by chance; 
(b) the overall memory performance for a given category, i.e. the number of category 
items recalled; 
(c) the intra-list-dependence of clustering between different categories. 
For the purposes of the research presented in this dissertation, the hypothesis is that the 
self would function as an organizing concept and that therefore, there would be a greater 
amount of clustering for self-owned items than for other-owned items. Therefore, the rel-
ative difference between self- and other-assigned items is main focus of interest, rather 
than the specific amount of clustering in a category itself or whether clustering is signif-
icantly different from a hypothetical chance level. Importantly, the overall frequency of 
items recalled should be accounted for, since memory performance for self-owned items 
is generally higher than for other-assigned items and our clustering index should not 
simply reflect the mere ownership effect itself. 
Measures of above-chance clustering 
Even if there is no systematic organization of memory using the categories of interest to 
the researcher, statistically some repetitions are to be expected purely by chance. If this 
is not taken into account, a measure of clustering is likely to overestimate the overall 
amount of memory organization it is intended to assess. Therefore, the expected amount 
of chance repetition has to be subtracted from the amount of clustering that is empirically 
observed. 
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Such measures are most suitable to address the question whether or not a an above-chance 
amount of clustering has occurred at all, that is whether the order of the output reflects 
the systematic grouping of the items in memory. The relevant statistical comparison 
would then be between the value of such an index and zero (or whichever value corre-
sponds to perfect chance clustering). Significant positive differences and would be indic-
ative of memory organization. 
Expected number of repetitions according to Bousfield and Bousfield 
(1966) 
Bousfield and Bousfield (1966, cited from Hunt, 1971) proposed a measure for the ex-
pected amount of clustering in randomly distributed output. By using the expected fre-
quency of pairs as a baseline, it is possible to test whether the empirically observed fre-
quency of pairs exceeds the number of pairings that occur randomly, that is if there is 
clustering of items. They proposed the following equations for calculating the expected 
frequency of repetitions E(Ri) in a given category i: 
𝐸(𝑅) = ∑ 𝑅𝑖 = ∑
 𝑚𝑖(𝑚𝑖−1)
𝑛
= (∑
𝑚𝑖
2
𝑛
𝑘
𝑖=1 ) − 1   (1) 
𝐸(𝑅𝑖) =  
 𝑚𝑖(𝑚𝑖−1)
𝑛
       (2) 
 
where R is the number of repetitions overall, Ri is the number of repetitions for a given 
category i, mi is the number of items recalled from category i, n is the total number of 
items recalled, and k is the number of categories. 
The advantage of this measure is that it is independent of overall number of category 
items recalled, as the absolute frequency of pairs would be expected to increase with the 
absolute frequency of recalled items. 
A limitation of this approach is, however, that it does not accurately capture differences 
in chance clustering between categories of the same list. According to Hunt (1971), even 
though equations (1) and (2) provided separate expected values for each category, they 
are only suited to assess overall clustering of a list. 
Clustering in free recall according to Gerjuoy & Spitz (1966) 
A commonly used clustering measure was proposed by Gerjuoy and Spitz (1966, cited 
from Thompson & Abramczyk, 1975). 
The clustering score is computed as follows: 
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𝐶𝑖 =  
𝑅𝑖− 𝐸(𝑅𝑖)
𝑀𝑎𝑥 𝑅𝑖−𝐸(𝑅𝑖)
    (3) 
where Ri is the observed number of repetitions for a given category i, E(Ri) is the expected 
number of repetitions when there is no non-random clustering and max Ri is the maxi-
mum number of repetitions of category i items given the number of category i items re-
called. 
For the overall amount of clustering in a given output, this gives the ARC-Index 
(Roenker, Thompson, & Brown, 1971) which is computed as follows: 
𝐴𝑅𝐶 =
𝑅−𝐸(𝑅)
𝑚𝑎𝑥 𝑅−𝐸 (𝑅)
         (4) 
Where R is the observed number of category repetitions for the entire list, E(R) is the 
expected number of repetitions when there is no non-random clustering and max R is the 
maximum number of category repetitions given the number of category items recalled, 
and the number of categories. 
For the overall score, max R is computed as 
𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑅 =  𝑛 − 𝑘    (5) 
(Where n is the number of items recalled and k the number of different categories in the 
output). 
The amount of clustering is calculated as the ratio of the number of observed above 
chance repetitions and the maximum number of above-chance repetitions. A value of zero 
indicates chance clustering, whereas a value close to 1 represents high clustering. Esti-
mating the number of expected repetitions is not without difficulties, however. Different 
approaches to obtain an adequate index for E(Ri) in the case of between- and within-list 
comparisons are discussed in later sections. An important limitation of the commonly 
used measure is that it is appropriate for quantifying clustering across an entire list but 
not specific subsets of lists (Hunt, 1971; Klein & Kihlstrom, 1986). 
Correction for dependency according to Hunt (1971) 
Hunt (1971) proposed a measure for the expected number of pairs that allowed within-
list comparisons of clustering of different categories. When making within-list compari-
sons, it needs to be taken into account that the amount of clustering in one category is no 
longer independent from the amount of clustering in the other category. Specifically, the 
more repetitions there are of one category with a given frequency of items of that category 
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recalled, the more clustering there will be for the remaining categories. Therefore, repe-
titions of non-i items that exceed chance should be subtracted from the number of items 
in the denominator. The following equations for determining E(Ri) were proposed. 
𝐸(𝑅𝑖)
′ =  
𝑚𝑖(𝑚𝑖−1)
𝑛𝑖
′   (6) 
Where 
𝑛𝑖
′ = 𝑛 −  [𝑅 − 𝐸(𝑅)] +  [𝑅𝑖 − 𝐸(𝑅𝑖) ]  (7) 
(Where R is the number of repetitions overall, Ri is the number of repetitions for a given 
category i, mi is the number of items recalled from category i and n is the total number of 
items recalled). 
Below, indexes of above-chance clustering are presented. The basic rationale of the clus-
tering measure is the same for both Gerjuoy and Spitz (1966) and in Klein and Kihlstrom 
( 1986). However, they differ with regard to how the expected amount of chance cluster-
ing, which forms part of the equation, is calculated. 
Quantifying clustering in a self-reference task (Klein & Kihlstrom, 1986) 
In their Experiment 1,  Klein and Kihlstrom (1986) used the expected amount of pairs per 
category in order to obtain a baseline for clustering that should occur randomly. Im-
portantly, they aimed to compare the amount of clustering between different categories 
that were recalled on the same trial. In previous studies, typically only the amount of 
clustering for an entire recall list was calculated. 
They utilized the rationale proposed by Bousfield and Bousfield (1966), applying Hunt's  
(1971) correction for expected pairings between different categories of the same list 
which is designed to take into account the fact that the within-list amount of clustering of 
a given category is not independent from the amount of clustering in the other categories. 
They applied the basic rationale from Gerjuoy and Spitz (1966) in order to quantify the 
amount of clustering per category, where the amount of clustering was defined as follows: 
𝐶 =  
𝑅𝑖− 𝐸(𝑅𝑖)
𝑀𝑎𝑥 𝑅𝑖−𝐸(𝑅𝑖)
    (8) 
(Where Ri is the observed number of repetitions for a given category i, E(Ri) is the ex-
pected number of repetitions when there is no non-random clustering and max Ri is the 
maximum number of repetitions of category i items given the number of category i items 
recalled.) 
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Here, a value of 0 indicates clustering at perfect chance level, whereas higher values in-
dicate a greater amount of clustering. 
Measuring clustering relative to overall memory performance 
Bower, Lesgold and Tiemann (1969): Modified ratio of repetitions 
The modified ratio of repetition proposed by Bower et al. (1969) is the proportion of pairs 
of same-category items relative to the number of items in that category. 
It is defined as 
𝑀𝑅𝑅 =  
∑ 𝑛𝑗𝑗𝑗
∑ 𝑛𝑖−1𝑗
, 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑛𝑗 > 1   (9) 
“Where nj is the number of words recalled from category or group j, njj is the number of 
pairs 
of the nj words which are recalled in consecutive order , and the summation ranges over 
the various categories or groups” (p.482). 
For a single category the MRRi is computed as 
𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑖 =  
𝑛𝑖𝑖
𝑛𝑖−1
     (10) 
In the case of perfect clustering, the MRR equals 1, in the absence of repetitions it takes 
on a value of 0. 
While this measure takes into account the number of items recalled, it is not anchored at 
chance level. Indeed, chance clustering may correspond to different scores depending on 
the specific output list. 
However, since our main focus was the difference in clustering between self- and other-
assigned items, this particular feature of the MRR need not be problematic. 
Robbins and Nolan (2001): Number of runs 
More recently, an alternative rationale was proposed by Robbins and Nolan (2001). Their 
clustering index c is equivalent to the MRR for a single category. While not developed in 
the context of recall tasks, specifically, it is adequate for the type of data produced by our 
task. Albeit mathematically equivalent to measures looking at the frequencies of simple 
pairs, the calculation for this clustering index has the advantage of requiring a more direct 
look at the length of an uninterrupted string of same-category items. 
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The reasoning behind this way of calculating clustering is that the more clustering there 
is, the fewer uninterrupted runs of same-category items there will be for a given amount 
of items recalled. A run is defined as an uninterrupted sequence of consecutive same-
category items. 
For items of a given subcategory, the clustering index is defined as 
𝐶 =  
𝑚𝑖𝑛−𝑜𝑏𝑠
𝑚𝑖𝑛−𝑚𝑎𝑥
=  
𝑛−𝑟
𝑛−1 
    (11) 
where n is the number of items in a given category and r is the number of runs. 
C is the ratio of the difference of the number of items in a given category (if at least the 
same number-1 of items from other categories have been recalled, this corresponds to 
minimal clustering) and the number of observed runs in that same category to the differ-
ence between the number of items in that category and the number of runs given maxi-
mum clustering (if any category items are recalled, said maximum will be exactly 1 run). 
Values close to 0 indicate an absence of clustering, values close to 1 indicate high clus-
tering. 
As can be easily demonstrated26, the sum of Cs over all categories equals the MRR, just 
as the modified repetition ratio with only one category j in the enumerator is equivalent 
to C. 
Ultimately, this measure permits a comparison between the amount of clustering in dif-
ferent categories within the same list, while controlling for overall memory performance. 
A potential criticism of this measure is that it does not control for the amount of clustering 
that would be expected by chance alone. However, this was not the focus of our research. 
                                                 
26 There is a simple relationship between the number of runs and the number of pairs of items for a given 
category. Let ni be the number of items of category i and ri the number of runs of category i. Let be the 
length of the k-th run, i.e. the k-th run contains li(k) consecutive items of cateogory i. Thus, it contains li(k) − 
1 pairs. The total number of pairs is thus given by 
 
∑ (𝑙𝑖
(𝑘)
− 1) =   ∑ 𝑙𝑖
(𝑘)𝑟𝑖
𝑘=1
𝑟𝑖
𝑘=1 −  ∑ 1 =  𝑛𝑖 − 𝑟𝑖
𝑟𝑖
𝑘=1  (12) 
 
as the sum of all items contained in all runs has to be the total number of items ni. Therefore, the total 
number of pairs of category i is ni − ri, the number of items of this category minus the number of runs of 
items of this category. The author would like to thank Dr. Matthias Augustin for providing this proof. 
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We chose the MRR/ C-Index in order to be able to compare clustering between categories 
within the same output. 
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Appendix B. Overview of hit and false alarm rates for the pilot 
study, Experiments 1-5, and Experiment 7 
 
Table B 1. Mean hit rates for self- and other-assigned items and false alarm rates for new items for the pilot 
study, Experiments 1-5, and Experiment 7. SD in parentheses. 
 Self-assigned 
(Hits) 
Other-assigned 
(Hits) 
New Items 
(False Alarms) 
Pilot study .39 (.19) .39 (.20) .11 (.09) 
Experiment 1 .70 (.20) .66 (.17) .13 (.14) 
Experiment 2 .71 (.16) .66 (.17) .13 (.14) 
Experiment 3 .31 (.17) .32 (.17) .11 (.11) 
Experiment 4 (matching trials) .55 (.16) .52 (.14) .13 (.12) 
Experiment 4 (non-matching 
trials) 
.53 (.17) .51 (.15) .23 (.14) 
Experiment 5 (perceptual) .55 (.20) .53 (.21) .07 (.06)a 
Experiment 5 (semantic) .68 (.21) .70 (.19)  
Experiment 7 .47 (.25) .47 (.24) b .25 (.18) 
Note. a False alarm rates cannot be differentiated between the semantic and conceptual encoding task and 
are the same for both conditions. 
b
 Hit rates for “other”-assigned items in Experiment 7 are computed as 
the mean hit rates between the hit rates in the “mother” and the “acquaintance” condition. 
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Appendix C. Stimulus Objects used in the Experiments 
Appendix C1. List of visual stimuli used in the Pilot Study 
 
 Set 1 
Meaningful stimuli 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
   
Meaningless pseudo objects 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
     
 
 
Set 2 
Meaningful stimuli 
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Meaningless pseudo objects 
 
  
 
 
 
     
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
   
  
 
 
Set 3 
Meaningful stimuli 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Meaningless pseudo objects 
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Appendix C2. List of visual stimuli and labels used in Experiments 1 and 2 
 
Set 1   
Item Label Translation 
 
 
Kürbis pumpkin 
 
 
Brokkoli broccoli 
 
 
Chili chili pepper 
 
 
Zitrone lemon 
 
 
Rose rose 
 
 
Nudelsieb strainer 
 
 
Schere scissors 
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Teekanne teapot 
 
 
Waschmaschine washing machine 
 
 
Fernseher television set 
 
 
Croissant croissant 
 
 
Fußball football 
 
 
Luftballons balloons 
 
 
Radiergummi eraser 
 
 
Sparschwein piggy bank 
 
 
Feuerzeug cigarette lighter 
 
 
Hammer hammer 
 
 
Zange tongs 
 
 
Fahrrad bicycle 
 
 
Kerze candle 
Appendices 133 
 
 
Kochtopf cooking pot 
 
 
Drehstuhl swivel chair 
 
 
Glühbirne light bulb 
 
 
Apfel apple 
 
 
Erdbeere strawberry 
 
 
Ananas pineapple 
 
 
Bonbon piece of candy 
 
 
Bier beer 
 
 
Rubikwürfel Rubik’s Cube 
 
 
Sporttasche gym bag 
 
 
Hantel dumbbell 
 
 
Senf mustard 
 
 
Pizza slice of pizza 
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Schraube screw 
 
 
Pinsel paintbrush 
 
 
Sonnenbrille sunglasses 
 
 
Kaktus cactus 
 
 
Hut hat 
 
 
Schlittschuhe ice skates 
 
 
Zahnpasta toothpaste 
 
 
Putzmittel cleaning agent 
 
 
Donut doughnut 
 
 
Eiscreme ice cream 
 
 
Notizblock notepad 
 
 
Malkasten paintbox 
 
 
Teddybär teddy bear 
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Saxophon saxophone 
 
 
Kühlbox cooling box 
 
 
Pfefferstreuer pepper pot 
 
  
 
Vase vase 
 
 
Set 2   
Item Label Translation 
 
 
 
Paprika bell pepper 
 
 
 
Tomate tomato 
 
 
 
Steinpilz porcino 
 
 
 
Salat lettuce 
 
 
 
Sonnenblume sunflower 
 
 
 
Schneebesen egg whisk 
 
 
 
Lupe magnifying glass 
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Kaffeetasse coffee cup 
 
 
 
Bügeleisen flat iron 
 
 
 
Kamera camera 
 
 
 
Brezel pretzel 
 
 
Tennisball tennis ball 
 
 
Fächer hand fan 
 
 
Textmarker highlighter 
 
 
Stempel rubber stamp 
 
 
Taschenlampe flashlight 
 
 
Bohrer power drill 
 
 
Schraubenzieher screwdriver 
 
 
Tretroller scooter 
 
 
Schlüssel key 
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Pfanne pan 
 
 
Schreibtisch desk 
 
 
Wäscheklammer clothespin 
 
 
Birne pear 
 
 
Trauben bunch of grapes 
 
 
Melone melon 
 
 
Kuchen cake 
 
 
Sekt sparkling wine 
 
 
Puzzle jigsaw puzzle 
 
 
Koffer suitcase 
 
 
Kegel bowling pin 
 
 
Käse cheese 
 
 
Pommes Frites fries 
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Mutter screw nut 
 
 
Leiter  ladder 
 
 
Krawatte necktie 
 
 
Topfpflanze potted plant 
 
 
Hemd shirt 
 
 
Campingzelt camping tent 
 
 
Kamm comb 
 
 
Putzeimer cleaning bucket 
 
 
Hotdog hotdog 
 
 
Schokopudding chocolate pudding 
 
 
Kalender calendar 
 
 
Dartbrett dartboard 
 
 
Schaukelpferd rocking horse 
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Keyboard keyboard 
 
 
Picknickkorb picnic basket 
 
 
Löffel spoon 
 
  
 
Stehlampe floor lamp 
 
 
Set 3   
Item Label Translation 
 
 
Karotte carrot 
 
 
Aubergine eggplant 
 
 
Knoblauch garlic 
 
 
Erdnüsse peanuts 
 
 
Veilchen violet 
 
 
Wanduhr wall clock 
 
 
Füller fountain pen 
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Mörser mortar 
 
 
Kaffeemaschine coffee maker 
 
 
Telefon telephone 
 
 
Toast toast 
 
 
Golfball golf ball 
 
 
Glöckchen little bells 
 
 
Geodreieck triangle ruler 
 
 
Schreibtischlampe desk lamp 
 
 
Teppichmesser box cutter 
 
 
Axt axe 
 
 
Spaten spade 
 
 
Rasenmäher lawn mower 
 
 
Pflaster band-aid 
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Eieruhr squirrel 
 
 
Schränkchen cabinet 
 
 
Kleiderbügel coat hanger 
 
 
Banane banana 
 
 
Kirsche cherry 
 
 
Kiwi kiwi 
 
 
Limonade lemonade 
 
 
Wein wine 
 
 
Jojo yo-yo 
 
 
Regenschirm umbrella 
 
 
Pingpongset ping-pong 
 
 
Milch milk 
 
 
Hamburger hamburger 
142 Appendices 
 
 
Spachtel scraper 
 
 
Schubkarre wheelbarrow 
 
 
Armbanduhr wristwatch 
 
 
Bäumchen small tree 
 
 
Schuhe shoes 
 
 
Golfschläger golf club 
 
 
Lippenstift lipstick 
 
 
Ascheschaufel dustpan 
 
 
Sandwich sandwich 
 
 
Cola coke 
 
 
Bilderrahmen picture frame 
 
 
Billardset billard balls 
 
 
Badeente rubber duck 
Appendices 143 
 
 
E-Gitarre electric guitar 
 
 
Gießkanne watering can 
 
 
Gabel fork 
 
  
 
Holztruhe wooden chest 
 
 
Primacy and recency items 
Item Label Translation 
 
 
Hamster hamster 
 
 
Goldfisch goldfish 
 
 
Papagei parrott 
 
 
Masken masks 
 
 
Fähnchen little flag 
 
 
Drachen kite 
 
 
Mütze cap 
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Trommel drum 
 
 
Mülleimer garbage can 
 
 
Briefmarke stamp 
 
 
Etikett tag 
 
  
 
Briefumschlag envelope 
 
 
 
Appendix C3. List of visual stimuli used in Experiment 3 
 
Set 1     
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Set 2     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
   
 
 
 
 
   
     
 
 
Set 3     
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Primacy and recency items 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix C4. List of visual stimuli with matching and non-matching verbal 
labels used in Experiment 4 
 
 
Set 1     
Item Match Translation Mismatch Translation 
 
 
Malkasten paintbox Sandkasten sandbox 
 
 
Broccoli broccoli Sellerie celery 
 
Pfefferstreuer pepper pot Essig vinegar 
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Putzmittel cleaning agent Schwamm sponge 
 
 
Vase vase Fackel torch 
 
 
Teekanne teapot Wasserglas glass of water 
 
 
Glühbirne light bulb Stoppuhr stop watch 
 
 
Fernseher television set Kamin chimney 
 
 
Hut hat Kleid dress 
 
 
Saxophon saxophone Klavier piano 
 
 
Bonbon piece of candy Kaugummi chewing gum 
 
 
Senf mustard Ketchup ketchup 
 
 
Pizza slice of pizza Schnitzel escalope 
 
 
Eiscreme ice cream Joghurt yoghurt 
 
 
Erdbeere strawberry Praline chocolate candy 
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Zitrone lemon Mandarine tangerine 
 
 
Kaktus cactus Herbstlaub autumn leaves 
 
 
Hantel dumbbell Schaukel swing 
 
 
Schlittschuhe ice skates Surfbrett surfboard 
 
 
Rubikwürfel Rubik’s Cube Spielkarten deck of cards 
 
 
Zange tongs Zirkel pair of compasses 
 
 
Pinsel paintbrush Farbeimer paint bucket 
 
 
Luftballons balloons Teelicht tea candle 
 
 
Radiergummi eraser Bleistift pencil 
 
 
Drehstuhl swivel chair Couch couch 
 
 
Rose rose Orchidee orchid 
 
 
Kürbis pumpkin Kohlkopf cabbage 
 
 
Chili chili pepper Ingwer ginger 
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Waschmaschine washing machine Nähmaschine sewing machine 
 
 
Schere scissors Stricknadel knitting needle 
 
 
Nudelsieb strainer Fleischwolf meat chopper 
 
 
Kochtopf cooking pot Schüssel bowl 
 
 
Kühlbox cooling box Tüte shopping bag 
 
 
Zahnpasta toothpaste Seife soap 
 
 
Sonnenbrille sunglasses Ohrringe earrings 
 
 
Notizblock notepad Zeitung newspaper 
 
 
Croissant croissant Brötchen bread roll 
 
 
Bier beer Fruchtsaft fruit juice 
 
 
Donut doughnut Berliner bismarck 
 
 
Ananas pineapple Avocado avocado 
 
 
Apfel apple Rosine raisin 
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Sporttasche gym bag Federball shuttlecock 
 
 
Fußball football Murmelspiel game of marbles 
 
 
Teddybär teddy bear Drachen kite 
 
 
Fahrrad bicycle Schlitten sleigh 
 
 
Schraube screw Tacker stapler 
 
 
Hammer hammer Feile file 
 
 
Kerze candle Teller plate 
 
 
Feuerzeug cigarette lighter Batterie battery 
 
  
 
Sparschwein piggy bank Aschenbecher ashtray 
 
 
Set 2     
Item Match Translation Mismatch Translation 
 
 
Salat lettuce Mais corn 
 
 
Tomate tomato Radieschen garden radish 
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Löffel spoon Streichholz match 
 
 
Putzeimer cleaning bucket Bürste paper clip 
 
 
Wäscheklammer clothespin Zahnbürste toothbrush 
 
 
Stehlampe floor lamp Briefkasten mailbox 
 
 
Kaffeetasse coffee cup Untertasse saucer 
 
 
Kamera camera Kopfhörer headphones 
 
 
Picknickkorb picnic basket Serviette napkin 
 
 
Hemd shirt Hose trousers 
 
 
Pommes Frites fries Nudeln pasta 
 
 
Schokopudding chocolate pudding Mayonnaise mayonnaise 
 
 
Kuchen cake Sahne cream 
 
 
Sekt sparkling wine Zuckerstück lump of sugar 
 
 
Trauben bunch of grapes Brombeere blackberry 
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Topfpflanze potted plant Palme palm tree 
 
 
Campingzelt camping tent Rucksack backpack 
 
 
Kegel bowling pin Flummi bouncy ball 
 
 
Schaukelpferd rocking horse Weihnachtsbaum Christmas tree 
 
 
Schraubenzieher screwdriver Fliegenklatsche fly swatter 
 
 
Taschenlampe flashlight Taschenrechner hand calculator 
 
 
Leiter  ladder Türknauf door knob 
 
 
Fächer hand fan Halstuch bandana 
 
 
Textmarker highlighter Büroklammer paper clip 
 
 
Koffer suitcase Handtasche handbag 
 
 
Sonnenblume sunflower Löwenzahn dandelion 
 
 
Dartbrett dartboard Pokal trophy cup 
 
 
Paprika bell pepper Bohnen beans 
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Steinpilz porcino Kartoffel potato 
 
 
Bügeleisen flat iron Toaster toaster 
 
 
Lupe magnifying glass Fernglas spyglass 
 
 
Pfanne pan Krug mug 
 
 
Kamm comb Handtuch towel 
 
 
Schneebesen egg whisk Kochlöffel cooking spoon 
 
 
Krawatte necktie Jackett suit coat 
 
 
Keyboard keyboard Schlagzeug drum kit 
 
 
Brezel pretzel Keks cookie 
 
 
Käse cheese Schinken ham 
 
 
Hotdog hotdog Schokoriegel chocolate bar 
 
 
Melone melon Aprikose apricot 
 
 
Birne pear Pflaume plum 
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Tennisball tennis ball Skateboard skateboard 
 
 
Tretroller scooter Rollstuhl wheelchair 
 
 
Bohrer power drill Kettensäge chainsaw 
 
 
Mutter screw nut Münze coin 
 
 
Puzzle jigsaw puzzle Kreisel spinning top 
 
 
Schlüssel key Zigarre cigar 
 
 
Stempel rubber stamp Etikett tag 
 
 
Addressbuch address book Klemmbrett clipboard 
 
  
 
Schreibtisch desk Bett bed 
 
 
Set 3     
Item Match Translation Mismatch Translation 
 
 
Veilchen violet Tulpe tulip 
 
 
Billardset billard balls Mikrofon microphone 
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Aubergine eggplant Zucchini zucchini 
 
 
Gießkanne watering can Gartenschlauch garden hose 
 
 
Gabel fork Zahnstocher toothpick 
 
 
Holztruhe wooden chest Kleiderständer hat stand 
 
 
Schränkchen chocolate bar Esstisch dining table 
 
 
Eieruhr hourglass Waage scales 
 
 
Kleiderbügel coat hanger Gürtel belt 
 
 
Armbanduhr wristwatch Halskette necklace 
 
 
Telefon telephone Radio radio 
 
 
Hamburger hamburger Eintopf stew 
 
 
Sandwich sandwich Würstchen sausage 
 
 
Cola coke Schnaps liquor 
 
 
Wein wine Cocktail cocktail 
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Kirsche cherry Orange orange 
 
 
Erdnüsse peanuts Erbsen peas 
 
 
Golfschläger golf club Gehstock walking stick 
 
 
Schuhe shoes Socken socks 
 
 
Badeente rubber duck Waschlappen washcloth 
 
 
Spachtel scraper Nägel nails 
 
 
Rasenmäher lawn mower Staubsauger vacuum cleaner 
 
 
Glöckchen little bells Triangel triangle 
 
 
Geodreieck triangle ruler Spitzer sharpener 
 
 
Schreibtisch-
lampe 
desk lamp Monitor monitor 
 
 
Karotte carrot Spargel asparagus 
 
 
Knoblauch garlic Zwiebel onion 
 
 
Kaffeemaschine coffee maker Korkenzieher corkscrew 
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Ascheschaufel dustpan Besen broom 
 
 
Lippenstift lipstick Puderdose powder compact 
 
 
Bilderrahmen picture frame Spiegel mirror 
 
 
Wanduhr wall clock Regal shelves 
 
 
Regenschirm umbrella Anorak anorak 
 
 
E-Gitarre electric guitar Violine violin 
 
 
Toast toast Spiegelei fried egg 
 
 
Milch milk Butter butter 
 
 
Limonade lemonade Cappucino cappuccino 
 
 
Banane banana Mango mango 
 
 
Kiwi kiwi Himbeere raspberry 
 
 
Bäumchen small tree Hecke hedge 
 
 
Golfball golf ball Springseil skipping rope 
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Pingpongset ping-pong Basketball basketball 
 
 
Jojo yo-yo Puppe doll 
 
 
Teppichmesser box cutter Pinzette tweezers 
 
 
Schubkarre wheelbarrow Bagger excavator 
 
 
Axt axe Rechen rake 
 
 
Spaten spade Schraubstock bench vise 
 
 
Pflaster band-aid Wattebausch cotton ball 
 
 
Mörser mortar Mixer blender 
 
  
 
Füller fountain pen Wecker alarm clock 
 
 
Practice items 
Item Match Translation Mismatch Translation 
 
 
Panda panda --- --- 
 
 
Hubschrauber helicopter --- --- 
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Rutschbahn slide --- --- 
 
 
Kirche church --- --- 
 
 
Steckdose power socket --- --- 
 
 
Schneemann snowman --- --- 
 
 
Krokodil crocodile --- --- 
 
 
Brücke bridge --- --- 
 
 
Fuchs fox --- --- 
 
 
Roulette roulette --- --- 
 
 
--- --- Elefant elephant 
 
 
--- --- Zeppelin zeppelin 
 
 
--- --- Fallschirm parachute 
 
 
--- --- Kraftwerk power plant 
 
 
--- --- Kasse checkout 
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--- --- Straßenbahn tram 
 
 
--- --- Tiger tiger 
 
 
--- --- Pyramiden pyramids 
 
 
--- --- Eichhörnchen squirrel 
 
  
 
--- --- Skateboard skateboard 
 
 
Primacy and recency items 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix C5. List of visual stimuli used in Experiment 5 by set, semantic 
category, and color 
 
 
Set 1       
Artificial Green 
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Artificial Purple 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
    
 
   
 
Natural Green 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
    
 
 
 
  
Natural Purple 
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Set 2       
Artificial Green 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
    
     
Artificial Purple 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
  
    
     
Natural Green 
    
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
    
     
Natural Purple 
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Set 3       
Artificial Green 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
     
  
 
  
 
 
    
  
  
 
Artificial Purple 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
   
    
     
Natural Green 
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
  
    
 
    
Natural Purple 
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Primacy and recency items 
Artificial Green 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
 
 
 
 
Artificial Purple 
 
 
 
 
    
    
Natural Green 
 
 
  
    
    
Natural Purple 
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Appendix C6. List of visual stimuli and veral labels used in Experiment 6 
 
Set 1   
Item Label Translation 
 
 
 
Iglu igloo 
 
 
 
Tannenzapfen pinecone 
 
 
 
Goldfisch goldfish 
 
 
 
Wäscheklammer clothespin 
 
 
 
Kamm comb 
 
 
 
Spülmaschine dishwasher 
 
 
 
Nudelholz rolling pin 
 
 
 
Tisch table 
 
 
 
Regal shelves 
 
 
 
Kerze candle 
 
 
 
Kleiderbügel coat hanger 
 
Rucksack backpack 
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Armbanduhr wristwatch 
 
 
Telefon telephone 
 
 
Trommel drum 
 
 
Croissant croissant 
 
 
Spiegelei fried egg 
 
 
Kürbis pumpkin 
 
 
Wassermelone watermelon 
 
  
 
Kaktus cactus 
 
 
Set 2   
Item Label Translation 
 
 
 
Windmühle windmill 
 
 
 
Rose rose 
 
Hummer lobster 
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Toilettenpapier toilet paper 
 
 
 
Schere scissors 
 
 
 
Bügeleisen flat iron 
 
 
 
Toaster toaster 
 
 
 
Sofa sofa 
 
 
 
Bank bench 
 
 
 
Fernseher television set 
 
 
 
Wanduhr wall clock 
 
 
Sonnenbrille sunglasses 
 
 
Ring ring 
 
 
Notizbuch notebook 
 
 
Schallplatten records 
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Hotdog hotdog 
 
 
Suppe soup 
 
 
Banane banana 
 
 
Knoblauch garlic 
 
  
 
Fahrrad bicycle 
 
 
Set 3   
Item Label Translation 
 
 
 
Hütte hut 
 
 
 
Löwenzahn dandelion 
 
 
 
Schwan swan 
 
 
 
Lippenstift lipstick 
 
 
 
Eimer bucket 
 
 
 
Staubsauger vacuum cleaner 
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Korkenzieher corkscrew 
 
 
 
Truhe chest 
 
 
 
Lampe lamp 
 
 
 
Kamera camera 
 
 
 
Glühbirne light bulb 
 
 
Regenschirm umbrella 
 
 
Hemd shirt 
 
 
Briefkasten mailbox 
 
 
Saxophon saxophone 
 
 
Eis ice cream 
 
 
Kuchen cake 
 
 
Erdbeere strawberry 
 
 
Erdnüsse peanuts 
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Boot boat 
 
 
Set 4   
Item Label Translation 
 
 
 
Brücke bridge 
 
 
 
Topfpflanze potted plant 
 
 
 
Kaninchen bunny 
 
 
 
Wattestäbchen cotton swab 
 
 
 
Lupe magnifying glass 
 
 
 
Kaffeemaschine coffee maker 
 
 
 
Gießkanne watering can 
 
 
 
Gardinen curtains 
 
 
 
Mülltonne garbage can 
 
 
 
Vase vase 
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Kopfhörer headphones 
 
 
Mütze cap 
 
 
Handtasche handbag 
 
 
Radio radio 
 
 
E-Gitarre electric guitar 
 
 
Käse cheese 
 
 
Sekt sparkling wine 
 
 
Chilischote chili pepper 
 
 
Kopfsalat lettuce 
 
  
 
Drachen kite 
 
 
Primacy and recency items 
Item Label Translation 
 
 
 
Mausefalle mouse trap 
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Sparschwein piggy bank 
 
 
 
Fächer hand fan 
 
 
 
Bagger excavator 
 
 
 
Heißluftballon hot-air balloon 
 
  
 
Bett bed 
 
 
Appendix C7. List of visual stimuli used in Experiment 7 
 
Assigned Shape 
 
List 1 
     
 
     
 
     
  
     
List 2 
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Assigned Shape 
  
List 1 
     
 
     
 
     
  
     
List 2 
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Assigned Shape 
 
List 1 
     
 
     
 
     
  
     
List 2 
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Appendix D: List of instructions used in the experiments  
All instructions were given in German language and are reproduced here as such. Addi-
tional clarifying information is provided in italics in English language. For the sake of 
space and grouping that makes sense with regards to content, line breaks and paragraph 
breaks that existed in the slides of the experiments have been removed. Remaining breaks 
signify a new slide. Similarly, only the text of the written instructions is reproduced here, 
not its visual style. Fonts, font sizes and formatting may differ from the experiments. 
Appendix D1: Instructions used in the pilot study 
Welcome and encoding phase (shopping task): 
Herzlich Willkommen, liebe Versuchsperson! In diesem Versuch möchten wir Sie bitten, 
sich vorzustellen, dass Sie an einem Kartenspiel teilnehmen. Dabei gibt es außer Ihnen 
noch einen zweiten Mitspieler. Bevor es losgehen kann, müssen die Karten ausgeteilt 
werden: Jeder erhält die Hälfte der Karten, sodass Sie und Ihr Mitspieler beide einen Sta-
pel von Karten bekommen. Weiter mit der Leertaste. 
Es gibt zwei Sorten von Karten: Nämlich solche, mit  einer blauen Rückseite und solche 
mit einer roten Rückseite. Jeder Spieler bekommt alle Karten derselben Sorte. Der Zufall 
hat entschieden, dass Sie den ersten Zug machen dürfen. Sie dürfen nun entscheiden, 
welche Sorte von Karten Sie für sich in Anspruch nehmen möchten. Weiter mit der Leer-
taste. 
Wenn Sie gerne mit dem Stapel roter Karten spielen möchten, so drücken Sie gleich auf 
die Taste "r" für rot. Wenn Sie gerne mit dem Stapel blauer Karten spielen möchten, so 
drücken Sie gleich auf die Taste "b" für blau. Weiter mit der Leertaste, um sich die beiden 
Stapel anschauen zu können.  
Mit welcher Farbe möchten Sie spielen? 
Sie haben sich für ROT/BLAU entschieden! Damit sind Sie nun der Rote/Blaue Spieler 
bzw. die Rote/Blaue Spielerin. Ihr Mitspieler bekommt die Blauen/Roten Karten zuge-
wiesen und ist somit der Blaue/Rote Spieler. Weiter mit der Leertaste. 
Gleich werden Ihnen nacheinander eine Reihe von Karten präsentiert, auf denen farbige 
Bilder zu sehen sind. Außerdem hat jede Karte entweder einen roten oder einen blauen 
Rand. Zur Erinnerung: Die blauen/roten Karten gehören Ihrem Mitspieler, die ro-
ten/blauen Karten Ihnen selbst. Weiter mit der Leertaste. 
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Zunächst müssen alle Karten richtig einsortiert werden. Dies bedeutet, dass Ihre eigenen 
Karten auf Ihrem Stapel und die Karten des Mitspielers auf dem anderen Stapel abgelegt 
werden müssen. Ob eine Karte Ihnen oder dem Mitspieler gehört, erkennen Sie daran, ob 
sie einen roten oder einen blauen Rand hat. Eine Karte mit rotem/blauem Rand gehört zu 
Ihnen. Eine Karte mit einem blauen/roten Rand gehört zum Mitspieler. Weiter mit der 
Leertaste. 
Wenn Ihnen eine Karte gezeigt wird, die zu Ihnen gehört, drücken Sie bitte die Taste „f/j“. 
Damit wird die Karte Ihrem Stapel hinzugefügt. Wenn Ihnen eine Karte gezeigt wird, die 
zu Ihrem Mitspieler gehört, drücken Sie bitte die Taste „j/f“. Damit wird die Karte dem 
Stapel des Mitspielers hinzugefügt. Wichtig ist, dass Sie dabei richtig antworten und so 
wenig Fehler wie möglich machen. Um mit dem Austeilen der Karten zu beginnen, drü-
cken Sie bitte die Leertaste. 
Recognition memory task and remember/know guess task: 
Sie haben den ersten Teil der Untersuchung überstanden. Im folgenden Teil unserer Un-
tersuchung geht es darum, wie gut Sie sich die Bilder auf den Karten im vorangegangenen 
Teil der Untersuchung merken konnten. Dabei spielt es keine Rolle, wem die Karten zu-
geordnet waren. Sie benötigen weiterhin die Tastatur. Sie haben nun zwei Aufgaben. 
Weiter mit der Leertaste. 
Aufgabe 1: Gleich werden Ihnen auf dem Bildschirm eine Reihe von bunten Bildern prä-
sentiert. Einige davon könnten Sie bereits aus der Sortieraufgabe kennen: Denn ein Teil 
dieser Bilder waren als Motive auf den blauen und den roten Karten zu sehen. Die Bilder, 
die bereits in der Sortieraufgabe vorkamen gelten somit als ALT. Die Bilder, die nicht in 
der Sortierphase vorkamen gelten somit als NEU. Weiter mit der Leertaste. 
Ihre Aufgabe ist es, zu entscheiden, ob ein Bild ALT oder NEU ist: Wenn Sie glauben, 
dass ein Bild bereits in der Sortieraufgabe gesehen haben, also ALT ist, so drücken Sie 
bitte die Taste "f". Wenn Sie glauben, dass ein Bild nicht in der Sortieraufgabe vorkam, 
also NEU ist, so drücken Sie bitte die Taste "j". Weiter mit der Leertaste. 
Aufgabe 2: Beurteilen Sie ein Objekt als „neu“ wird im Anschluss sofort ein weiteres 
Objekt präsentiert. Beurteilen Sie ein Objekt hingegen als „alt“, möchten wir Sie bitten, 
noch eine weitere Unterscheidung vorzunehmen: Weiter mit der Leertaste. 
Bei manchen Bildern werden Ihnen wahrscheinlich Details aus der Sortierphase einfallen: 
z.B. die Farbe des Rahmens, Ihre eigene Reaktion, ein Geräusch außerhalb des Labors 
Appendices 177 
oder ob dieses Bild im Film eher am Anfang oder am Ende der Aufgabe vorkam etc. Das 
heißt, Sie ERINNERN sich in diesem Fall an das Objekt in der Situation. In dem anderen 
Fall wird Ihnen ein Objekt einfach VERTRAUT vorkommen. Sie wissen dann, dass Sie 
dieses Objekt schon einmal gesehen haben, aber Sie können keine weiteren mit dem Ob-
jekt verbundenen Details abrufen. Weiter mit der Leertaste. 
Drücken Sie auf dem Zahlenblock auf die "1", wenn Sie sich bewusst an Aspekte der 
Situation Erinnern, in der das Bild. vorkam. Drücken Sie auf dem Zahlenblock auf die 
"2" , wenn Ihnen das Objekt einfach nur vertraut vorkommt, d.h., wenn Sie keine be-
wusste Erinnerung an die Lernsituation haben, aber trotzdem wissen, dass das Objekt 
vorkam. Falls Sie bei Ihrer Entscheidung nur geraten haben sollten, dann drücken Sie auf 
dem Zahlenblock auf die "3". Mit der Leertaste können Sie die Gedächtnisaufgabe nun 
starten. 
If an „old“ response was selected: 
Sie haben mit "alt" geantwortet. Warum? 
Thank you and goodbye: 
Sie haben es geschafft! Die Untersuchung ist nun zu Ende. Bitte wenden Sie sich an den 
Versuchsleiter. Vielen Dank für ihre Teilnahme. 
 
Appendix D2: Instructions used in Experiment 1 
Welcome and encoding phase (shopping task): 
Herzlich Willkommen, liebe Versuchspersonen! In diesem Experiment sollen Sie sich 
vorstellen, dass Sie bei einer Verlosung eine Reihe verschiedenster Preise gewonnen zu 
haben. Da verschiedene Sponsoren an unserer imaginären Tombola teil genommen ha-
ben, sind die Preise Produkte aus den verschiedensten Geschäften und Gaststätten. Sie 
entstammen verschiedenen Preisgruppen und sind für verschiedene Zielgruppen interes-
sant. Weiter mit der Leertaste. 
Eine Sache ist dabei wichtig zu wissen: Sie haben einen Mitspieler, der ebenfalls an der 
Verlosung teilgenommen hat. Stellen Sie sich vor, dass dieser Mitspieler genauso viele 
Preise gewonnen hat wie Sie. Dieser Mitspieler sitzt Ihnen gegenüber und nimmt mit 
ihnen am Experiment teil. Bitte reden Sie trotzdem nicht miteinander. Merken Sie sich 
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bitte Folgendes: Sie sind SPIELER1 / SPIELER 2. Ihre Farbe ist BLAU / ROT. Ihr Mit-
spieler ist SPIELER 1 / SPIELER 2. Seine oder ihre Farbe ist ROT / BLAU. Weiter mit 
der Leertaste. 
Gleich wird Ihnen auf dem Bildschirm nacheinander eine Reihe von Gegenständen prä-
sentiert. Die Hälfte dieser Gegenstände stellen die Preise dar, die Sie gewonnen haben. 
Die andere Hälfte sind die Preise Ihres Mitspielers. Darüber, wer nun genau was be-
kommt, entscheidet einzig und allein das Los. Tauschen ist nicht erlaubt. Zunächst muss 
aber jeder Preis seinem neuen Besitzer zugewiesen werden. Weiter mit der Leertaste. 
Ihre Aufgabe wird nun darin bestehen, die Preise richtig zu SORTIEREN. Dafür benöti-
gen Sie die MAUS. Dazu werden gleich alle Preise einzeln auf dem Bildschirm erschei-
nen. Nach einer Weile wird jedes Bild entweder einen BLAUEN / ROTEN oder einen 
ROTEN / BLAUEN Rahmen erhalten – dieser Rahmen zeigt an, welchem Teilnehmer 
das Bild gehört. Darunter werden Sie links und rechts zwei Container sehen, die als Auf-
schrift „MITSPIELER“ oder „ICH“ tragen. Der Schriftzug „MITSPIELER“ ist in ROT / 
BLAU, der Schriftzug „ICH“ ist in BLAU / ROT geschrieben. Weiter mit der Leertaste. 
Die FARBE des RAHMENS zeigt den BESITZER des jeweiligen Preises an. Die Preise, 
die einen ROTEN / BLAUEN Rahmen erhalten, gehören in den Container von SPIELER 
1 /SPIELER 2. Damit handelt es sich um die Preise Ihres Mitspielers. Die Preise, die 
einen BLAUEN / ROTEN Rahmen erhalten, gehören in den Container von SPIELER 2 / 
SPIELER 1. Damit handelt es sich um IHRE Preise. Weiter mit der Leertaste. 
Wenn Sie sehen, dass einer der Preise einen ROTEN / BLAUEN Rahmen erhält, so KLI-
CKEN Sie bitte mit dem Mauszeiger in das Kästchen, das den Container von SPIELER 
1 / SPIELER 2 – also Ihres MITSPIELERS – darstellen soll. Wenn Sie sehen, dass einer 
der Preise einen BLAUEN / ROTEN Rahmen erhält, so KLICKEN Sie bitte mit dem 
Mauszeiger in das Kästchen, das den Container von SPIELER 2 / SPIELER 1 – also 
IHNEN – darstellen soll. Weiter mit der Leertaste. 
Gleich geht es los. Wenn Sie noch Fragen haben, wenden Sie sich bitte jetzt an den Ver-
suchsleiter. Bitte bearbeiten Sie die Aufgabe allein, ohne Kommunikation mit dem Mit-
spieler. (Beachten Sie außerdem, dass es sich hier um ein reines Fantasie-Spiel handelt. 
Am Ende des Versuchs werden Sie die angekündigte Entlohnung, aber keinen der Ihnen 
zugelosten Preise erhalten.) Drücken Sie bitte die Leertaste, um mit dem Sortieren der 
Preise zu beginnen. 
Recognition memory and remember/know/guess task: 
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Dies war der erste Teil der Untersuchung. Im nächsten Teil des Versuchs geht es darum, 
wie gut Sie sich die Preise aus dem vorangegangenen Teil merken konnten. Dazu benö-
tigen Sie nur die TASTATUR. Dabei spielt es keine Rolle, wer welchen Preis bekommen 
hat. Sie sollen einfach nur angeben, ob Sie einen Gegenstand während dieses Versuchs 
schon einmal gesehen haben oder nicht. Sie haben nun zwei Aufgaben. Weiter mit der 
Leertaste. 
Aufgabe 1: Gleich werden Ihnen nacheinander Bilder verschiedener Gegenstände auf 
dem Bildschirm gezeigt. Einige sind Ihnen während der Sortieraufgabe bereits als Preise 
begegnet. Einige werden neu hinzu kommen. Darunter werden Sie zwei Kästchen sehen, 
die jeweils die Aufschrift „ALT“ oder „NEU“ tragen. Weiter mit der Leertaste. 
Wenn Sie glauben, einen Gegenstand während des Versuchs schon einmal gesehen zu 
haben, gilt er als ALT. Drücken Sie dann bitte die Taste, die dem Feld „ALT“ zugeordnet 
ist. Dabei handelt es sich um die Taste „F“. Wenn Sie glauben, einen Gegenstand während 
des Versuchs nicht gesehen zu haben, gilt er als NEU. Drücken Sie dann bitte die Taste, 
die dem Feld „NEU“ zugeordnet ist. Dabei handelt es sich um die Taste „J“. Weiter mit 
der Leertaste. 
Aufgabe 2: Bei manchen Bildern werden Ihnen wahrscheinlich DETAILS aus der Sor-
tierphase einfallen: z.B. die Farbe des Rahmens, Ihre eigene Reaktion, ein Geräusch au-
ßerhalb des Labors oder ob dieses Bild im Film eher am Anfang oder am Ende der Auf-
gabe vorkam etc. Das heißt, Sie ERINNERN sich in diesem Fall an das Objekt in der 
Situation. In dem anderen Fall wird Ihnen ein Objekt einfach VERTRAUT vorkommen. 
Sie wissen dann, dass Sie dieses Objekt schon einmal gesehen haben, aber Sie können 
keine weiteren mit dem Objekt verbundenen Details abrufen. Weiter mit der Leertaste. 
Drücken Sie auf dem Zahlenblock auf die "1", wenn Sie sich bewusst an Aspekte der 
Situation ERINNERN, in der das Bild vorkam. Drücken Sie auf dem Zahlenblock auf die 
"2", wenn Ihnen das Objekt einfach nur VERTRAUT vorkommt, d.h., wenn Sie keine 
bewusste Erinnerung an die Lernsituation haben, aber trotzdem wissen, dass das Objekt 
vorkam. Falls Sie bei Ihrer Entscheidung nur GERATEN haben sollten, dann drücken Sie 
auf dem Zahlenblock auf die "3". Mit der Leertaste können Sie die Gedächtnisaufgabe 
nun starten. 
If an „old“ response was selected: 
Sie haben mit "alt" geantwortet. Warum? 
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Thank you and goodbye: 
Sie haben es geschafft! Die Untersuchung ist nun zu Ende. Bitte wenden Sie sich an den 
Versuchsleiter. Vielen Dank für ihre Teilnahme. 
 
Appendix D3: Instructions used in Experiment 2 
Welcome and encoding phase (shopping task):  
Herzlich Willkommen, liebe Versuchspersonen! In diesem Experiment sollen Sie sich 
vorstellen, dass Sie bei einer Verlosung eine Reihe verschiedenster Preise gewonnen ha-
ben. Da verschiedene Sponsoren an unserer imaginären Tombola teil genommen haben, 
sind die Preise Produkte aus den verschiedensten Geschäften. Sie entstammen verschie-
denen Preisgruppen und sind für verschiedene Zielgruppen interessant. Weiter mit der 
Leertaste. 
Dabei sollen Sie sich Folgendes vorstellen: Sie haben einen Mitspieler, der ebenfalls an 
der Verlosung teilgenommen hat. Stellen Sie sich vor, dass dieser Mitspieler genauso 
viele Preise gewonnen hat wie Sie. Merken Sie sich bitte Folgendes: Ihre Farbe ist ROT 
/ BLAU. Die Farbe Ihres Mitspieler ist BLAU / ROT. Weiter mit der Leertaste. 
Gleich wird Ihnen auf dem Bildschirm nacheinander eine Reihe von Gegenständen prä-
sentiert. Die Hälfte dieser Gegenstände stellen die Preise dar, die Sie gewonnen haben. 
Die andere Hälfte sind die Preise Ihres Mitspielers. Darüber, wer nun genau was be-
kommt, entscheidet einzig und allein das Los. Tauschen ist nicht erlaubt. Zunächst muss 
aber jeder Preis seinem neuen Besitzer zugewiesen werden. Weiter mit der Leertaste. 
Ihre Aufgabe wird nun darin bestehen, die Preise richtig zu SORTIEREN. Dafür benöti-
gen Sie die MAUS. Dazu werden gleich alle Preise einzeln auf dem Bildschirm erschei-
nen. Nach einer Weile wird jedes Bild entweder einen BLAUEN oder einen ROTEN 
Rahmen erhalten – dieser Rahmen zeigt an, welchem Teilnehmer der Preis gehört. Da-
runter werden Sie links und rechts zwei Container sehen, die als Aufschrift „ICH“ oder 
„MITSPIELER“ tragen. Jede dieser Aufschriften ist in der Farbe des jeweiligen Spielers 
geschrieben. Weiter mit der Leertaste. 
Die FARBE des RAHMENS zeigt den BESITZER des jeweiligen Preises an. Die Preise, 
die einen ROTEN / BLAUEN Rahmen erhalten, gehören in Ihren Container. Damit han-
delt es sich um IHRE eigenen Preise. Die Preise, die einen BLAUEN / ROTEN Rahmen 
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erhalten, gehören in den Container  Ihres MITSPIELERS. Damit handelt es sich um die 
Preise des Mitspielers. Weiter mit der Leertaste. 
Wenn Sie sehen, dass einer der Preise einen ROTEN Rahmen erhält, so KLICKEN Sie 
bitte mit dem Mauszeiger in das Kästchen, das Ihren Container darstellen soll. Wenn Sie 
sehen, dass einer der Preise einen BLAUEN Rahmen erhält, so KLICKEN Sie bitte mit 
dem Mauszeiger in das Kästchen, das den Container Ihres MITSPIELERS darstellen soll. 
Weiter mit der Leertaste. 
Gleich geht es los. Wenn Sie noch Fragen haben, wenden Sie sich bitte jetzt an den Ver-
suchsleiter. (Beachten Sie außerdem, dass es sich hier um ein reines Fantasie-Spiel han-
delt. Am Ende des Versuchs werden Sie die angekündigte Entlohnung, aber keinen der 
Ihnen zugelosten Preise erhalten.) Drücken Sie bitte die Leertaste, um mit dem Sortieren 
der Preise zu beginnen. 
Recognition memory and remember/know/guess task: 
Dies war der erste Teil der Untersuchung. Im nächsten Teil des Versuchs geht es darum, 
wie gut Sie sich die Preise aus dem vorangegangenen Teil merken konnten. Dazu benö-
tigen Sie nur die TASTATUR. Dabei spielt es keine Rolle, wer welchen Preis bekommen 
hat. Sie sollen einfach nur angeben, ob Sie einen Gegenstand während dieses Versuchs 
schon einmal gesehen haben oder nicht. Sie haben nun zwei Aufgaben. Weiter mit der 
Leertaste. 
Aufgabe 1: Gleich werden Ihnen nacheinander Bilder verschiedener Gegenstände auf 
dem Bildschirm gezeigt. Einige sind Ihnen während der Sortieraufgabe bereits als Preise 
begegnet. Einige werden neu hinzu kommen. Darunter werden Sie zwei Kästchen sehen, 
die jeweils die Aufschrift „ALT“ oder „NEU“ tragen. Weiter mit der Leertaste. 
Wenn Sie glauben, einen Gegenstand während des Versuchs schon einmal gesehen zu 
haben, gilt er als ALT. Drücken Sie dann bitte die Taste, die dem Feld „ALT“ zugeordnet 
ist. Dabei handelt es sich um die Taste „F“. Wenn Sie glauben, einen Gegenstand während 
des Versuchs nicht gesehen zu haben, gilt er als NEU. Drücken Sie dann bitte die Taste, 
die dem Feld „NEU“ zugeordnet ist. Dabei handelt es sich um die Taste „J“. Weiter mit 
der Leertaste. 
Aufgabe 2: Bei manchen Bildern werden Ihnen wahrscheinlich DETAILS aus der Sor-
tierphase einfallen: z.B. die Farbe des Rahmens, Ihre eigene Reaktion, ein Geräusch au-
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ßerhalb des Labors oder ob dieses Bild im Film eher am Anfang oder am Ende der Auf-
gabe vorkam etc. Das heißt, Sie ERINNERN sich in diesem Fall an das Objekt in der 
Situation. In dem anderen Fall wird Ihnen ein Objekt einfach VERTRAUT vorkommen. 
Sie wissen dann, dass Sie dieses Objekt schon einmal gesehen haben, aber Sie können 
keine weiteren mit dem Objekt verbundenen Details abrufen. Weiter mit der Leertaste. 
Drücken Sie auf dem Zahlenblock auf die "1", wenn Sie sich bewusst an Aspekte der 
Situation ERINNERN, in der das Bild vorkam. Drücken Sie auf dem Zahlenblock auf die 
"2", wenn Ihnen das Objekt einfach nur VERTRAUT vorkommt, d.h., wenn Sie keine 
bewusste Erinnerung an die Lernsituation haben, aber trotzdem wissen, dass das Objekt 
vorkam. Falls Sie bei Ihrer Entscheidung nur GERATEN haben sollten, dann drücken Sie 
auf dem Zahlenblock auf die "3". Mit der Leertaste können Sie die Gedächtnisaufgabe 
nun starten. 
If an „old“ response was selected: 
Sie haben mit "alt" geantwortet. Warum? 
Thank you and goodbye: 
Sie haben es geschafft! Die Untersuchung ist nun zu Ende. Bitte wenden Sie sich an den 
Versuchsleiter. Vielen Dank für ihre Teilnahme. 
 
Appendix D4: Instructions used in Experiment 3 
Welcome and encoding phase (shopping task):  
Herzlich Willkommen, liebe Versuchspersonen! Bei diesem Versuch möchten wir Sie 
bitten, sich eine etwas ungewöhnliche Situation vorzustellen: Und zwar, dass sie bei einer 
besonderen Verlosung eine Reihe von Preisen gewonnen haben. Ein Kunstliebhaber hat 
seine Kollektion aufgelöst und eine Reihe von surrealistischen und abstrakten Bildern 
gehört nun Ihnen. Weiter mit der Leertaste. 
Dabei sollen Sie sich Folgendes vorstellen: Sie haben einen Mitspieler, der ebenfalls an 
der Verlosung teilgenommen hat. Stellen Sie sich vor, dass dieser Mitspieler genauso 
viele Bilder gewonnen hat wie Sie. Merken Sie sich bitte Folgendes: Ihre Farbe ist ROT 
/ BLAU. Die Farbe Ihres Mitspieler ist BLAU / ROT. Weiter mit der Leertaste. 
Gleich wird Ihnen auf dem Bildschirm nacheinander eine Reihe von Bildern präsentiert. 
Die Hälfte dieser Bilder stellen die Preise dar, die Sie gewonnen haben. Die andere Hälfte 
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sind die Preise Ihres Mitspielers. Darüber, wer nun genau was bekommt, entscheidet ein-
zig und allein das Los. Tauschen ist nicht erlaubt. Zunächst muss aber jeder Preis seinem 
neuen Besitzer zugewiesen werden. Weiter mit der Leertaste.  
Ihre Aufgabe wird nun darin bestehen, die Preise richtig zu SORTIEREN. Dafür benöti-
gen Sie die MAUS. Dazu werden gleich alle Bilder einzeln auf dem Bildschirm erschei-
nen. Nach einer Weile wird jedes Bild entweder einen BLAUEN / ROTEN oder einen 
ROTEN / BLAUEN Rahmen erhalten – dieser Rahmen zeigt an, welchem Teilnehmer 
der Preis gehört. Darunter werden Sie links und rechts zwei Container sehen, die als Auf-
schrift „ICH“ oder „MITSPIELER“ tragen. Jede dieser Aufschriften ist in der Farbe des 
jeweiligen Spielers geschrieben. Weiter mit der Leertaste. 
Die FARBE des RAHMENS zeigt den BESITZER des jeweiligen Preises an. Die Preise, 
die einen ROTEN / BLAUEN Rahmen erhalten, gehören in Ihren Container. Damit han-
delt es sich um IHRE eigenen Preise. Die Preise, die einen BLAUEN / ROTEN Rahmen 
erhalten, gehören in den Container  Ihres MITSPIELERS. Damit handelt es sich um die 
Preise des Mitspielers. Weiter mit der Leertaste. 
Wenn Sie sehen, dass einer der Preise einen ROTEN / BLAUEN Rahmen erhält, so KLI-
CKEN Sie bitte mit dem Mauszeiger in das Kästchen, das Ihren Container darstellen soll. 
Wenn Sie sehen, dass einer der Preise einen BLAUEN / ROTEN Rahmen erhält, so KLI-
CKEN Sie bitte mit dem Mauszeiger in das Kästchen, das den Container Ihres MITSPIE-
LERS darstellen soll. Weiter mit der Leertaste. 
Gleich geht es los. Wenn Sie noch Fragen haben, wenden Sie sich bitte jetzt an den Ver-
suchsleiter. (Beachten Sie außerdem, dass es sich hier um ein reines Fantasie-Spiel han-
delt. Am Ende des Versuchs werden Sie die angekündigte Entlohnung, aber keines der 
Ihnen zugelosten Bilder erhalten. Und lassen Sie sich nicht beirren, wenn ihnen einige 
Bilder merkwürdig erscheinen.) Drücken Sie bitte die Leertaste, um mit dem Sortieren 
der Preise zu beginnen.  
Recognition memory and remember/know/guess task: 
Dies war der erste Teil der Untersuchung. Im nächsten Teil des Versuchs geht es darum, 
wie gut Sie sich die Bilder aus dem vorangegangenen Teil merken konnten. Dazu benö-
tigen Sie nur die TASTATUR. Dabei spielt es keine Rolle, wer welches Bild als Preis 
bekommen hat. Sie sollen einfach nur angeben, ob Sie ein Bild während dieses Versuchs 
schon einmal gesehen haben oder nicht. Sie haben nun zwei Aufgaben. Weiter mit der 
Leertaste. 
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Aufgabe 1: Gleich werden Ihnen nacheinander Bilder verschiedener Gegenstände auf 
dem Bildschirm gezeigt. Einige sind Ihnen während der Sortieraufgabe bereits als Preise 
begegnet. Einige werden neu hinzu kommen. Darunter werden Sie zwei Kästchen sehen, 
die jeweils die Aufschrift „ALT“ oder „NEU“ tragen. Weiter mit der Leertaste. 
Wenn Sie glauben, ein Bild während des Versuchs schon einmal gesehen zu haben, gilt 
es als ALT. Drücken Sie dann bitte die Taste, die dem Feld „ALT“ zugeordnet ist. Dabei 
handelt es sich um die Taste „F“. Wenn Sie glauben, ein Bild während des Versuchs nicht 
gesehen zu haben, gilt es als NEU. Drücken Sie dann bitte die Taste, die dem Feld „NEU“ 
zugeordnet ist. Dabei handelt es sich um die Taste „J“. Weiter mit der Leertaste. 
Aufgabe 2: Beurteilen Sie ein Bild als „NEU“, wird sogleich das nächste Bild auf dem 
Bildschirm erscheinen. Beurteilen Sie hingegen ein Bild als „ALT“, so möchten wir Sie 
bitten, eine weitere Unterscheidung vorzunehmen. Weiter mit der Leertaste. 
Bei manchen Bildern werden Ihnen wahrscheinlich DETAILS aus der Sortierphase ein-
fallen: z.B. die Farbe des Rahmens, Ihre eigene Reaktion, ein Geräusch außerhalb des 
Labors oder ob dieses Bild eher am Anfang oder am Ende der Aufgabe vorkam etc. Das 
heißt, Sie ERINNERN sich in diesem Fall an das Objekt in der Situation. In dem anderen 
Fall wird Ihnen ein Objekt einfach VERTRAUT vorkommen. Sie wissen dann, dass Sie 
dieses Objekt schon einmal gesehen haben, aber Sie können keine weiteren mit dem Ob-
jekt verbundenen Details abrufen. Weiter mit der Leertaste. 
Drücken Sie auf dem Zahlenblock auf die "1", wenn Sie sich bewusst an Aspekte der 
Situation ERINNERN, in der das Bild vorkam. Drücken Sie auf dem Zahlenblock auf die 
"2", wenn Ihnen das Objekt einfach nur VERTRAUT vorkommt, d.h., wenn Sie keine 
bewusste Erinnerung an die Lernsituation haben, aber trotzdem wissen, dass das Objekt 
vorkam. Falls Sie bei Ihrer Entscheidung nur GERATEN haben sollten, dann drücken Sie 
auf dem Zahlenblock auf die "3". Mit der Leertaste können Sie die Gedächtnisaufgabe 
nun starten.  
If an „old“ response was selected: 
Sie haben mit "alt" geantwortet. Warum? 
Valence rating task:  
Im letzten Teil der Untersuchung geht es darum, zu beurteilen, wie angenehm (positiv) 
oder unangenehm (negativ) Ihnen die gezeigten Bilder erscheinen. Dazu brauchen Sie die 
Maus. Gleich werden Ihnen nach und nach noch einmal die Bilder gezeigt, die sie aus den 
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vorangehenden Teilen der Untersuchung bereits kennen. Außerdem werden sie auf dem 
Bildschirm eine Skala mit neun Kästchen sehen. Auf den Kästchen sind Figuren mit fröh-
lichem oder traurigem Gesichtsausdruck abgebildet. Ihre Aufgabe wird nun darin beste-
hen, die Bilder anhand dieser Skala zu bewerten. Weiter mit der Leertaste. 
Dabei steht das linke Kästchen mit dem fröhlichen Gesicht für ein sehr positives oder 
angenehmes Bild und das rechte Kästchen mit dem traurigen Gesicht für ein sehr negati-
ves oder unangenehmes Bild. Das mittlere Kästchen mit dem neutralen Gesichtsausdruck 
steht für ein neutrales Bild. Bitte klicken Sie mit der Maus in das Kästchen, das Ihrer 
Meinung nach am besten widergibt, als wie positiv oder negativ sie das gezeigte Bild 
empfinden. Weiter mit der Leertaste. 
Auch die Kästchen zwischen den Figuren sind gültige Wahlmöglichkeiten. Sie sind Zwi-
schenstufen und können genauso wie die Kästchen mit den Figuren angeklickt werden. 
Bitte beachten Sie, dass es bei dieser Aufgabe keine richtigen oder falschen Antworten 
gibt. Es geht allein um Ihre persönliche Einschätzung. Bitte versuchen Sie ihre Entschei-
dung möglichst spontan zu treffen. Wenn Sie keine weiteren Fragen haben, können Sie 
den nächsten Teil des Experiments nun mit der Leertaste starten. 
Thank you and goodbye:  
Sie haben es geschafft! Die Untersuchung ist nun zu Ende. Bitte wenden Sie sich an den 
Versuchsleiter. 
Vielen Dank für ihre Teilnahme. 
 
Appendix D5: Instructions used in Experiment 4 
Welcome and encoding phase (shopping task): 
Herzlich Willkommen, liebe Versuchsperson! In diesem Experiment sollen Sie sich vor-
stellen, dass Sie bei einer Verlosung eine Reihe von Preisen gewonnen haben. Da ver-
schiedene Sponsoren an unserer imaginären Tombola teil genommen haben, sind die 
Preise Produkte aus den verschiedensten Bereichen. Weiter mit der Leertaste. 
Dabei sollen Sie sich Folgendes vorstellen: Sie haben einen Mitspieler, der ebenfalls an 
der Verlosung teilgenommen hat. Dieser Mitspieler hat genau so viele Preise gewonnen 
wie Sie. Merken Sie sich bitte Folgendes: Ihre Farbe ist ROT / BLAU. Die Farbe Ihres 
Mitspieler ist BLAU / ROT. Weiter mit der Leertaste. 
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Zunächst muss jeder Preis seinem neuen Besitzer zugewiesen werden. Gleich wird Ihnen 
auf dem Bildschirm nacheinander eine Reihe von Gegenständen präsentiert. Die Hälfte 
dieser Gegenstände stellen die Preise dar, die Sie gewonnen haben. Die andere Hälfte 
sind die Preise Ihres Mitspielers. Darüber, wer nun genau was bekommt, entscheidet ein-
zig und allein das Los. Weiter mit der Leertaste. 
Ihre Aufgabe wird nun darin bestehen, die Preise richtig zu SORTIEREN. Dafür benöti-
gen Sie die MAUS. Dazu werden gleich alle Preise einzeln auf dem Bildschirm erschei-
nen. Nach einer Weile wird jedes Bild entweder einen BLAUEN oder einen ROTEN 
Rahmen erhalten. Darunter werden Sie links und rechts zwei Container sehen, die die 
Aufschrift „ICH“ oder „MITSPIELER“ in der Farbe des jeweiligen Spielers tragen. Wei-
ter mit der Leertaste. 
Die FARBE des RAHMENS zeigt den BESITZER des jeweiligen Preises an. Die Preise, 
die einen ROTEN / BLAUEN Rahmen erhalten, gehören in Ihren Container. Damit han-
delt es sich um IHRE eigenen Preise. Die Preise, die einen BLAUEN / ROTEN Rahmen 
erhalten, gehören in den Container  Ihres MITSPIELERS. Damit handelt es sich um die 
Preise des Mitspielers. Weiter mit der Leertaste. 
Wenn Sie sehen, dass einer der Preise einen ROTEN / BLAUEN Rahmen erhält, so KLI-
CKEN Sie bitte mit dem Mauszeiger auf Ihren Container. Wenn Sie sehen, dass einer der 
Preise einen BLAUEN / ROTEN Rahmen erhält, so KLICKEN Sie bitte mit dem Maus-
zeiger auf den Container Ihres MITSPIELERS. Weiter mit der Leertaste. 
Gleich geht es los. Wenn Sie noch Fragen haben, wenden Sie sich jetzt an den Versuchs-
leiter. (Beachten Sie außerdem, dass es sich um ein reines Fantasie-Spiel handelt. Am 
Ende des Versuchs werden Sie die angekündigte Entlohnung, aber keinen der Preise er-
halten.) Drücken Sie  die Leertaste, um zu beginnen. 
Semantic matching task:  
Dies war der erste Teil der Untersuchung. Im nächsten Teil des Versuchs geht es darum, 
wie gut Sie Objekten einen Namen zuordnen können. Gleich werden Ihnen nacheinander 
Bilder verschiedener Gegenstände auf dem Bildschirm gezeigt. Unter jedem Bild wird 
ein Wort als Unterschrift stehen, das entweder zum Bild passt oder nicht. Weiter mit der 
Leertaste. 
Auf der TASTATUR sehen Sie zwei Tasten mit Aufklebern. Wenn Sie ein Paar aus einem 
Bild und einem passenden Wort, also einer korrekten Bezeichnung, sehen, so drücken Sie 
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bitte die rechte Taste. Wenn Sie ein Paar aus einem Bild und einem unpassenden Wort, 
also einer falschen Bezeichnung, sehen, so drücken Sie bitte die linke Taste. Weiter mit 
der Leertaste. 
Versuchen Sie bitte, so schnell wie möglich zu antworten, aber gleichzeitig auch Fehler 
zu vermeiden. Platzieren Sie Ihren linken Zeigefinger auf der linken Taste (für "Nein") 
und ihren rechten Zeigefinger auf der rechten Taste (für "Ja") und behalten Sie Ihre Finger 
möglichst die ganze Zeit über dort. Weiter mit der Leertaste. Nach jedem Durchgang 
erhalten Sie eine kurze Rückmeldung. Zunächst gibt es eine kurze Übungsphase, damit 
Sie sich mit der Aufgabe vertraut machen können. Wenn Sie keine Fragen mehr haben, 
können Sie diese mit der Leertaste starten. 
Passt die Beschriftung zum Bild? Halten Sie sich bereit. 
Recognition memory task in addition to semantic matching task:  
Dies war die Übungsphase. Nun folgt der eigentliche Test. An der Zuordnungs-Aufgabe 
und der Tastenbelegung ändert sich nichts. Allerdings kommt nun eine weitere Aufgabe 
hinzu: Einige der Objekte, die Sie als Bilder sehen werden, sind vorhin bereits als Preise 
in der Verlosung aufgeteilt. Wir möchten von Ihnen nach jedem Durchgang wissen, ob 
Sie sich an ein Bild aus der Sortierphase erinnern können. Weiter mit der Leertaste. 
Wenn Sie glauben, dass Sie ein Bild bereits in der Sortierphase gesehen haben, so drücken 
Sie bitte die „Ja“-Taste (rechte Taste). Wenn Sie glauben, dass Sie ein Bild bereits in der 
Sortierphase nicht gesehen haben, so drücken Sie bitte die „Nein“-Taste (linke Taste). 
Wenn Sie sich unsicher sind, raten Sie einfach. Dabei  ist es egal, ob Sie oder der Mit-
spieler einen Preis erhalten haben. Bitte behalten Sie während der Aufgabe die Zeigefin-
ger auf den Tasten und versuchen Sie weiterhin, so schnell und korrekt wie möglich zu 
antworten. Wenn Sie keine Fragen mehr haben, können Sie den Test mit der Leertaste 
starten. 
Passt die Beschriftung zum Bild? Halten Sie sich bereit. 
Kam das Bild schon in der Sortierphase vor? 
After the first block of the matching and recognition memory task: 
Pause... Sobald Sie mit der zweiten Hälfte der Aufgabe fortfahren möchten, drücken Sie 
die Leertaste. 
Thank you and goodbye: 
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Sie haben es geschafft! Die Untersuchung ist nun zu Ende. Bitte wenden Sie sich an den 
Versuchsleiter. Vielen Dank für ihre Teilnahme. 
 
Appendix D6: Instructions used in Experiment 5 
Welcome and encoding phase (shopping task and perceptual or semantic classification 
task): 
Herzlich Willkommen, liebe Versuchspersonen! In diesem Experiment sollen Sie sich 
vorstellen, dass Sie bei einer Verlosung eine Reihe verschiedenster Preise gewonnen ha-
ben. Da verschiedene Sponsoren an unserer imaginären Tombola teil genommen haben, 
sind die Preise Produkte aus verschiedenen Kategorien. Weiter mit der Leertaste. 
Zu jedem der Gegenstände sollen Sie nacheinander zwei verschiedene Aufgaben ausfüh-
ren. Dabei handelt es sich um einfache Kategorisierungen. Für die erste Aufgabe gibt es 
zwei Möglichkeiten. Davon sollen Sie für jeden Gegenstand nur jeweils eine ausführen. 
Um welche Aufgabe es sich handelt, wird Ihnen jedes Mal auf dem Bildschirm angezeigt, 
bevor wir Ihnen einen neuen Gegenstand präsentieren. Weiter mit der Leertaste. 
Die Gegenstände, die Sie gleich sehen, können sich auf zwei Arten voneinander unter-
scheiden. Zum einen können Sie eine unterschiedliche FARBE haben. Ein Teil der Ge-
genstände wird in GRÜN, der andere in LILA dargestellt. Zum anderen können Sie auf 
unterschiedliche Weise entstanden sein. So entstammt ein Teil der Objekte der NATUR, 
während der andere Teile der Objekte KÜNSTLICH hergestellt ist . Zu Beginn jedes 
Durchgangs sollen Sie eine dieser beiden Unterscheidungen treffen. Weiter mit der Leer-
taste. 
Erscheint zu Beginn eines Durchgangs die Frage, „Ist das Objekt grün oder lila?“, so 
sollen Sie genau dies entscheiden, nachdem das Objekt auf dem Bildschirm gezeigt 
wurde. Dazu benötigen Sie die beklebten Tasten auf der linken Seite der TASTATUR. 
Drücken Sie auf die Taste mit dem GRÜNEN Aufkleber (obere Taste), wenn es sich um 
ein grünes Objekt handelt. Drücken Sie auf die Taste mit dem LILA Aufkleber (untere 
Taste), wenn es sich um ein lila  Objekt handelt. Sie können die Taste drücken, sobald 
das Objekt wieder vom  Bildschirm verschwunden ist. Weiter mit der Leertaste. 
Erscheint zu Beginn eines Durchgangs die Frage, „Ist das Objekt natürlich oder künst-
lich?“,  so sollen Sie genau dies entscheiden, nachdem das Objekt auf dem Bildschirm 
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gezeigt wurde. Dazu brauchen Sie die beklebten Tasten auf der rechten Seite der Tastatur. 
Drücken Sie auf die Taste mit der Aufschrift NAT (obere Taste), wenn es sich um ein 
NATÜRLICHES Objekt handelt. Drücken Sie auf die Taste mit der Aufschrift KÜN (un-
tere Taste), wenn es sich um ein KÜNSTLICHES Objekt handelt. Sie können die Taste 
drücken, sobald das Objekt wieder vom Bildschirm verschwunden ist. Weiter mit der 
Leertaste. 
Für die zweite Aufgabe sollen Sie sich Folgendes vorstellen: Sie haben einen Mitspieler, 
der mit Ihnen an unserer Verlosung teilgenommen hat. Stellen Sie sich vor, dass dieser 
Mitspieler genauso viele Preise gewonnen hat wie Sie. Merken Sie sich bitte Folgendes: 
Ihr Symbol ist der KREIS / das QUADRAT. Das Symbol Ihres Mitspieler ist das QUAD-
RAT / der KREIS. Weiter mit der Leertaste. 
Jeder Gegenstand wird Ihnen ein zweites Mal auf dem Bildschirm präsentiert. Die Hälfte 
dieser Gegenstände stellen die Preise dar, die Sie gewonnen haben. Die andere Hälfte 
sind die Preise Ihres Mitspielers. Darüber, wer welche Preise gewinnt, entscheidet einzig 
und allein das Los. Tauschen ist nicht erlaubt. Zunächst muss aber jeder Preis seinem 
neuen Besitzer zugewiesen werden. Weiter mit der Leertaste.  
Ihre zweite Aufgabe wird immer darin bestehen, die Preise richtig zu SORTIEREN. Da-
für benötigen Sie die MAUS. Jeder Preise wird dazu ein zweites Mal auf dem Bildschirm 
erscheinen. Nach einer Weile wird jedes Bild entweder einen KREISFÖRMIGEN oder 
einen QUADRATISCHEN Rahmen erhalten – dieser Rahmen zeigt an, welchem Teil-
nehmer der Preis gehört. Darunter werden Sie links und rechts zwei Container sehen, die 
als Aufschrift „ICH“ oder „MITSPIELER“ tragen. Jeder dieser Container ist mit dem 
Symbol des jeweiligen Spielers versehen. Weiter mit der Leertaste. 
Wenn Sie sehen, dass einer der Preise einen KREISFÖRMIGEN / QUADRATISCHEN 
Rahmen erhält, so handelt es sich um Ihren Preis. KLICKEN Sie bitte mit dem Mauszei-
ger in das Kästchen, das Ihren Container darstellen soll. Wenn Sie sehen, dass einer der 
Preise einen QUADRATISCHEN / KREISFÖRMIGEN Rahmen erhält, so handelt es 
sich um den Preis des Mitspielers. KLICKEN Sie bitte mit dem Mauszeiger in das Käst-
chen, das den Container Ihres MITSPIELERS darstellen soll. Weiter mit der Leertaste. 
Gleich geht es los. Die Kategorisierungsaufgabe (also GRÜN/LILA oder NATÜR-
LICH/KÜNSTLICH) wird sich immer mit der Gewinnspielaufgabe abwechseln. Bitte be-
achten Sie, dass es nicht auf Schnelligkeit ankommt. Lassen Sie sich so viel Zeit, wie Sie 
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brauchen. Wenn Sie noch Fragen haben, wenden Sie sich bitte jetzt an den Versuchsleiter. 
Drücken Sie bitte die Leertaste, um zu beginnen. 
Ist das Objekt natürlich oder künstlich? Halten Sie sich bereit. 
Ist das Objekt grün oder lila? Halten Sie sich bereit. 
Wer bekommt das Objekt? Halten Sie sich bereit. 
Recognition memory and remember/know/guess task: 
Dies war der erste Teil der Untersuchung. Im nächsten Teil des Versuchs geht es darum, 
wie gut Sie sich die Preise aus dem vorangegangenen Teil merken konnten. Dazu benö-
tigen Sie nur die TASTATUR. Dabei spielt es keine Rolle, wer welchen Preis bekommen 
hat. Sie sollen einfach nur angeben, ob Sie einen Gegenstand während dieses Versuchs 
schon einmal gesehen haben oder nicht. Sie haben nun zwei Aufgaben. Weiter mit der 
Leertaste. 
Aufgabe 1: Gleich werden Ihnen nacheinander Bilder verschiedener Gegenstände auf 
dem Bildschirm gezeigt. Einige sind Ihnen während der Sortieraufgabe bereits als Preise 
begegnet. Einige werden neu hinzu kommen. Darunter werden Sie zwei Kästchen sehen, 
die die Aufschrift „ALT“ bzw. „NEU“ tragen. Weiter mit der Leertaste. Wenn Sie glau-
ben, einen Gegenstand während des Versuchs schon einmal gesehen zu haben, gilt er als 
ALT. Drücken Sie dann bitte die Taste, die dem Feld „ALT“ zugeordnet ist. Dabei han-
delt es sich um die Taste „F“. Wenn Sie glauben, einen Gegenstand während des Versuchs 
nicht gesehen zu haben, gilt er als NEU. Drücken Sie dann bitte die Taste, die dem Feld 
„NEU“ zugeordnet ist. Dabei handelt es sich um die Taste „J“. Weiter mit der Leertaste. 
Aufgabe 2: Beurteilen Sie einen Gegenstand als „NEU“, wird sogleich der nächste Ge-
genstand auf dem Bildschirm erscheinen. Beurteilen Sie hingegen einen Gegenstand als 
„ALT“, so möchten wir Sie bitten, eine weitere Unterscheidung vorzunehmen. Weiter mit 
der Leertaste. 
Bei manchen Bildern werden Ihnen wahrscheinlich DETAILS aus der Sortierphase ein-
fallen: z.B. die Farbe des Rahmens, Ihre eigene Reaktion, ein Geräusch außerhalb des 
Labors oder ob dieses Bild im Film eher am Anfang oder am Ende der Aufgabe vorkam 
etc. Das heißt, Sie ERINNERN sich in diesem Fall an das Objekt in der Situation. In dem 
anderen Fall wird Ihnen ein Objekt einfach VERTRAUT vorkommen. Sie wissen dann, 
dass Sie dieses Objekt schon einmal gesehen haben, aber Sie können keine weiteren mit 
dem Objekt verbundenen Details abrufen. Weiter mit der Leertaste. 
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Drücken Sie die Zahlentaste "1", wenn Sie sich bewusst an Aspekte der Situation ERIN-
NERN, in der das Bild vorkam. Drücken Sie die Zahlentaste "2", wenn Ihnen das Objekt 
einfach nur VERTRAUT vorkommt, d.h., wenn Sie keine bewusste Erinnerung an die 
Lernsituation haben, aber trotzdem wissen, dass das Objekt vorkam. Falls Sie bei Ihrer 
Entscheidung nur GERATEN haben sollten, dann drücken Sie die Zahlentaste "3". Mit 
der Leertaste können Sie die Gedächtnisaufgabe jetzt starten. 
If an „old“ response was selected: 
Sie haben mit "alt" geantwortet. Warum? 
Thank you and goodbye:  
Sie haben es geschafft! Die Untersuchung ist nun zu Ende. Bitte wenden Sie sich an den 
Versuchsleiter. Vielen Dank für ihre Teilnahme. 
 
Appendix D7: Instructions used in Experiment 6 
Welcome and encoding phase (shopping task): 
Herzlich Willkommen, liebe Versuchspersonen! In diesem Experiment sollen Sie sich 
vorstellen, dass Sie bei einer Verlosung eine Reihe verschiedenster Preise gewonnen ha-
ben. Da verschiedene Sponsoren  unsere imaginären Tombola unterstützen, sind die 
Preise Gegenstände aus den verschiedensten Bereichen. Weiter mit der Leertaste. 
Dabei sollen Sie sich Folgendes vorstellen: Sie haben einen Mitspieler, der ebenfalls an 
der Verlosung teilgenommen hat. Stellen Sie sich vor, dass dieser Mitspieler genauso 
viele Preise gewonnen hat wie Sie. Merken Sie sich bitte Folgendes: Ihre Farbe ist ROT 
/ BLAU. Die Farbe Ihres Mitspieler ist BLAU / ROT. Weiter mit der Leertaste. 
Gleich wird Ihnen auf dem Bildschirm nacheinander eine Reihe von Gegenständen prä-
sentiert. Ein Drittel der Gegenstände stellt die Preise dar, die Sie gewonnen haben. Ein 
weiteres Drittel der Gegenstände sind die Preise Ihres Mitspielers. Das verbleibende Drit-
tel sind die Preise, die niemand gewonnen hat. Sie werden zurück behalten. Preise, für 
die es keinen Gewinner gibt, haben keine eigene Farbe. Darüber, wer welchen Preis be-
kommt, entscheidet das Los. Tauschen ist nicht erlaubt. Zunächst muss jeder Preis seinem 
neuen Besitzer zugewiesen werden. Weiter mit der Leertaste. 
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Ihre Aufgabe wird nun darin bestehen, die Preise richtig zu SORTIEREN. Dafür benöti-
gen Sie die MAUS. Dazu werden gleich alle   Preise einzeln auf dem Bildschirm erschei-
nen. Nach einer Weile wird jedes Bild entweder einen BLAUEN oder einen ROTEN oder 
einen SCHWARZEM Rahmen erhalten – dieser Rahmen zeigt an, wohin der Preis gehört. 
Darunter werden Sie links und rechts zwei Container sehen, die als Aufschrift „ICH“ oder 
„MITSPIELER“ tragen. Jede dieser Aufschriften ist in der Farbe des jeweiligen Spielers 
geschrieben. In der Mitte befindet sich ein Container mit der Aufschrift "Kein Gewinner" 
in schwarzer Farbe. Weiter mit der Leertaste. 
Die FARBE des RAHMENS zeigt den BESITZER an. Die Preise, die einen ROTEN / 
BLAUEN Rahmen erhalten, gehören in Ihren Container. Damit handelt es sich um IHRE 
eigenen Preise. Die Preise, die einen BLAUEN / ROTEN Rahmen erhalten, gehören in 
den Container  Ihres MITSPIELERS. Damit handelt es sich um die Preise des Mitspielers. 
Die Preise, die einen SCHWARZEN Rahmen erhalten, gehören in den mittleren Contai-
ner mit der schwarzen Aufschrift. Diese Preise hat diesmal niemand gewonnen. Weiter 
mit der Leertaste. 
Wenn Sie sehen, dass einer der Preise einen ROTEN / BLAUEN Rahmen erhält, so KLI-
CKEN Sie bitte mit dem Mauszeiger in das Kästchen, das Ihren Container darstellen soll. 
Wenn Sie sehen, dass einer der Preise einen BLAUEN / ROTEN Rahmen erhält, so KLI-
CKEN Sie bitte mit dem Mauszeiger in das Kästchen, das den Container Ihres MITSPIE-
LERS darstellen soll. Wenn Sie sehen, dass einer der Preise einen SCHWARZEN RAH-
MEN erhält, so KLICKEN Sie bitte mit dem Mauszeiger in das Kästchen, auf dem "Kein 
Gewinner" steht. Weiter mit der Leertaste. 
Gleich geht es los. Wenn Sie noch Fragen haben, wenden Sie sich bitte jetzt an den Ver-
suchsleiter. Drücken Sie bitte die Leertaste, um mit dem Sortieren der Gegenstände zu 
beginnen. 
Recall task:  
Dies war der erste Teil der Untersuchung. Im nächsten Teil des Versuchs geht es darum, 
wie gut Sie sich die Preise aus dem vorangegangenen Teil merken konnten. Dabei spielt 
es keine Rolle, wer welchen Preis bekommen hat. Sie sollen einfach nur wiedergeben, an 
welche Gegenstände aus dem Gewinnspiel Sie sich erinnern. Weiter mit der Leertaste. 
Bitte wenden Sie sich an die Versuchsleiterin. Sie wird Ihnen erklären, wie der Gedächt-
nistest ablaufen wird. Wenn alle Teilnehmer mit dem Sortieren der Gegenstände fertig 
sind, kann es mit dem Gedächtnistest losgehen. 
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Detailed instructions for the recall task were given by the experimenter who asked par-
ticipants to write down whichever items they remembered from the sorting task on a sheet 
of paper, without taking the owner into account, to list items below each other with a new 
row for every single item. The experimenter also informed participants that they had five 
minutes to complete the task, that synonyms were permissible and answered questions 
regarding the task if necessary. 
Valence ratings: 
Im letzten Teil der Untersuchung geht es darum, zu beurteilen, wie angenehm (positiv) 
oder unangenehm (negativ) Sie die gezeigten Objekte finden. Dazu brauchen Sie die 
Maus. Gleich werden Ihnen nach und nach noch einmal Bilder gezeigt, von denen Sie 
einige schon aus vorherigen Teilen der Untersuchung kennen. Außerdem werden Sie auf 
dem Bildschirm eine Skala mit neun Kästchen sehen. Auf den Kästchen sind Figuren mit 
fröhlichem oder traurigem Gesichtsausdruck abgebildet. Ihre Aufgabe wird nun darin be-
stehen, die Bilder anhand dieser Skala zu bewerten. Weiter mit der Leertaste. 
Dabei steht das linke Kästchen mit dem fröhlichen Gesicht für etwas sehr Positives oder 
Angenehmes und das rechte Kästchen mit dem traurigen Gesicht für etwas sehr Negatives 
oder Unangenehmes. Das mittlere Kästchen mit dem neutralen Gesichtsausdruck steht 
für etwas, das Sie als neutral empfinden. Bitte klicken Sie mit der Maus in das Kästchen, 
das Ihrer Meinung nach am besten widergibt, als wie positiv oder negativ sie das gezeigte 
Bild empfinden. Weiter mit der Leertaste. 
Auch die Kästchen zwischen den Figuren sind gültige Wahlmöglichkeiten. Sie stellen 
Zwischenstufen dar und können genauso wie die Kästchen mit den Figuren angeklickt 
werden. Bei dieser Aufgabe gibt es keine richtigen oder falschen Antworten. Es geht al-
lein um Ihre persönliche Einschätzung. Bitte versuchen Sie, Ihre Entscheidung möglichst 
spontan zu treffen. Wenn Sie keine weiteren Fragen haben, können Sie den letzten Teil 
des Versuchs nun mit der Leertaste starten. 
Thank you and goodbye: 
Sie haben es geschafft! Die Untersuchung ist nun zu Ende. Bitte wenden Sie sich an den 
Versuchsleiter. Vielen Dank für Ihre Teilnahme. 
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Appendix D8: Instructions used in Experiment 7 
Welcome: 
Herzlich willkommen! Vielen Dank für deine Bereitschaft, an dieser Untersuchung teil-
zunehmen und damit einen wichtigen Beitrag zur Wissenschaft zu leisten. Wenn du so-
weit bist, drücke bitte die Leertaste, um zu den Instruktionen zu gelangen. 
Perceptual matching task: 
Diese Untersuchung besteht aus zwei Teilen. Im ersten Teil werden dir Kombinationen 
von Begriffen und Formen präsentiert und Du sollst entscheiden, ob die jeweilige Kom-
bination zuvor gelernten Zuordnungen entspricht oder nicht. Zum Fortfahren drücke bitte 
die Leertaste. 
Für den ersten Teil sollst Du zuerst die Zuordnungen lernen. Sobald Du die Leertaste 
drückst, erscheinen die Zuordnungen für 60 Sekunden. Es ist sehr wichtig, dass Du Dir 
die Zuordnung gut einprägst. Bist Du bereit? Dann drücke bitte die Leertaste... 
Ich bin der KREIS / das QUADRAT / das SECHSECK. 
Meine Mutter ist das QUADRAT / das SECHSECK / der KREIS. 
Ein Bekannter ist das SECHSECK / der KREIS / das QUADRAT. 
Im Folgenden werden dir nacheinander mehrere Kombinationen von Begriffen und For-
men präsentiert. Du sollst für jede Kombination entscheiden, ob diese den eben gelernten 
Zuordnungen entspricht oder nicht. Ist die Kombination korrekt, drücke die Taste L ("Ja"; 
lege jetzt Deinen rechten Zeigefinger auf diese Taste). Ist die Kombination falsch, drücke 
die Taste S ("Nein"; lege jetzt Deinen linken Zeigefinger auf diese Taste). Bitte reagiere 
so schnell wie möglich, ohne Fehler zu machen. Mit der Leertaste startest du eine ent-
sprechende Übung... 
Das waren die Übungsdurchgänge... Zusätzlich zu den Formen werden nun verschiedene 
Bilder verschiedener Objekte auf dem Bildschirm erscheinen. Auf diese Objekte selbst 
sollst du nicht reagieren. Da diese Objekte aber an derselben Stelle erscheinen wie die 
Formen, ist es sinnvoll, sie dir anzusehen. Deine Aufgabe bleibt aber gleich: Drücke die 
Taste L für passende Kombinationen und die Taste S für unpassende Kombinationen. 
Bitte arbeite weiterhin so schnell wie möglich, ohne Fehler zu machen. Drücke nun die 
Leertaste, um die nächsten Durchgänge zu starten. 
Recognition memory and remember/know/guess task: 
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Im nächsten Teil des Versuchs geht es darum, wie gut du dir die Bilder aus dem voran-
gegangenen Teil merken konntest. Dabei spielt es keine Rolle, wo du das Bild gesehen 
hast (z.B. im Kreis). Du sollst sollen einfach nur entscheiden, ob du einen Gegenstand 
während dieses Versuchs schon einmal gesehen hast oder nicht. Dazu hast du zwei Auf-
gaben. Die Instruktionen für die beiden Aufgaben startest du mit der Leertaste. 
Aufgabe 1: Gleich werden dir nacheinander Bilder verschiedener Gegenstände auf dem 
Bildschirm gezeigt. Einige sind dir während der Zuordnungsaufgabe bereits begegnet. 
Einige werden neu hinzu kommen. Darunter wirst du zwei Kästchen sehen, die jeweils 
die Aufschrift „ALT“ oder „NEU“ tragen. Weiter mit der Leertaste. 
Wenn du glaubst, einen Gegenstand während des Versuchs schon einmal gesehen zu ha-
ben, gilt er als ALT. Drücke dann bitte die Taste, die dem Feld „ALT“ zugeordnet ist. 
Dabei handelt es sich um die Taste „G“. Wenn du glaubst, einen Gegenstand während 
des Versuchs noch nicht gesehen zu haben, gilt er als NEU. Drücke dann bitte die Taste, 
die dem Feld „NEU“ zugeordnet ist. Dabei handelt es sich um die Taste „J“. Weiter mit 
der Leertaste. 
Aufgabe 2: Beurteilst du einen Gegenstand als „NEU“, wird sofort der nächste Gegen-
stand auf dem Bildschirm erscheinen. Beurteilst du hingegen einen Gegenstand als 
„ALT“, so möchten wir dich bitten, eine weitere Unterscheidung vorzunehmen. Weiter 
mit der Leertaste. 
Bei manchen Bildern werden dir wahrscheinlich DETAILS aus der vorherigen Phase des 
Versuchs einfallen: z.B. die Form, in der das Bild gezeigt wurde, deine eigene Reaktion 
oder ein Geräusch von außerhalb des Labors etc. Das heißt, du ERINNERST dich in die-
sem Fall an das Objekt in der Situation. In anderen Fällen wird dir ein Objekt einfach 
VERTRAUT vorkommen. Du weißt dann, dass du dieses Objekt schon einmal gesehen 
hast, aber du kannst keine weiteren mit dem Objekt verbundenen Details abrufen. Weiter 
mit der Leertaste. 
Drücke auf die Taste "1", wenn du dich bewusst an Aspekte der Situation ERINNERST, 
in der das Bild vorkam. Drücke auf die Taste "2", wenn dir das Objekt einfach nur VER-
TRAUT vorkommt, d.h., wenn du keine bewusste Erinnerung an die Auftretenssituation 
hast, aber trotzdem weißt, dass das Objekt vorkam. Falls du bei deiner Entscheidung ein-
fach nur GERATEN haben solltest, dann drücke auf die Taste "3". Mit der Leertaste star-
test du die Gedächtnisaufgabe. 
If an „old“ response was selected: 
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Du hast mit "alt" geantwortet. Warum? 
Thank you and goodbye: 
Das war´s...Vielen Dank für deine Teilnahme! Bitte melde dich nun bei der Versuchslei-
tung.  
